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ON	SUPPOSING,	IMAGINING,	AND	RESISTING	
	
My	research	focuses	on	the	philosophy	of	imagination.		Within	the	analytic	tradition,	
there	recently	has	been	a	growing	interest	in	imagination.	The	current	research	lies	
at	the	crossroads	of	various	sub-disciplines	of	philosophy,	including	aesthetics,	
moral	psychology,	ethics,	epistemology,	and	philosophy	of	mind.		My	work	joins	this	
choir	as	a	voice	from	within	philosophy	of	mind.			
	
My	dissertation	addresses	two	questions	within	philosophy	of	imagination.	What	I	
call	the	Relation	Question	asks	what	is	the	proper	relation	between	supposition	and	
imagination,	and	what	I	call	the	Unification	Question	asks	what	is	the	imagination.		
With	regards	to	the	Relation	Question,	philosophers	answer	it	in	one	of	two	ways:	
either	supposition	and	imagination	are	distinct	mental	capacities	(what	I	call	two-
nature	views)	or	supposition	is	a	kind	of	imagination	(what	I	call	one-nature	views).		
I	argue	that	both	views	fail	to	explain	all	of	the	features	central	to	the	relation.		With	
regards	to	the	Unification	Question,	many	philosophers	doubt	it	has	an	answer	
because	there	is	no	clear	way	to	unify	the	disparate	activities	of	imagination.		I	argue	
that	this	skepticism	is	the	result	of	mischaracterizing	the	relation	between	
imagining	and	supposing.		Thus,	I	answer	both	the	Relation	and	Unification	Questions	
by	arguing	that	both	imagining	and	supposing	(as	we	typically	understand	these	
terms)	are	both	instances	of	what	I	call	the	as-if-true	attitude.	I	call	this	the	as-if-true	
attitude	view	of	imagining.	The	explanatory	payoff	of	this	is	that	my	view	can	
explain	all	of	the	features	central	to	the	relation	without	positing	two	distinct	
mental	capacities	(as	two-nature	views	do)	and	without	getting	facts	about	
supposition	wrong	(as	one-nature	views	do).		It	also	gives	us	a	way	of	seeing	how	
we	might	unify	the	different	activities	of	imagination.	
	
Finally,	I	demonstrate	that	my	view	has	application	to	what	is	known	in	the	
literature	as	the	phenomenon	of	imaginative	resistance.		This	phenomenon	has	to	
do	with	competent	imaginers	failing	to	comply	with	invitations	to	imagine	certain	
propositions.		It	has	been	noted	in	the	literature	that	there	is	variation	to	this	
phenomenon,	where	some	people	experience	it	and	some	do	not.		Some	
philosophers	attempt	to	explain	this	by	appealing	to	contextual	factors.		Thus,	I	call	
 
them	Contextual	Variant	Views.	I	argue	that	these	views	fail	to	account	for	all	of	
variation.		I	show	that	from	my	as-if-true	attitude	view	comes	another	view	that	I	
call	Constraint	Variant	View.		I	argue	that	this	view	can	account	for	all	of	the	
variation	of	imaginative	resistance.	
	
	
	
KEYWORDS:	Imagination,	Supposition,	Constraints,	As-If-True	Attitude,	Imaginative	
Resistance		
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Dissertation	Overview 
	
What	is	the	imagination?		Answering	this	question	has	proved	difficult	for	
philosophers.		Many	philosophers	consider	the	question	too	difficult	(if	not	
impossible)	to	answer	in	part	due	to	the	challenge	of	unifying	the	many	different	
characterizations	and	activities	of	the	imagination.		For	instance,	there	are	
taxonomic	challenges	with	regards	to	the	different	uses	and	meanings	of	the	term	
(Gendler	2011;	cf.	also	Strawson	1982,	and	Walton	1990).		Similarly,	there	are	
challenges	in	unifying	the	different	explanatory	roles	for	which	we	call	upon	the	
imagination	(Kind	2013).		Because	of	these	challenges,	and	others,	for	ease	of	
reference,	call	this	question	the	Unification	Question.		Related	to	this	question	is	
another	difficult	question,	namely,	the	question	of	the	relation	between	imagination	
and	other	speculative	mental	states	such	as	supposing	and	conceiving.		Call	this	the	
Relation	Question	(from	hereon	I	restrict	this	question	to	only	imagining	and	
supposing).		As	Kind	(2016)	notes,	the	answer	to	the	Relation	Question	depends	
importantly	on	what	the	imagination	is.		
In	this	dissertation,	I	answer	both	the	Unification	Question	and	the	Relation	
Question.		My	argument	focuses	on	answering	the	Relation	Question.		I	develop	and	
defend	a	view	that	all	imagining	is	a	kind	of	supposing.		For	reasons	that	will	become	
clear	below,	I	call	this	view	the	As-If-True	Attitude	view,	or	AIT	view	for	short.	I,	
then,	return	to	the	Unification	question,	and	I	argue	that	this	view	gives	us	an	
answer	to	this	question	as	well.		As	I	argue,	an	answer	to	this	question	has	proven	
difficult	for	philosophers	because	we	have	mischaracterized	the	relation	between	
imagining	and	supposing.		Once	we	rightly	characterize	this	relation,	we	arrive	at	
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the	right	characterization	of	the	imagination	that	unifies	the	different	activities	of	
imagination.	
In	chapter	one	of	this	dissertation,	I	focus	on	existing	answers	to	the	Relation	
Question,	and	I	argue	that	they	all	fail.		First,	I	propose	a	taxonomy	by	which	we	can	
group	existing	answers	to	the	Relation	Question.	Existing	answers	fall	into	one	of	
two	groups.	What	I	call	two-nature	views	hold	that	imagining	and	supposing	are	
distinct	mental	capacities;	and	what	I	call	one-nature	views	hold	that	supposing	is	a	
kind	of	imagining.		Second,	I	delineate	a	set	of	features	which	I	argue	constitutes	an	
explanandum	for	any	answer	to	this	question.	Central	to	the	set	are	two	broad	
differences	between	imagining	and	supposing	and	one	specific	similarity	between	
imagining	and	supposing.		Finally,	I	offer	reasons	why	all	current	views	fail	to	
explain	this	set	of	features	as	a	whole.		In	positing	two	distinct	mental	capacities,	I	
argue	that	two-nature	views	are	uneconomical	and	fail	to	explain	the	similarity	
between	supposing	and	imagining.		In	positing	that	supposing	is	a	kind	of	imagining,	
I	argue	that	one-nature	views	get	facts	about	supposition	wrong	and,	as	a	result,	
they	fail	to	explain	the	differences.		
In	chapter	two	of	this	dissertation,	I	propose	and	defend	a	new	answer	to	the	
Relation	Question.		First,	I	propose	and	develop	a	new	view	of	the	relation	between	
imagination	and	supposition	that	I	call	the	AIT	view.		I	posit	what	I	call	the	as-if-true	
attitude,	and	I	help	myself	to	a	notion	discussed	in	the	literature	referred	to	as	
‘constraints’.		As	we	will	see,	the	constraints	are	different	mental	mechanisms	and	
capacities	that	can	limit	what	can	be	imagined.		I	argue	that	both	imagining	and	
supposing,	as	they	are	often	understood,	are	both	instances	of	the	as-if-true	attitude.		
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What	makes	them	different	are	different	constraints	that	get	placed	on	the	as-if-true	
attitude.	Second,	I	show	how	the	AIT	view	succeeds	where	the	current	views	fail.		
Unlike	two-nature	views,	the	AIT	view	does	not	hold	that	imagining	and	supposing	
are	distinct	mental	capacities.		Because	of	this,	I	show	that	the	view	can	explain	the	
specific	similarity	between	imagining	and	supposing.		Unlike	current	one-nature	
views,	I	do	not	take	supposing	to	be	a	kind	of	imagining.		Because	of	this,	the	AIT	
view	does	not	get	facts	about	supposition	wrong.		As	a	result,	the	AIT	view	can	
explain	the	differences	between	supposing	and	imagining.		Finally,	I	show	how	this	
view	not	only	offers	an	answer	to	the	Relation	Question,	but	that	it	also	offers	an	
answer	to	the	Unification	Question.		
	 In	chapter	three	of	this	dissertation,	I	apply	the	AIT	view	to	what	is	called	the	
phenomenon	of	imaginative	resistance.		This	phenomenon	can	be	characterized	as	
competent	imaginers	failing	to	comply	with	invitations	to	imagine	certain	
propositions.		It	has	been	noted	in	the	literature	that	there	is	variation	to	this	
phenomenon,	where	some	people	experience	it	and	some	do	not.		Some	
philosophers	attempt	to	explain	this	by	appealing	to	contextual	factors.		I	call	those	
views	Contextual	Variant	Views.	I	argue	that	Contextual	Variant	Views	fail	to	account	
for	all	of	variation.		I	show	that	the	AIT	view	draws	our	attention	to	another	view—
what	I	call	Constraint	Variant	View.		I	argue	that	this	view	can	account	for	all	of	the	
variation	of	imaginative	resistance.	
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Supposition	vs.	Imagination	
	
Chapter	One	
	
How	should	we	characterize	the	relation	between	imagination	and	supposition?		
Call	this	the	Relation	Question.		There	are	two	types	of	view	that	attempt	to	answer	
this	question—what	I	will	call	one-nature	views	and	two-nature	views.		Two-nature	
views	hold	that	supposition	and	imagination	are	distinct	mental	capacities.		Current	
one-nature	views	argue	that	supposing	is	somehow	a	kind	of	imagining.1			In	this	
chapter,	I	argue	that	both	types	of	view	fail	to	rightly	characterize	the	relation	for	
different	reasons.		In	Chapter	2,	I	develop	and	defend	a	view	that	avoids	these	
problems	and	thus	succeeds	in	answering	the	Relation	Question.	
	 The	structure	of	this	paper	is	as	follows:	section	1.1	provides	some	necessary	
stage	setting.		In	particular,	I	give	an	overview	of	the	Relation	Question.		I	also	argue	
for	a	set	of	criteria	that	any	view	of	the	relation	must	account	for.		Section	1.2	
discusses	two-nature	views.		I	argue	that	they	fail	to	explain	all	of	the	features	central	
to	the	relation.		Section	1.3	discusses	one-nature	views.	I	argue	that	they	also	fail	to	
explain	all	of	the	features.		
	
§	1.1		Stage	Setting	
	
	 The	reasons	given	in	the	literature	for	why	we	should	make	a	distinction	
between	supposition	and	imagination	seem	to	fall	into	two	broad	categories:	things	
that	we	can	and	cannot	do	with	each	mental	activity,	and	things	that	each	mental	
                                                
1	In	chapter	two,	I	argue	for	a	different	kind	of	one-nature	view,	hence	my	qualification	of	‘current’. 
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activity	does	or	does	not	do	to	us.		In	particular,	we	can	suppose	more	propositional	
contents	than	we	can	imagine,	but	in	our	imaginings	we	can	experience	more	
phenomenal	contents.	Call	this	difference	the	Ability	Difference.			Further,	
imagination	does	more	to	us,	at	least	affectively,	than	supposition.		Imagination	can	
cause	us	to	feel	fear,	anxiety,	joy,	and	so	on.		Supposition	does	not	usually	do	this	to	
us.		Call	this	difference	the	Emotional	Difference	(cf.	also	Arcangeli	2014).	Thus,	we	
can	characterize	the	differences	between	supposition	and	imagination	as	follows:	
	 Ability	Difference:	We	are	able	to	suppose	more	propositional	contents	than		
	 	 	 												we	can	imagine;	however,	in	our	imaginings,	we	are	able		
	 	 	 												to	experience	in	fine-grained	ways	phenomenal	contents.	
	
	 Emotional	Difference:	Supposition	rarely	triggers	affect	and	desire;		
	 	 	 	 						imagination	very	often	triggers	both	affect	and		
	 	 	 	 						desire,	and	can	even	motivate	us	to	action.	
	
	 We	can	see	the	plausibility	of	the	Ability	Difference	through	reflecting	on	
the	fact	that	we	can	suppose	just	about	anything	with	minimal	effort.		For	instance,	
we	can	suppose	that	humans	can	fly	like	superman,	that	there	are	finite	prime	
numbers,	and	that	contradictions	are	true.		However,	we	cannot	imagine	a	
contradiction.		This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	we	cannot	form	an	image	of	a	
contradiction.		Yet,	the	imagination	has	an	ability	that	supposition	lacks.		I	am	
referring	to	the	imagination’s	ability	to	form	images	that	allows	us	to	have	very	
vivid	experiences.		When	we	suppose	contents,	we	do	not	experience	those	contents	
in	any	way.		Related	to	this,	Weatherson	(2004)	suggests	that	supposition	can	be	
more	coarse-grained	in	ways	that	imagination	cannot.	When	I	suppose	for	the	sake	
of	argument,	I	rarely	if	ever	fill	in	details	or	embellish	my	thoughts,	and	so	on.		
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However,	filling	in	details	and	embellishing	is	at	the	core	of	most	imaginative	
activities.		
	 We	can	also	see	the	plausibility	of	the	Ability	Difference	(and	implicitly	the	
Emotional	Difference)	through	reflecting	on	what	has	been	called	the	puzzle	of	
imaginative	resistance.		The	puzzle	arises	from	the	apparent	asymmetry	of	response	
between	imagining	descriptive	errors	and	imagining	what	we	take	to	be	moral	or	
aesthetic	errors.		Moran	(1994)	claims	that	this	puzzle	can	only	arise	with	imagining	
and	not	supposing.2		As	a	result,	he	claims	that	the	puzzle	gives	us	a	reason	to	keep	
supposition	distinct	from	imagination.		Gendler	(2000)	also	uses	this	puzzle	as	a	
way	to	demarcate	imagination	from	supposition.	In	order	to	understand	the	
asymmetry	of	response,	Gendler	has	us	consider	the	following	two	statements:	
(1)	I	am	asked	to	make-believe	that	P	holds	(where	P	is	some	non-moral		
proposition	that	I	do	not	believe	holds).	
(2)	I	am	asked	to	make-believe	that	M	holds	(where	M	is	some	moral		
proposition	that	I	do	not	believe	holds).	
	
If	I	am	asked	to	make-believe	that	Hobbits	live	in	Middle	Earth,	I	have	no	
trouble	complying	with	the	request.		This	is	an	example	of	statement	(1)	above.		
However,	if	I	am	asked	to	make-believe	that	female	infanticide	is	a	good,	I	have	
resistance,	to	some	degree,	in	complying	with	this	request.	This	is	an	example	of	
statement	(2)	above.		The	asymmetry	of	response	between	instances	of	(1)	and	(2)	
is	what	gives	rise	to	the	puzzle	of	imaginative	resistance.		Instances	of	(1)	do	not	
evoke	imaginative	resistance;	where	as,	instances	of	(2)	do	evoke	imaginative	
                                                
2	Moran’s	term	for	‘supposing’	is	hypothetical	reasoning. 
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resistance.			However,	Gendler	argues	that	this	puzzle	disappears	in	the	activity	of	
supposing:	
(3)	I	am	asked	to	suppose	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	P	holds	(where	P	is		
some	non-moral	proposition	that	I	do	not	believe	holds).	
(4)	I	am	asked	to	suppose	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	M	holds	(where	M	is		
some	moral	proposition	that	I	do	not	believe	holds).	
	
When	the	request	is	for	supposition	rather	than	make-belief	(i.e.,	imagining),	
then	we	do	not	experience	the	asymmetry.		With	no	difficulty,	I	can	suppose	for	the	
sake	of	argument	that	Cantor’s	Theorem	is	false.		Likewise,	without	difficulty,	I	can	
suppose	for	the	sake	of	the	argument	that	female	infanticide	is	a	good.		As	a	result,	
supposition	is	immune	to	the	puzzle	of	imaginative	resistance,	whereas	the	
imagination	is	not.		This	is	why	Gendler	concludes	that	imagination	is	distinct	from	
supposition.		In	fact,	many	philosophers	agree	that	imaginative	resistance	illustrates	
one	difference	between	imagining	and	supposing	(cf.,	Doggett	and	Egan	2007,	and	
Balcerak	Jackson	2016)	
	 We	can	see	the	plausibility	of	the	Emotional	Difference	by	reflecting	on	the	
fact	that	our	imaginings	often	move	us	in	very	vivid	and	powerful	ways.		When	we	
imaginatively	engage	novels,	we	can	feel	pity,	hope,	or	indignation	among	other	
affective	states	for	certain	characters	and	their	actions.		Our	supposings	do	not	move	
us	in	the	same	way.	This	can	be	seen	in	Moran’s	(1994)	characterization	of	the	
difference	when	he	contrasts	imaginative	engagement	with	hypothetical	reasoning,	
which	he	takes	to	be	equivalent	to	supposition.		According	to	Moran,	hypothetical	
reasoning	involves	merely	seeing	what	follows	from	the	truth	of	some	proposition,	
whereas	“imagination	with	respect	to	emotional	attitudes	may	require	such	things	
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as	dramatic	rehearsal,	the	right	mood,	the	right	experiences,	a	sympathetic	nature”	
(Moran	1994,	105).		Also,	according	to	Moran,	engaging	imagination	requires	more	
effort	and	a	greater	conceptual	and	experiential	repertoire	than	hypothetical	
reasoning	or	supposition.		When	the	imagination	is	engaged	it	calls	upon	further	
mental,	conative,	and	affective	states.		When	I	imagine	that	p,	often	my	other	mental	
states	such	as	beliefs,	desires,	and	emotions	contribute	in	my	imagining	that	p.		
When	I	suppose	that	p,	I	need	not	engage	other	mental	states	such	as	beliefs,	desires,	
and	emotions.		For	example,	when	I	imagine	that	Romeo	and	Juliet	are	about	to	
commit	suicide,	my	background	beliefs	and	other	imaginings	from	the	story,	along	
with	my	desire	that	they	thrive,	all	contribute	to	how	I	imagine	the	content.		These	
affective	and	conative	states	make	my	imagining	more	vivid	and	salient.		I	do	not	
merely	imagine	the	proposition	as	true	in	order	to	see	what	follows	logically	from	
its	truth,	as	I	would	if	I	were	only	supposing	the	proposition.		Rather,	I	imagine	it	as	
being	true	and	I	imagine	what	it	would	be	like—that	is,	in	my	imagining,	I	am	
carried	along	by	all	sorts	of	desires,	affections,	and	imagery.		
	 Related	to	the	Emotional	Difference,	Doggett	and	Egan	(2007)	acknowledge	
what	can	be	called	the	motivational	difference	between	imagining	and	supposing.		I	
lump	the	motivational	difference	under	the	Emotional	Difference,	primarily	
because	it	is	our	values,	emotions	and	desires,	broadly	construed,	that	are	
responsible	for	our	motivations.		Doggett	and	Egan	attempt	to	explain	how	our	
imagination	can	motivate	us	to	act.		As	they	point	out,	children	are	a	good	source	of	
examples	of	imagination	motivating	action.		“When	they	imagine	that	they	are	cats	
or	elephants	or	cops	or	robbers,	this	can	give	rise	to	all	sorts	of	behavior”	(2).			
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Doggett	and	Egan	point	out	that	the	motivation	to	act	is	missing	when	we	suppose	
that	something	is	the	case.		
Supposing	for	reductio	that	we	are	elephants	does	not	motivate	us	at	all;		
neither	does	supposing	that	we	are	immaterial	souls	or	birds	or.…When	we		
entertain	the	possibility	that	something	is	the	case,	we	aren’t	so	motivated.			
Merely	entertaining	the	possibility	that	John	McCain	will	be	president	in		
2009	does	not	motivate	us	at	all.	Neither	does	entertaining	the	possibility		
that	we	are	cops	or	robbers	or.…(Doggett	and	Egan	2007,	2)	
	
According	to	Doggett	and	Egan,	then,	we	have	one	more	reason	to	demarcate	
supposition	from	imagination.		Supposition	does	not	motivate	us	to	do	anything;	
imagination	very	often	motivates	us	to	act	in	a	variety	of	ways.3				
In	sum,	both	the	Ability	Difference	and	the	Emotional	Difference	give	us	
compelling	reasons	to	think	that	supposition	and	imagination	are	distinct.		As	I	
mentioned	above,	we	can	do	more	with	supposition,	but	the	imagination	does	more	
to	us	(e.g.,	motivates	us	to	action,	moves	us	to	tears,	and	so	on).		As	will	become	
evident	later,	another	way	to	characterize	this	is	that	supposition	is	freer	or	less	
constrained.		In	contrast,	imagination	is	less	free	or	more	constrained.4		Imagining	
often	takes	greater	effort	requiring	a	greater	conceptual	and	experiential	repertoire.		
Imagination	often	brings	about	further	cognitive,	conative,	and	affective	states.		
Supposition	does	not.		Supposition	is	immune	to	the	puzzle	of	imaginative	
resistance;	we	can	suppose	just	about	anything	with	minimal	effort.		But	there	are	
                                                
3	Balcerak	Jackson	(2016)	argues	that	supposition	motivates	us	to	deliberate.		Even	if	this	is	true,	
Doggett	and	Egan’s	point	goes	through	that	our	imaginings	can	motivate	us	in	more	ways	than	
supposition.	 
4	I	will	discuss	what	I	mean	by	‘constraints’	in	chapter	2.		For	now,	I	use	it	an	intuitive	sense	to	refer	
to	the	various	mental	mechanisms	and	capacities	that	restrict	which	contents	can	be	successfully	
imagined.		I	will	give	a	more	detailed	analysis	when	I	develop	my	view. 
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some	things	that	we	cannot	imagine	(logical	contradictions)	or	resist	imagining	
(moral	and	aesthetic	errors),	so	imagining	is	not	immune	to	the	puzzle	of	
imaginative	resistance.		Imagination	motivates	a	variety	of	behavior.		Supposition	
does	not.				
Some	philosophers	think	that	these	differences	favor	two-nature	views	over	
one-nature	views.		However,	before	turning	to	such	views	it	is	worth	considering	
some	significant	similarities	that	might	warrant	one-nature	views	over	two-nature	
views.		
Arcangeli	(2014)	describes	some	of	the	similarities	between	supposition	and	
imagination.		She	argues	that	both	imagination	and	supposition	are	will-dependent	
and	truth-independent.		They	are	both	will-dependent	in	that	successful	
performance	of	each	activity	depends	on	one’s	willingness	to	engage	in	that	activity.		
They	are	both	truth-independent	in	that	we	can	bear	each	attitude	to	any	content	
regardless	of	the	truth-value	of	such	contents.5		According	to	Arcangeli,	these	
features	help	to	contrast	both	supposition	and	imagination	from	belief.		This	is	
because	belief	is	largely	will-independent	meaning	that	you	cannot	just	believe	
anything	at	will,	and	belief	is	truth-dependent	because	it	is	sensitive	to	the	truth-
values	of	its	contents.		Additionally,	supposition	and	imagination	are	both	
responsive	to	the	inference	mechanism.		Essential	to	supposing	is	the	holding	of	
certain	contents	to	be	true	in	order	to	explore	logical	consequences.6		Yet,	in	our	
                                                
5	Although	they	are	similar	in	these	respects,	I	will	argue	below	that	supposition	is	more	will-
dependent	than	imagination	and	that	supposition	is	more	truth	independent	than	imagination. 
6	Though	in	chapter	two,	I	will	argue	that	there	is	a	distinction	between	what	supposition	is	and	what	
we	do	with	supposition.	 
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imaginings,	we	also	make	all	sorts	of	inferences.		This	can	be	seen	when	children	
pretend.		For	instance,	if	a	child	is	pretending	to	have	a	tea	party	and	someone	spills	
one	of	the	tea	cups	onto	a	teddy	bear,	the	child	can	successfully	infer	that	the	tea	cup	
is	now	empty	and	“teddy”	needs	to	be	cleaned.7			
While	these	similarities	are	important	and	should	be	explained	on	any	view	
of	the	relation	between	supposition	and	imagination,	there	is	one	similarity	that	is	
most	pressing	for	any	view	to	explain.		Weinberg	and	Mesin	(2006)	describe	this	
similarity	well:	
It	is	rare	to	confuse	either	supposing	or	imagining	with	believing,	but	it		
seems	fairly	likely	that	we	commonly	confuse	supposing	and	imagining	with		
one	another.		A	supposition	may	slide	into	a	daydream	via	free	association	if		
one	is	not	paying	close	attention,	for	example,	and	it	may	be	impossible	to		
say	where	the	one	activity	leaves	off	and	the	other	commences	(194).		
	
The	observation	seems	to	be	about	vague	boundaries	between	supposing	and	
imagining.		As	an	example	of	this,	consider	Jackson’s	(1982)	famous	thought	
experiment	about	Mary.		In	particular,	consider	teaching	this	thought	experiment	to	
a	freshman	in	an	introduction	to	philosophy	class.		At	first,	you	are	asking	the	
student	to	entertain	certain	propositions	as	if	they	are	true.		Mary	is	a	scientist.	She	
knows	all	of	the	physical	facts	about	color.		Though	she	has	been	confined	to	a	black	
and	white	room	for	her	entire	life,	she	has	normal	color	vision.		By	the	end	of	the	
thought	experiment,	however,	you	do	not	merely	ask	your	student	to	simply	
entertain	certain	propositions	as	if	they	are	true.		This	is	because	when	Mary	is	
                                                
7	I	take	this	example	from	Leslie’s	(1994a)	famous	psychological	experiment	that	aims	to	show	that	
children	can	make	reliable	inferences	within	their	games	of	pretense.		I	will	discuss	this	experiment	
further	below. 
 12 
released	from	her	confinement	and	shown,	for	the	first	time	a	ripe,	red	tomato,	you	
do	not	merely	want	the	student	to	take	this	as	true;	rather,	you	want	her	to	imagine	
the	experience.	The	force	of	the	thought	experiment	comes	from	imagining	what	it	
would	be	like	for	Mary	to	see	red	for	the	first	time.		The	thought-experiment	begins	
with	an	activity	of	supposing	but	clearly	ends	with	a	more	robust	activity	of	
imagining.		Still,	it	is	not	entirely	clear	where	the	one	activity	ends	and	the	other	
begins.		Does	the	robust	activity	of	imagining	begin	only	when	she	is	released	from	
the	black	and	white	room?		Does	it	begin	when	one	is	attempting	to	picture	her	in	
the	black	and	white	room?		Does	it	begin	when	one	attempts	to	imagine	what	it	
would	be	like	to	know	all	of	the	physical	facts	about	color?		Reasons	could	be	given	
to	support	any	of	these	transitional	points.		As	a	result,	it	is	unclear	whether	there	is	
a	specific	transition	from	supposing	to	imagining.		Arguably,	many	thought	
experiments	have	a	structure	like	this,	and	so	provide	us	with	examples	of	confusing	
supposing	with	imagining.		As	Langland-Hassan	(2015)	claims	the	distinction	
between	‘imagining’	and	‘supposing’	does	not	come	from	folk	psychology.		Ordinary	
folk	use	the	terms	interchangeably.8					
Although	there	is	more	than	one	similarity	between	imagining	and	
supposing,	I	think	that	this	particular	similarity	is	of	the	most	concern	for	any	
characterization	of	the	relation.		This	is	because	the	other	similarities	do	not	
necessarily	point	to	a	particular	characterization	of	the	relation	between	supposing	
                                                
8	Interestingly,	at	the	2016	SSPP	Annual	Conference,	Michael	Stuart	presented	results	from	a	series	of	
experiments	that	tried	to	disambiguate	supposition	from	imagination	among	ordinary	folk.		Results	
were	mixed,	even	after	being	primed	about	the	differences	between	supposing	and	imagining,	it	
seemed	that	the	participants	had	a	hard	time	not	simply	using	‘supposition’	and	‘imagination’	as	
interchangeable	terms	referring	to	roughly	the	same	activity.	 
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and	imagining;	however,	the	fact	that	we	could	confuse	supposing	with	imagining	
does	point	to	a	particular	characterization	of	the	relation.		For	ease	of	reference,	
then,	I	will	name	this	feature:	
	 Similarity:	Given	that	there	are	vague	boundaries	between	supposition	and		
	 	 									imagination,	it	is	possible	to	confuse	one	with	the	other.	
	
	 The	Ability	Difference,	the	Emotional	Difference,	and	Similarity	together	
constitute	a	set	of	features	that	any	view	of	the	relation	between	supposition	and	
imagination	must	explain.		Despite	this,	both	current	one-nature	views	and	two-
nature	views	fail	to	account	for	at	least	one	of	them.		In	the	rest	of	this	chapter,	I	
support	this	claim.		In	section	1.2,	I	will	characterize	two-nature	views	and	
demonstrate	how	they	fail	to	explain	Similarity.		In	section	1.3,	I	will	characterize	
one-nature	views	and	demonstrate	how	they	fail	to	explain	both	the	Ability	
Difference	and	the	Emotional	Difference.							
 
 
§	1.2	Two-Nature	Views	
	
	 Two-nature	views	draw	on	the	Ability	Difference	and	the	Emotional	
Difference	in	arguing	that	supposition	and	imagination	are	two	distinct	mental	
capacities.		Moran	(1994),	Gendler	(2002),	and	Kind	(2013)	can	all	be	read	as	
endorsing	something	like	a	two-nature	view,	though	none	of	them	develop	it	
explicitly	as	such.		Recently,	however,	Balcerak	Jackson	(2016)	has	explicitly	argued	
for	such	a	position.		Balcerak	Jackson	discusses	what	she	calls	the	common	nature	
thesis.		According	to	this	thesis,	imagining,	supposing,	and	conceiving	are	all	
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instances	of	the	same	basic	cognitive	capacity.9		This	gives	us	a	simple	way	of	
characterizing	two-nature	views.		A	view	about	the	relation	of	supposing	and	
imagining	is	two-nature	just	in	case	it	rejects	the	common	nature	thesis—that	is,	it	
rejects	that	imagining	and	supposing	are	both	instances	of	the	same	basic	cognitive	
capacity.		According	to	this	view,	then,	imagining	and	supposing	are	the	result	of	
distinct	mental	capacities.			 	
	 We	can	distinguish	mental	capacities	by	appealing	to	the	distinct	nature	of	
each	capacity.		Consider	two	paradigmatically	distinct	mental	capacities:	belief	and	
desire.		The	nature	of	belief	is	distinct	from	the	nature	of	desire	due	to	different	
directions	of	fit	to	reality	as	well	as	different	functional	roles	in	behavior.		As	has	
been	rehearsed	often,	belief	aims	at	the	truth—it	has	a	mind	to	world	direction	of	
fit;	in	contrast,	desire	aims	at	satisfaction—it	has	a	mind	to	world	direction	of	fit	(cf.	
Humberstone,	1992).		And	the	functional	role	of	belief	is	to	provide	the	information	
that	satisfies	desire.		My	desire	for	food	and	my	belief	that	there	is	food	in	the	pantry	
together	explain	my	behavior	of	walking	to	the	pantry	and	getting	food.	Thus,	belief	
is	a	mental	capacity	that	is	distinct	from	the	mental	capacity	of	desire,	and	so	on.	
Two-nature	views	such	as	Balcerak	Jacksons’	are	committed	to	something	similar	
about	imagining	and	supposing.		According	to	Balcerak	Jackson,	the	differences	
between	supposition	and	imagination	are	sufficient	to	establish	that	supposition	
and	imagination	have	different	natures	and	so	belong	to	distinct	mental	capacities.			
The	problem,	as	I	already	indicated,	is	that	two-nature	views	cannot	explain	all	of	
                                                
9 Though she includes conceiving, I will drop it from this discussion.   
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the	features	that	characterizes	the	relation	between	supposition	and	imagination.		I	
will	show	this	next.	
1.2.1	Against	Two-Nature	Views	
	 	
	 My	case	against	two-nature	views	is	two-fold:	first,	such	views	are	
uneconomical,	and,	second,	such	views	fail	to	explain	Similarity.		
	 The	first	concern	relies	on	an	intuition	almost	as	old	as	philosophy	itself.			For	
any	two	competing	hypotheses	or	theories,	we	should	prefer	the	simplest.		This	is	
sometimes	referred	to	as	“Ockham’s	Razor”	or	the	law	of	parsimony.		Employing	
such	a	principle,	it	is	unnecessary	to	posit	two	distinct	mental	capacities	in	order	to	
explain	features	that	one	mental	capacity	can	explain.		As	a	result,	if	we	can	explain	
the	set	of	features	central	to	the	relation	between	imagining	and	supposing	without	
positing	that	each	is	a	distinct	mental	capacity,	then	we	should	avoid	positing	that	
each	is	a	distinct	mental	capacity.			
	 The	second	concern	is	that	two-nature	views	fail	to	explain	Similarity.		In	
order	to	see	this,	consider	two	paradigmatic	distinct	mental	capacities:	belief	and	
fictional	imagining.		It	is	very	rare	to	confuse	one	of	these	mental	capacities	with	the	
other.		Even	in	small	children	who	are	still	developing	cognitively,	it	is	rare	that	they	
confuse	belief	with	pretense	(cf.	Gendler	2003)10.		Gendler	(2003)	draws	out	a	
principle	from	this	fact	that	she	calls	the	quarantining	principle.		This	principle	
states	that	things	do	not	come	to	be	believed	merely	because	they	are	pretended.		A	
                                                
10	Though	Gendler	uses	‘pretense’	in	this	article	she	does	not	distinguish	it	from	imagining.		Some	
philosophers	want	to	keep	the	terms	distinct	reserving	‘pretense’	for	overt	behavior	and	‘imagining’	
for	the	mental	act.		Gendler	does	not	think	that	the	distinction	makes	a	difference	to	her	points	about	
quarantining. 
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child	who	pretends	that	a	banana	is	a	telephone	will	not,	in	normal	circumstances,	
come	to	believe	that	the	banana	is	a	telephone.		Such	quarantining	happens	
automatically,	and	it	gives	us	a	principled	way	of	being	sure	that	there	is	a	difference	
between	belief	and	pretense.11			
	 Arguably,	this	sort	of	quarantining	happens	often	between	the	many	mental	
capacities	that	we	take	as	paradigmatically	distinct.		Simply	because	we	desire	that	p	
be	the	case,	it	does	not	follow	that	we	come	to	believe	that	p	is	the	case	or	that	p	will	
be	the	case.		Because	of	this,	it	is	plausible	to	think	that	distinct	mental	capacities	
operate	according	to	some	kind	of	quarantining	principle	and	that	this	accounts	for	
the	fact	that	we	rarely	confuse	them.		One	could	say	that	the	quarantining	prevents	
vague	boundaries.12		The	problem	that	the	existence	of	such	a	principle	raises	for	
two-nature	views	is	clear:	if	supposition	and	imagination	are	distinct	mental	
capacities,	then	there	ought	to	be	some	sort	of	quarantining	principle	applicable	to	
them	and,	given	this,	we	ought	to	expect	to	rarely	confuse	supposing	with	imagining.		
But	of	course,	we	can	and	do	confuse	supposing	with	imagining	as	Similarity	
observes.		Thus,	two-nature	views	of	supposition	and	imagination	cannot	explain	
Similarity.		Given	that	two-nature	views	posit	that	supposing	and	imagining	are	
distinct	mental	capacities,	such	views	predict	that	we	should	rarely	confuse	
                                                
11	There	seems	to	be	much	empirical	support	for	this.		For	a	recent	discussion,	see	Van	Leeuwen	
(2014). 
12	Gendler	also	discusses	examples	of	contagion	between	belief	and	imaginings,	which	might	be	a	
problem	for	trying	to	use	quarantining	as	a	way	to	avoid	vague	boundaries.		However,	I	agree	with	
Van	Leeuwen	who	states	that	contagion	shows	simply	that	the	cognitive	attitudes	are	permeable,	not	
that	there	are	no	boundaries	(cf.	Van	Leeuwen	2014). 
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supposings	and	imaginings.		Yet	such	predictions	conflict	with	the	data,	namely,	that	
we	often	confuse	one	for	the	other.			
	 Another	argument	that	counts	against	two-nature	views	relies	on	what	Van	
Leeuwen	(2014a)	calls	cognitive	governance.		Simply	put,	cognitive	governance	
refers	to	the	informational	background	that	supplies	and	governs	new	inferences	
among	cognitive	attitudes.		For	instance,	often	we	make	inferences	while	engaging	
in	imaginative	activities.		When	reading	The	Lion,	the	Witch	and	the	Wardrobe,	we	
might	make	the	inference	that	Lucy	Pevensie	has	a	heart	that	pumps	blood.		
Although	this	is	never	explicitly	told	to	us	in	the	story,	it	is	rather	clear	that	she	is	a	
human	both	in	and	out	of	Narnia.		And	we	know	that	humans	have	hearts	that	pump	
blood.		In	this	case,	our	beliefs	about	humans	cognitively	govern	our	imaginings	of	
the	story,	allowing	us	to	infer	further	imaginings.		Belief	cognitively	governs	other	
cognitive	attitudes	such	as	imaginings,	supposing,	acceptances,	and	so	on.			
	 However,	those	attitudes	do	not	cognitively	govern	belief.		In	order	to	see	
this,	consider	an	example	from	Van	Leeuwen	that	shows	the	way	belief	cognitively	
governs	imagining:	
	 INITIAL	IMAGINING:	Michelangelo’s	David	falls	off	a	boat	into	the	water.	
	 FACTUAL	BELIEFS:	Michelangelo’s	David	is	marble.		Marble	sinks	in	water.	
	 INFERRED	IMAGINING:	Michelangelo’s	David	is	sinking	in	the	water.	
	
In	this	example,	some	of	our	factual	beliefs	supply	information	that	governs	a	new	
inference	in	our	imagining.		To	show	that	imagining	cannot	do	this	for	belief,	Van	
Leeuwen	changes	the	example	as	follows:	
	 INITIAL	FACTUAL	BELIEFS:	Michelangelo’s	David	is	marble.		Marble	sinks	in		
	 	 	 	 	 water.	
	 IMAGINING:	Michelangelo’s	David	falls	off	a	boat	into	the	water.	
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	 FACTUAL	BELIEF:	Michelangelo’s	David	is	sinking	in	the	water.	(2014,	702-	
	 	 	 									703)	
	
As	this	example	illustrates,	if	our	imaginings	cognitively	governed	our	beliefs,	then	
we	would	form	absurd	belief	states,	such	as	Michelangelo’s	David	is	both	sinking	in	
the	water	and	in	a	museum	in	Florence,	Italy.		This	obviously	does	not	happen.		
Imaginings	do	not	give	us	new	beliefs	the	way	that	beliefs	can,	and	do,	give	us	new	
imaginings.	Thus,	cognitive	governance	gives	us	another	plausible	way	of	
distinguishing	paradigmatically	distinct	cognitive	attitudes.		Cognitive	governance	
would	indicate	that	belief	and	imagining	have	different	natures.	
	 Additionally,	as	Van	Leeuwen	points	out,	it	is	important	to	see	that	specific	
attitudes	can	be	cognitively	self-governing.		Thus,	imaginings	coupled	with	other	
imaginings	can	allow	us	to	infer	further	imaginings.	The	same	can	be	said	for	
supposings.		However,	beliefs	differ	in	that	they	are	characterized	by	having	
cognitive	governance	in	general.		Beliefs	do	to	other	attitudes	what	those	attitudes	
cannot	do	to	belief.		Van	Leeuwen	suggests	that	this	shows	an	anti-symmetric	
relation	between	beliefs	and	imaginings	(2014,	703).		In	so	far	as	we	could	modify	
Van	Leeuwen’s	example	to	contrast	supposition	with	belief,	it	is	plausible	to	hold	
that	supposings	also	have	this	anti-symmetric	relation	with	beliefs.	Similar	to	
Gendler’s	quarantining,	cognitive	governance	supports	our	pre-theoretical	idea	that	
belief	is	paradigmatically	distinct	from	imagining.		Also,	just	as	we	do	not	find	a	
quarantining	principle	between	supposing	and	imagining,	supposing	and	imagining	
do	not	cognitively	govern	one	another.		Both	Gendler’s	quarantining	and	Van	
Leewuen’s	cognitive	governance	put	pressure	on	the	idea	that	imagining	is	a	
cognitive	capacity	distinct	from	supposing.	
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1.2.2	An	Objection	and	Reply	
	 	
	 At	this	point,	a	two-nature	theorist	could	argue	that	Similarity	is	not	a	
problem	for	two-nature	views.		After	all,	it	is	an	empirical	fact	that,	under	certain	
conditions,	we	can	confuse	distinct	mental	states.		We	could	confuse	some	
imaginings	with	perceptions	as	well	as	episodic	memories.13		These	facts	should	not,	
and	do	not,	motivate	us	to	develop	a	theory	according	to	which	perception,	
imagining,	and	memories	belong	to	the	same	basic	cognitive	capacity.					
	 My	reply	is	that	not	all	confusions	fall	under	Similarity.		Yes,	there	is	
empirical	support	that	under	some	conditions,	we	struggle	to	differentiate	between	
different	mental	states.		The	problem	is	what	must	those	conditions	be	in	order	to	
count	as	an	example	of	Similarity.		Consider	the	Perky	experiment	(Perky	1910),	in	
which	subjects	take	themselves	to	be	visualizing	an	object	that	they	are	actually	
perceiving.		This	experiment	arguably	shows	that,	under	the	right	conditions,	we	can	
confuse	perception	with	imagery.		However,	these	conditions	are	not	ordinary	
conditions;	rather,	they	are	highly	controlled,	laboratory	conditions.		As	Peter	
Langland-Hassan	has	argued,	“given	the	great	lengths	one	must	go	in	order	to	make	
someone	confuse	the	two”,	it	seems	to	follow	that	it	is	very	rare	to	confuse	
imagining	with	perceiving	(Langland-Hassan	2015,	670).14	And	this	shows	that	such	
confusions	would	actually	be	rare;	whereas,	the	confusion	of	Similarity	is	not	rare.	
                                                
13	Thanks	to	Magdalena	Balcerak	Jackson	for	pushing	me	on	this.	 
14 Arguably,	a	similar	thing	can	be	said	concerning	cases	known	as	“false	memories”	(Cf.	Debus	
2016).		Plausibly,	in	such	cases,	subjects	mistake	a	vivid	imagining	about	a	past	event	as	an	episodic	
memory	of	the	same	event.		Again	the	conditions	have	to	be	very	specific	(repeated	questions	about	
the	event,	claims	of	authoritative	reports	from	one’s	parents)	in	order	for	the	subject	to	“accept”	it	as	
a	memory.		
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	 I	would	argue	that	Similarity	does	not	require	special	conditions	in	order	for	
it	to	be	true.		In	the	most	mundane	of	conditions,	it	seems	that	we	can	begin	a	
supposing	and	slide	into	a	more	robust	imagining	unwittingly.		These	considerations	
provide	for	the	following	argument:	
1. In	the	most	mundane	of	conditions,	it	is	rare	to	confuse	distinct	mental	
states/capacities.	
2. In	the	most	mundane	of	conditions,	it	is	not	rare	to	confuse	supposing	with	
imagining.	
3. Therefore,	supposing	and	imagining	are	not	distinct	mental	states.	
	
Premise	1	is	more	plausible	than	its	denial	given	the	experiment-like	conditions	one	
needs	in	order	to	confuse	distinct	mental	states.		Premise	2	is	more	plausible	than	
its	denial	given	Similarity,	and	our	Mary	thought-experiment	example.		Thus	the	
objection	from	the	two-nature	theorist—that	confusing	mental	states	is	common	
and	so	does	not	pose	a	threat	to	her	view—does	not	go	through.	
	 Yet,	even	if	it	is	true	that	in	normal	conditions	we	can	confuse	imagining	with	
perception	or	episodic	memory,	one	plausible	explanation	for	this	is	that	they	share	
the	same	mental	imagery,	and	thus	they	are	all	phenomenally	similar.		On	some	
views	(Nanay	2015,	2016),	perception	and	mental	imagery	can	share	the	same	
content.	The	phenomenal	similarity	between	perception	and	mental	imagery	is	
based	on	that	sameness	of	content.		If	an	episodic	memory	state	and	an	imagined	
state	share	the	same	mental	imagery,	it	does	not	seem	too	controversial	that	we	
could	mistake	one	for	the	other.		
	 However,	as	plausible	as	this	explanation	of	the	confusion	of	distinct	mental	
states	might	be,	it	does	not	explain	why	we	can	confuse	supposing	with	imagining.		
This	is	because,	arguably,	supposing	and	imagining	do	not	share	mental	imagery.		
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That	is,	imagery	is	not	constitutive	of	supposition.		Thus,	normal	conditions	or	not,	
the	confusing	of	imagination,	perception,	and	episodic	memory	does	not	fall	under	
Similarity.		
		 It	follows,	then,	that	two-nature	views	fail	to	explain	Similarity.		In	fact,	such	
views	imply	that	Similarity	is	false.		As	I	have	argued,	this	is	primarily	because	they	
posit	distinct	cognitive	capacities	for	supposing	and	imagining.		As	I	have	suggested,	
this	in	turn	makes	two-nature	views	less	economical	than	one-nature	views,	but	
current	one-nature	views	have	their	own	set	of	problems.		
	
 
§	1.3	One-Nature	Views	
	
	 One-nature	views	draw	on	the	similarity	between	supposition	and	
imagination	in	arguing	that	imagining	and	supposing	are	both	instances	of	the	same	
cognitive	capacity.		We	can	again	appeal	to	Balcerak	Jackson’s	common	nature	thesis	
is	order	to	give	a	simple	characterization	of	one-nature	views.		A	view	about	the	
relation	between	supposing	and	imagining	is	one-nature	just	in	case	it	endorses	the	
common	nature	thesis.		Though	there	are	no	one-nature	views	that	explicitly	argue	
for	the	common	nature	thesis,	it	is	plausible	to	take	one-nature	views	as	implicitly	
endorsing	something	like	it.		All	current	one-nature	views	argue	that	supposition	is	
a	kind	of	imagination.		However,	their	proponents	disagree	as	to	what	kind	of	
imagining	supposition	is.		Currie	and	Ravenscroft	(2002)	and	Weinberg	and	Meskin	
(2006)	hold	that	supposition	is	a	belief-like	imagining.		Arcangeli	(2014)	holds	that	
supposition	is	more	like	the	mental	state	of	acceptance	than	it	is	like	belief.				
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	 In	what	remains	in	this	section,	I	will	do	two	things.	First,	I	will	summarize	
the	different	one-nature	views.		Second,	I	will	summarize	an	argument	that	
Arcangeli	(2014)	raises	against	Currie	and	Ravenscroft,	and	Weinberg	and	Meskin.		I	
do	this	in	order	to	show	that	her	argument	generalizes	such	that	it	is	a	problem	for	
all	current	one-nature	views,	including	Arcangeli’s	own	view.		In	general,	I	argue	
taking	supposition	as	a	kind	of	imagining	gets	facts	about	supposition	wrong.		
Because	of	this,	such	views	fail	to	explain	both	the	Ability	Difference	and	
Emotional	Difference.				
1.3.1	Currie	and	Ravenscroft	
	
Currie	and	Ravenscroft	(2002)	develop	and	defend	a	simulationist	account	of	
the	imagination.		They	focus	their	account	of	the	imagination	on	what	they	call	
recreative	imagination,	or:	
…the	capacity	to	put	ourselves	in	the	place	of	another,	or	in	the	place	of	our	
own	future,	past,	or	counterfactual	self:	seeing,	thinking	about,	and	
responding	to	the	world	as	the	other	sees,	thinks	about,	and	responds	to	it	
(2002,	8-9).	
	
This	capacity	is	also	referred	to	as	imaginative	projection,	and	involves,	in	
particular,	projecting	ourselves	into	“states	that	are	not	perceptions	or	beliefs	or	
decisions,	or	experiences	of	movements	of	one’s	body,	but	which	are	in	various	ways	
like	those	states”	(2002,	8-9).	These	are	the	states	of	recreative	imagination.		
Recreative	states	mimic	or	simulate	their	counterpart	states.		For	instance,	
perception	is	a	mental	state;	thus,	its	recreative	state	is	called	perception-like	
imagining.		If	the	latter	involves	visual	imagery,	it	mirrors	vision	in	the	former.		
According	to	Currie	and	Ravenscroft,	for	any	mental	state,	there	is	a	recreative	state	
 23 
that	mimics	it.		There	are	beliefs	and	there	are	belief-like	imaginings.		There	are	
desires,	and	there	are	desire-like	imaginings.		Belief-like	imaginings	mirror	the	
inferential	role	that	belief	plays.		Desire-like	imaginings	mirror	our	real	desires	and	
affections.		Currie	and	Ravenscroft	postulate	desire-like	imaginings	to	explain	the	
conative	and	affective	consequences	of	our	imaginative	activities.		For	instance,	
when	we	find	ourselves	wanting	Harry	Potter	to	defeat	Lord	Voldemort,	this	desire	
is	not	a	real	desire.	For	Currie	and	Ravenscroft,	it	is	a	desire-like	imagining.		For	
them	supposition	is	belief-like	imagining	that	is	isolated	from,	or	not	affected	much	
by,	desire-like	imagining	(2002,	35).	
In	light	of	this,	we	can	see	how	Currie	and	Ravenscroft,	at	least	implicitly,	
endorse	the	common	nature	thesis,	and	so	can	be	viewed	as	holding	to	a	one-nature	
view.		According	to	them,	there	is	one	capacity	for	recreative	imagining.		From	this	
one	capacity	comes	of	all	of	the	recreative	states—including	supposition,	or	mere	
belief-like	imagining.		It	is	clear	that	for	them,	supposition	is	not	its	own	cognitive	
capacity	separate	and	distinct	from	imagination;	rather	it	just	is	a	certain	kind	of	
imagining.	
1.3.2	Weinberg	and	Meskin	
	
The	next	one-nature	view	comes	from	Weinberg	and	Meskin	(2006).		
Weinberg	and	Meskin	attempt	to	develop	an	account	that	distinguishes	imagining	
and	supposing	in	light	of	our	cognitive	architecture.		Before	setting	out	the	details	of	
their	account,	I	will	need	to	say	more	about	cognitive	architecture	in	general.		
Theories	that	invoke	the	notion	of	cognitive	architecture	are	those	that	attempt	to	
map	out	the	formal	structure	of	the	mind	at	the	functional	level.		‘Functional’	refers	
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to	the	input-output	relations	between	certain	mental	states—such	as	belief	and	
desire—and	other	mental	mechanisms—such	as	inference	mechanisms	and	the	
decision-making	system.		Originally,	theories	of	cognitive	architecture	posited	two	
representational	states:	belief	and	desire	(cf.	Nichols	and	Stich	2003).		Often	
theorists	refer	to	belief	and	desire	as	“boxes”,	indicating	that	each	are	functionally	
distinct	pieces	of	our	cognitive	architecture.		The	belief	box	contains	representations	
that	play	the	functional	role	of	belief.		The	desire	box	contains	representations	that	
play	the	functional	role	of	desire.		In	order	to	see	how	this	is	meant	to	work,	
consider	the	following	example.		Suppose	you	perceive	the	event	of	my	returning	
from	the	fridge	with	a	beer.		According	to	the	cognitive	architecture	account,	this	
action	or	event	can	be	explained	by	positing	that	my	belief	box	contains	at	least	the	
representation	‘there	is	beer	in	the	fridge’,	and	my	desire	box	contains	the	
representation	‘I	want	a	beer’.		These	representations	causally	interact	with	other	
relevant	components	such	as	the	action-generating	mechanism	in	order	to	usher	in	
my	behavior—namely,	my	going	to	the	fridge	and	retrieving	a	beer.		Although	many	
think	that	this	theory	is	still	incomplete,	it	has	been	widely	adopted	among	cognitive	
scientists	and	philosophers	(cf.	Nichols	and	Stich	2003).	
One	of	the	reasons	it	is	incomplete	is	that	it	is	not	clear	how	imagination	fits	
in.		Nichols	and	Stich	(2003)	were	the	first	to	attempt	to	remedy	this	gap	by	
developing	a	cognitive	architecture	account	of	the	imagination.		Weinberg	and	
Meskin	base	much	of	their	account	on	Nichols	and	Stich’s	account.		Hence,	following	
Nichols	and	Stich,	Weinberg	and	Meskin	talk	of	both	a	belief	box	(BB	from	hereon)	
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and	an	imagination	box	(IB	from	hereon).15		Weinberg	and	Meskin,	then,	describe	
five	mechanisms	that	interact	with	both	the	IB	and	the	BB:	(1)	the	affect	systems,	(2)	
the	monitoring	systems,	(3)	the	inferential	mechanisms,	(4)	the	Updater,	and	(5)	
various	domain-specific	processes—e.g.,	folk	morality	mechanism,	folk	biology	
mechanism,	folk	psychology	mechanism,	and	so	on.		Following	this,	they	describe	
two	mechanisms	that	work	exclusively	with	the	IB:	(6)	the	Inputter	and	(7)	the	
Script	Elaborator.		It	is	not	necessary	to	discuss	each	of	these	in	order	to	understand	
their	view.		But	to	see,	in	general,	how	Weinberg	and	Meskin’s	cognitive	architecture	
view	works,	consider	both	the	affect	system	(1)	and	the	inferential	mechanism	(3).		
Consider	the	affect	system,	first.		The	affect	system	underwrites	the	whole	
range	of	our	affective	states	and	emotions.		It	is	uncontroversial	to	see	that	the	BB	
can	interact	with	our	affect	systems	causing	emotions	within	us.			Many	beliefs	can	
move	us	emotionally.		My	belief	that	my	son	is	hurt	will	cause	me,	for	example,	to	
have	pity	on	his	pain.		In	the	same	way,	then,	the	IB	interacts	with	the	affect	systems	
causing	emotions	to	arise	within	us.		My	imagining	that	a	fictional	character	is	
suffering	will	cause	me	to	have	pity	on	such	a	character.			
	 Now,	consider	the	inference	mechanism.		The	inference	mechanism	also	
interacts	with	both	the	BB	and	the	IB.		If	we	have	the	belief	that	p	and	the	belief	that	
if	p,	then	q,	then	the	inference	mechanism	would	give	as	an	output	of	the	belief	that	
q.		Likewise,	if	we	have	an	imagining	that	p	and	an	imagining	that	if	p,	then	q,	then	
the	inference	mechanism	will	give	as	an	output	the	imagining	that	q.		One	of	the	
most	cited	examples	that	illustrates	how	the	inference	mechanism	interacts	with	
                                                
15	Nichols	and	Stich	refer	to	the	IB	as	the	‘Possible	Worlds	Box’	or	PWB. 
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imagination	is	Leslie’s	(1994a)	tea	party	experiment.		In	this	experiment,	Leslie	
would	have	children	pretend	to	be	having	a	tea	party.		After	asking	the	children	to	
“fill”	the	empty	cups	with	tea,	the	experimenter	took	one	cup	and	turned	it	over,	
shaking	it	and	replacing	it	upright.		When	the	experimenter	asked	which	cup	was	
empty,	the	children	indicated	that	it	was	the	one	that	the	experimenter	had	turned	
over—although	both	were	in	fact	empty.		According	to	Leslie,	the	experiment	shows	
that	the	inference	mechanism	treats	belief	and	pretend	(imaginary)	representations	
in	much	the	same	way.	
	 Building	on	these	ideas,	Weinberg	and	Meskin	argue	that	their	cognitive	
architecture	account	gives	us	better	way	to	account	for	the	relation	between	
supposition	and	imagination:	
	 [Supposition	and	imagination]	are	mental	activities	which	involve	different		 	
	 characteristic	sets	of	cognitive	processes	engaging	with	IB.	Moreover,	for	both			
	 supposing	and	imagining,	and	for	each	process	in	the	architecture,	one	can		
	 specify	whether	its	engagement	is	typical,	atypical,	or	variable	(2006,	194).16			
	
As	can	be	seen,	for	Weinberg	and	Meskin,	supposition	and	imagination	are	not	
functionally	distinct	mental	capacities	as	two-nature	views	hold.		Rather,	whether	
an	activity	counts	as	supposing	or	imagining	depends	on	which	cognitive	processes	
are	engaging	the	IB.		For	instance,	the	inference	system	is	an	example	of	a	process	
that	is	typical	of	both	activities.		It	is	often	used	in	imagination	(as	we	have	seen	with	
Leslie’s	Tea	Party),	and	use	of	it	seems	essential	to	the	activity	of	supposition.		
Supposition,	after	all,	is	often	undertaken	to	reason	through	the	consequences	of	
                                                
16	They	do	not	specify	what	they	mean	by	typical,	atypical,	or	variable;	however,	I	take	it	that	typical	
means	the	interaction	is	very	regular;	atypical	means	the	interaction	is	very	rare;	variable	means	the	
interaction	happens	some	of	the	time. 
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taking	some	content	as	true.		Interaction	with	the	inference	mechanism	
demonstrates	how	similar	supposition	and	imagination	can	be.	
	 In	contrast,	the	affect	systems	are	an	example	of	processes	that	show	how	
distinct	supposition	and	imagination	can	be.		Being	moved	emotionally	is	a	central	
part	of	most	activities	of	the	imagination.		Weinberg	and	Meskin	think	that	there	are	
imaginative	activities	that	do	not	produce	affect,	such	as	philosophical	thought-
experiments,	so	they	characterize	the	interaction	between	imagination	and	the	
affect	system	as	variable	as	opposed	to	typical.		However,	the	interaction	between	
supposition	and	the	affect	system	is	clearly	atypical.		They	do	note	that	some	acts	of	
supposition	may	have	unintended	side-effects	of	producing	emotions,	but	these,	
they	claim,	are	never	a	proper	part	of	supposition	(195).		According	to	Weinberg	
and	Meskin,	this	explains	how	it	is	rare	to	be	moved	emotionally	by	supposition,	but	
it	is	rather	common	to	be	moved	emotionally	by	our	imaginings.	
	 It	is	evident	that	Weinberg	and	Meskin,	at	least	implicitly,	endorse	the	
common	nature	thesis,	and	so	can	be	read	as	holding	to	a	one-nature	view.		There	is	
one	box	that	receives	and	processes	imaginary	representations,	the	IB.		This	box	is	
responsible	for	both	supposition	and	imagination.		Which	activity	a	person	is	
engaged	in	depends	on	which	other	cognitive	processes	are	engaging	the	IB.		Similar	
to	Currie	and	Ravenscroft,	then,	it	is	plausible	to	take	them	as	treating	supposition	
as	kind	of	imagination.		At	least	functionally,	supposition	is	belief-like	imagining.		I	
will	next	briefly	discuss	the	criticism	that	Arcangeli	(2014)	raises	against	both	
Currie	and	Ravenscroft,	and	Weinberg	and	Meskin.		In	considering	her	criticisms,	we	
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arrive	at	her	own	one-nature	view	of	the	relation	between	supposition	and	
imagination.			I	will	then	argue	that	her	view	is	susceptible	to	the	same	criticism.		
1.3.3	Arcangeli	
	
In	her	2014,	Arcangeli	argues	against	views	that	she	calls	cognitivist	views	of	
supposition,	where	supposition	is	taken	as	a	belief-like	imagining.		In	this	paper,	she	
sets	out	three	grades	of	cognitivism	about	supposition:	(1)	supposition	is	a	belief,	
(2)	supposition	is	belief-like	imagining,	and	(3)	supposition	is	a	sub-species	of	
belief-like	imagining.		She	dismisses	(1)	quickly	given	that	it	is	wildly	implausible	
and	no	one	defends	it.		As	she	claims,	there	is	nothing	wrong	with	supposing	
statements	that	we	know	are	false;	however,	there	is	something	problematic	in	
believing	statements	that	we	know	are	false.		She	argues	that	(2)	is	problematic	
because	supposition	is	“freer”	than	belief-like	imagining—that	is,	we	can	suppose	
more	contents	that	we	can	imagine—,	and	supposition	is	emotionally	“cold”—that	
is,	supposition	does	not	normally	trigger	emotions.		In	essence,	(2)	is	problematic	
because	it	implies	that	the	Ability	Difference	and	the	Emotional	Difference	are	
false.		Most	of	her	argument	is	focused	on	(3),	where	she	places	Currie	and	
Ravenscroft’s	and	Weinberg	and	Meskin’s	views.		Her	main	criticism	is	that	they	fail	
to	explain	the	Ability	Difference	and	the	Emotional	Difference.		I	will	first	
rehearse	some	general	considerations	she	gives	as	to	why	one	should	reject	
cognitivism	about	supposition.		I	will	then	turn	to	her	more	substantive	criticisms	of	
both	Currie	and	Ravenscroft’s	and	Weinberg	and	Meskin’s	views.	
Her	general	reason	to	reject	cognitivist	views	of	supposition	is	the	fact	that	
belief	and	supposition	actually	have	very	little	in	common.		She	sets	out	five	features	
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by	which	we	can	compare	and	contrast	belief,	imagination,	and	supposition.		These	
are	inferentiality,	emotionality,	normativity,	relation	to	will,	and	relation	to	truth.		
Belief,	imagination,	and	supposition	all	share	in	the	feature	of	inferentiality.	That	is,	
all	of	them	can	infer	more	content	from	some	initial	content.		Emotionality	is	found	
in	both	imagining	and	belief;	in	contrast,	as	we	have	seen,	supposition	does	not	take	
emotional	inputs.		The	third	feature	normativity,	concerns	the	constraints	of	each	
attitude.		All	three	attitudes	are	different	on	this	feature.		Supposition	is	the	least	
constrained	of	the	three;	as	we	know,	one	can	suppose	just	about	anything.		
Imagination	is	more	constrained	by	one’s	worldview,	desires,	visual	imagery,	
affections,	and	so	on.		And	belief	is	perhaps	the	most	constrained	as	it	is	essential	to	
belief	to	track	truth,	conform	to	the	world,	and	abide	by	rational	coherence.			
The	fourth	feature	is	the	relation	of	each	attitude	to	will.		Recall	that	we	have	
seen	this	above	in	the	discussion	of	similarities	between	supposition	and	
imagination.		Both	supposition	and	imagination	are	will-dependent.		In	contrast,	
belief	is	will-independent.		You	can	choose	what	to	suppose,	and	you	even	can	
choose	what	to	imagine	(though	as	we	have	seen	with	the	Ability	Difference	there	
are	some	limits	to	this).		However,	you	cannot	choose	(at	least	directly)	what	to	
believe.		Finally,	the	fifth	feature	is	the	relation	of	each	attitude	to	truth.		Again	we	
have	seen	this	above.		Both	supposition	and	imagination	are	truth-independent.		In	
contrast,	belief	is	truth-dependent.			We	are	not	required	to	suppose	or	imagine	only	
true	things,	but	belief	is	constrained	by	truth.		We	take	our	beliefs	to	be	true,	and	we	
try	to	avoid	holding	false	beliefs.		As	Arcangeli	demonstrates,	supposition	and	belief	
only	share	one	of	the	five	features	(inferentiality).		This	indicates	that	supposition	
 30 
and	belief	are	more	different	than	they	are	alike.		Thus,	according	to	Arcangeli,	this	
is	a	general	reason	to	reject	cognitivist	views	about	supposition.		However,	she	
provides	more	specific	and	substantive	criticisms	as	well.		I	turn	to	these	next.	
	 Arcangeli,	first,	argues	that	both	Currie	and	Ravenscroft,	and	Weinberg	and	
Meskin	fail	to	explain	what	I	have	called	the	Ability	Difference.17		Recall	that,	with	
Currie	and	Ravenscroft,	supposition	is	a	type	of	belief-like	imagining	that	is	separate	
from	desire-like	imagining.		With	this,	they	explain	the	fact	that	we	can	suppose	
more	than	we	can	imagine;	it	is	due	to	the	fact	that	desire-like	imagining	acts	as	a	
constraint	on	what	sort	of	contents	can	be	imagined	but	does	not	do	so	in	the	case	of	
supposition.		When	belief-like	imagining	is	isolated	from	desire-like	imagining,	we	
can	successfully	suppose	more	content.		Arcangeli’s	main	problem	with	this	is	that	it	
seems	to	conflict	with	the	widespread	claim	that	supposition	is	effortless.		This	is	
because,	according	to	Arcangeli,	when	a	person	imagines	a	content	that	would	
normally	be	constrained,	that	person	has	to	disconnect	her	desire-like	imagining	in	
order	to	successfully	suppose	the	content.		This	is	just	counterintuitive	to	how	most	
of	us	experience	the	act	of	supposition.		We	do	not	usually	feel	that	we	need	to	make	
an	effort	to	filter	out	desire-like	imagining	in	order	to	successfully	suppose	a	certain	
content.			
	 According	to	Arcangeli,	Weinberg	and	Meskin	fail	to	explain	the	Ability	
Difference	for	similar	reasons.	Recall	that	for	them,	the	imagination	box	has	a	
suppositional	mode	which	occurs	when	the	imagination	box	is	disconnected	from	
                                                
17	What	I	call	the	Ability	Difference,	Arcangeli	calls	the	normative	difference.		I	will	use	my	terms	
throughout. 
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certain	cognitive,	conative,	and	other	domain-specific	mechanisms,	such	as	folk	
morality	and	folk	psychology	mechanisms.		This,	according	to	them,	explains	the	
Ability	Difference	by	showing	that	when	in	suppositional	mode,	one	can	more	
freely	entertain	contents	that	would	normally	be	constrained	if	connected	to	other	
mechanisms.		Arcangeli	sees	two	problems	with	this	explanation.		First,	if	
disconnecting	some	of	the	mechanisms	takes	an	effort	of	the	will,	then	they	face	the	
same	objection	raised	against	Currie	and	Ravenscroft.		The	second	problem	is	that	it	
is	not	clear	that,	when	in	suppositional	mode,	the	imagination	box	is	disconnected	
from	all	mechanisms.		According	to	Weinberg	and	Meskin,	supposition	interacts	in	a	
variable	manner	with	many	domain-specific	mechanisms.		They	give	as	an	example	
a	detective	engaging	in	supposition	in	order	to	determine	how	a	murder	took	place.		
Here,	the	suppositional	mode	might	interact	with	certain	domain-specific	
mechanisms,	such	as	folk	psychology	mechanisms,	in	order	to	determine	what	the	
murderer	was	thinking,	and	so	on.		Arcangeli’s	point	is	that	if	in	suppositional	mode,	
the	imagination	box	is	not	disconnected	from	all	cognitive,	conative,	and	other	
domain-specific	mechanisms,	then,	appealing	to	the	disconnection	will	not	help	to	
explain	the	Ability	Difference	between	supposition	and	imagination.			
	 According	to	Arcangeli,	Weinberg	and	Meskin	will	reply	that	it	is	the	
disconnection	from	certain	kinds	of	mechanisms,	namely,	the	ones	that	would	
constrain	the	act	of	supposition.	The	problem	now	is	that	it	is	not	clear	what	triggers	
which	mechanisms	to	disconnect	for	the	relevant	activity	of	supposition.		Until	this	
is	answered,	it	is	not	clear	that	Weinberg	and	Meskin’s	view	really	does	explain	the	
difference.		As	Arcangeli	claims,	Weinberg	and	Meskin	could	appeal	to	context	to	
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account	for	the	disconnection	of	the	relevant	mechanisms.		But	as	she	argues,	this	
fails	because	in	many	contexts	we	can	vacillate	between	supposing	and	imagining.		I	
add	that	if	Weinberg	and	Meskin	have	to	appeal	to	something	extra-mental	to	
explain	the	disconnection,	then	it	is	obvious	that	their	account	of	supposition	cannot	
explain	the	Ability	Difference.	Thus,	according	to	Arcangeli,	and	in	light	of	these	
further	considerations,	all	cognitivist	views	of	supposition	fail	to	explain	the	Ability	
Difference	between	supposition	and	imagination.			
	 Arcangeli	also	argues	that	such	views	fail	to	explain	the	Emotional	
Difference.		According	to	Arcangeli,	Currie	and	Ravenscroft	do	not	clearly	address	
the	emotional	asymmetry	between	supposition	and	imagination.		It	is	not	too	
difficult	to	see	that	in	response	they	might	give	a	similar	explanation	as	they	do	for	
the	Ability	Difference—namely,	that	when	belief-like	imagining	is	disconnected	
from	desire-like	imagining	it	accounts	for	the	emotional	asymmetry.		But,	her	
objections	to	their	explanation	of	the	Ability	Difference	would	hold	here	as	well—it	
conflicts	with	the	effortlessness	of	supposition.			
	 Weinberg	and	Meskin	do	offer	an	explanation	for	the	emotional	asymmetry.		
But,	like	Currie	and	Ravenscroft,	it	is	also	the	same	as	their	explanation	of	the	
Ability	Difference—that	is,	the	emotional	difference	is	explained	by	the	fact	that	
supposition	is	disconnected	from	the	affect	mechanism.			Thus,	her	same	objections	
would	apply	here	as	well.		Either	the	disconnection	is	up	to	us,	which	conflicts	with	
the	effortlessness	of	supposition,	or	the	question	of	what	triggers	the	disconnection	
is	left	unanswered.	If	the	latter,	it	is	again	not	clear	that	their	account	can	explain	the	
difference	by	merely	appealing	to	disconnection.		Even	setting	aside	worries	about	
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disconnection,	Arcangeli	argues	that	it	is	false	that	supposition	is	disconnected	from	
the	affect	system.		Certain	contents	cause	affect	regardless	of	whether	we	are	merely	
supposing	such	content.		She	quotes	Nichols	(2006)	who	argues	that	if	we	suppose	
that	a	diner	has	eviscerated	a	cat	and	was	eating	its	dripping	entrails,	we	would	
surely	feel	disgust.		Thus,	according	to	Arcangeli,	all	cognitivist	views	of	supposition	
fail	to	explain	the	Emotional	Difference.		
After	raising	these	criticisms	to	cognitivist	views	of	supposition,	Arcangeli	
considers	an	objection	to	her	view.			Given	the	problems	for	cognitivist	views	about	
supposition,	the	objection	claims	that	one	ought	to	question	whether	supposition	is	
any	kind	of	imagining	whatsoever.		Given	this,	the	objection	continues,	we	ought	to	
take	seriously	the	possibility	that	two-nature	views	are	right—imagining	and	
supposing	are	distinct	mental	capacities.			She	is	rather	quick	in	dismissing	this	
suggestion,	stating	that	“[g]iven	its	will-dependence	and	truth-independence,	
however,	arguably	supposition	belongs	to	the	imaginative	realm,	and	the	differences	
between	supposition	and	[cognitive	imagination]	are	better	explained	by	
maintaining	that	the	former	is	a	specific	type	of	imagining	distinct	from	the	latter”	
(Arcangeli	2014,	621).		This	is	the	extent	of	her	reasons	to	reject	the	possibility	that	
two-nature	views	are	correct.		As	it	stands,	it	is	rather	weak.		After	all,	because	two	
things	share	properties,	that	is	not	enough	to	take	each	as	belonging	to	the	same	
mental	capacity.		However,	we	can	read	her	charitably	as	claiming	that	we	do	not	
have	good	reasons	to	see	supposition	as	being	functionally	distinct	from	imagining.		
As	a	result,	I	read	her	as	defending	a	one-nature	view	of	supposition	and	
imagination.		
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	 After	considering	the	objection,	Arcangeli	argues	that	supposition	is	a	sui	
generis	kind	of	imagining.		She	suggests	that	supposition	could	be	understood	as	an	
acceptance-like	imagining.		She	does	not	fully	develop	or	defend	this	view;	however,	
she	gestures	at	its	plausibility	by	showing	how	it	fits	within	an	existing	framework	
of	imagination.		The	framework	that	she	has	in	mind	is	that	different	types	of	
imaginings	have	their	own	non-imaginative	counterparts	(recall	above	Currie	and	
Ravenscroft	2002).		For	instance,	sensory-like	imagining	has	a	counterpart	in	
perception	and	belief-like	imagining	has	a	counterpart	in	belief.		She	argues	that	the	
mental	state	of	acceptance	can	be	viewed	as	a	non-imaginative	counterpart	to	
supposition.		She	acknowledges	that	other	philosophers	have	posited	a	distinct	
mental	state	called	‘acceptance’	in	order	to	deal	with	certain	problems	of	belief.		For	
instance,	she	mentions	that	there	are	seemingly	paradoxical	cases	in	which	a	person	
seems	to	hold	both	the	belief	that	p	and	the	belief	that	~p.		To	remove	the	air	of	
paradox,	we	can	hold	that	one	of	those	mental	states	is	not	belief	but	acceptance.18	
Acceptance	is	also	more	similar	to	supposition	than	belief.		For	instance,	acceptance,	
unlike	belief,	is	will-dependent,	and	acceptance	is	truth-independent.		Though	I	am	
sympathetic	with	her	reasons	to	reject	cognitivist	views	of	supposition,	I	think	that	
her	proposed	view	is	susceptible	to	the	same	problems	that	she	raised	against	those	
views.	
	
 
 
 
 
                                                
18	Arcangeli	does	not	give	an	example	of	cases	such	as	these,	but	cf.	Bratman	1992. 
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1.3.4	Against	Arcangeli	
	
	 In	order	to	argue	against	Arcangeli,	I	will	first	summarize	her	argument	in	a	
way	that	is	faithful	to	her	criticisms	of	cognitivist	views	of	supposition.		I	will	then	
demonstrate	how	this	argument	generalizes	so	that	Arcangeli’s	view	is	susceptible	
to	the	same	worries	she	raised	against	the	cognitivist	views.			
	 By	way	of	summary,	cognitivist	views	of	supposition	cannot	explain	the	
differences	between	supposition	and	imagination	primarily	because	they	
mischaracterize	supposition.		In	order	to	see	how	this	is	so,	consider	how	
supposition	is	often	characterized.		Supposition	is	described	as	one	of	the	freest	of	
cognitive	attitudes.		As	I	noted	earlier	in	the	chapter,	we	can	suppose	anything	with	
minimal	effort.		It	is	this	effortlessness	that	Arcangeli	argues	is	misconstrued	by	
cognitivist	views.		This	effortlessness	is	captured	well	by	reflecting	on	two	
characteristics	that	are	essential	to	supposition.		The	first	is	what	I	call	the	ESSENCE	
of	supposition.		And	the	second	is	what	I	call	the	PHENOMENOLOGY	of	supposition.		
What	we	refer	to	as	the	effortlessness	of	supposition	can	be	captured	by	either	one,	
or	both,	of	these	two	characteristics:	
	 ESSENCE:	We	can	suppose	just	about	any	content.	
	 PHENOMENOLOGY:	With	supposition,	we	experience	as	if	we	can	suppose		
	 	 	 	 any	content.	
	
As	we	know,	Arcangeli	argues	that	cognitivist	views	of	supposition	imply	that,	in	
order	to	successfully	suppose	some	content,	one	needs	to	turn	off	certain	mental	
mechanisms	such	as	desires	and	affections.		This	implies	that	supposition	takes	
effort	on	our	part.		However,	this	conflicts	with	PHENOMENOLOGY.		But	
PHENOMENOLOGY	seems	to	be	the	best	reason	to	think	that	ESSENCE	is	true—that	
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is,	our	best	evidence	that	we	can	suppose	just	about	anything	is	our	introspective	
awareness	that	we	experience	as	if	we	can	suppose	just	about	anything.		Given	this,	
both	ESSENCE	and	PHENOMENOLOGY	together	give	us	a	good	reason	to	accept	and	
explain	both	the	Ability	Difference	and	the	Emotional	Difference.19		Thus,	the	root	
of	the	problems	for	cognitivist	views	of	supposition	is	that	they	get	facts	about	
supposition	wrong—i.e.,	their	views	imply	that	ESSENCE	and	PHENOMENOLOGY	
are	false.		I	will	next	show	that	these	criticisms	generalize	such	that	Arcangeli’s	view	
is	susceptible	to	them	as	well.					
	 Following	Arcangeli,	I	hold	that	will-dependence	and	truth-independence	are	
general	features	of	the	imaginative	realm.		The	problem	is	that	supposition	and	
imagination	actually	vary	significantly	with	regards	to	these	features.		I	will	show	
how	they	do	so	with	respect	to	will-dependence,	first,	and	truth-independence,	
second.		What	the	variation,	in	each	case,	shows	is	that	Arcageli’s	view	is	susceptible	
to	her	own	criticisms.			
Consider	will-dependence,	then.		Not	all	imaginings	have	the	same	degree	of	
will-dependence,	and	some	imaginings	are	will-independent.		As	we	have	already	
seen,	many	imaginings	are	constrained	in	such	a	way	that	a	mere	willing	would	not	
be	sufficient	for	successfully	undertaking	the	activity.		For	instance,	you	might	not	
be	able	to	will	yourself	to	imagine	some	distasteful	content.		Some	imaginings	are	
will-independent	in	that	they	are	involuntary,	such	as	earworms—involuntary	
songs	or	sounds	that	pop	up	in	our	mind.		In	contrast,	supposition	is	the	most	will-
                                                
19	It	might,	at	first,	not	be	obvious	that	ESSENCE	and	PHENOMENOLOGY	give	us	reasons	to	accept	
and	explain	the	Emotional	Difference,	but	recall	that	one	of	the	reasons	we	can	suppose	just	about	
anything	is	due	to	the	fact	that	supposition	does	not	really	trigger	our	affections	and	desires. 
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dependent	of	all	imaginative	activities.		For	supposition,	the	will-dependence	is	
largely	a	black	and	white	issue:	either	you	do	will	to	suppose	some	content	or	you	
do	not	will	to	suppose	some	content.	The	success	of	undertaking	the	activity	
depends	ultimately	on	one’s	willingness	to	entertain	the	content	as	if	it	is	true.		
Attempting	to	imagine	that	same	content	in	a	more	robust	way	may	lead	to	
difficulties.		As	a	result,	with	imagining,	its	will-dependence	is	a	matter	of	degrees,	
or	it	is	inoperative.			
We	can	further	understand	this	idea—that	the	will-dependence	of	imaginings	
either	comes	in	degrees	or	is	inoperative—by	reflecting	on	how	imaginings	are	
often	constrained	in	ways	that	supposings	are	not.		Imaginings	can	be	constrained	
by	visual	images.		Supposition	is	not	so	constrained.		I	can	suppose	at	will	that	a	
square-circle	exists.		I	cannot	imagine	at	will	that	a	square-circle	exists	because	I	
cannot	form	an	image	of	a	square-circle.		Moreover,	such	constraints	are,	at	times,	
completely	independent	of	the	will.	As	Nanay	(2016)	reminds	us,	we	can	have	
“involuntary	flashbacks	to	some	scene	that	we	have	seen	earlier”	(125).		Because	
some	mental	images	are	involuntarily	formed,	will-dependence	cannot	be	a	
generalized	feature	of	the	imaginative	realm—not,	at	least,	without	some	
qualification.			
Of	course,	forming	visual	images	is	not	always	involuntary.		But	even	when	it	
depends	on	my	will,	and	thus	is	voluntary,	its	will-dependence	arguably	comes	in	
degrees.		In	order	to	see	this,	compare	the	following	tasks	of	supposition	and	
imagining.		Consider	that	I	am	asked	to	suppose	that	the	world	is	ending	because	of	
a	zombie	apocalypse.		Again,	such	an	activity	seems	to	be	maximally	will-dependent.		
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As	long	as	I	have	a	basic	understanding	of	what	the	words	of	the	sentence	mean,	or	
the	concepts	involved,	I	should	be	able	to	successfully	suppose	that	sentence.		
Suppose	further	that	I	am	not	a	fan	of	the	zombie	apocalypse	genre,	and	that	I	would	
not	have	the	slightest	idea	of	what	a	zombie	is	supposed	to	look	like.		Now	if	I	were	
asked	to	now	imagine	that	the	world	is	ending	because	of	a	zombie	apocalypse,	I	
would	have	difficulty.		I	would	be	able	to	comply	but	only	insofar	as	I	am	able	to	
form	vague	images.		I	might	want	to	form	vivid	images,	but	my	mere	willing	would	
not	be	successful.		In	contrast,	if	I	were	a	zombie	apocalypse	super-fan,	then	I	would	
be	able	to	form,	with	ease,	vivid	images	of	zombies	and	of	the	end	of	the	world.		But,	
one	does	not	become	a	super-fan	overnight.		As	one	becomes	more	steeped	in	the	
zombie	apocalyptic	genre,	such	a	person’s	ability	to	form	vivid	images	of	the	zombie	
apocalypse	arguably	becomes	more	refined.		In	other	words,	the	formation	of	the	
vivid	images	becomes	more	will-dependent.		In	this	case,	given	one	constraint	on	
our	imaginative	activities	(i.e.,	the	formation	of	images),	the	will-dependence	of	
imagination	admits	of	degree.	Thus,	we	have	seen	that,	with	such	a	constraint,	either	
our	will-dependence	is	inoperative	in	forming	images	or	it	comes	in	degrees.	
Let’s	consider	another	set	of	constraints	on	imaginings.		Often	in	our	
imaginings,	there	are	emotions	and	desires	that	are	triggered	by	imagining	some	
content.		Usually	the	emotions	and	desires	color	how	one	imagines	that	content.		
Given	that	emotions	and	desires	are	not	directly	will-dependent,	a	successful	
undertaking	of	a	complex	imaginative	activity	that	included	emotions	and	desires	
would	not	exclusively	depend	on	the	will.		One	example	of	this	is	our	engagement	
with	novels	or	movies.		When	our	imaginations	are	engaged	with	these	fictions,	we	
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are	carried	along	or	transported	to	the	fictional	world.		There	is	an	immersion	that	
happens.		It	is	in	this	immersion	that	we	experience	being	moved	in	all	sorts	of	ways.		
We	find	ourselves	being	angry	at	“bad	guys”,	happy	at	“good	guys”,	and	intrigued	by	
“conflicted	guys”.		In	good	novels	or	movies,	or	ones	that	grip	us,	we	can	experience	
a	whole	range	of	emotions	and	desires.		Such	experiences	are	more	like	a	discovery	
than	a	decision.		We	find	ourselves	having	these	various	emotions	and	desires;	such	
emotions	do	not	seem	to	depend	on	our	wills.		To	the	extent	that	emotions	and	
desires	are	essential	to	some	imaginative	acts	and	to	the	extent	that	emotions	and	
desires	are	not	will-dependent,	it	follows	that	we	have	another	example	that	will-
dependence	is	sometimes	inoperative	in	accomplishing	an	imaginative	act.		
As	a	last	example	of	how	the	will-dependence	of	imagination	comes	in	
degrees,	we	can	also	consider	the	phenomenon	of	imaginative	resistance.		Recall	
that	this	phenomenon	arises	when	otherwise	competent	imaginers	fail	to	comply	
with	an	invitation	to	imagine	certain	content.	One	reason	that	we	resist	is	because	
we	are	unwilling	to	imagine	certain	content	(cf.	Gendler	2000,	2006).		I	also	think	
that	imaginative	resistance	comes	in	degrees.	(For	a	fuller	defense	of	this	claim,	see	
chapter	3	of	this	dissertation).		Contextual	factors	such	as	genre	can	mitigate	the	
resistance	one	has	to	certain	imaginings.		I	may	resist	imagining	that	a	head	
decapitation	scene	is	funny	if	such	a	scene	is	in	a	realistic	fiction.		However,	I	might	
not	resist	imagining	that	a	head	decapitation	scene	is	funny	if	such	a	scene	is	in	a	
dark	comedy	genre.20		Different	genres	might	make	me	more	or	less	willing	to	
imaginatively	engage	with	the	stories.		If	imaginative	resistance	is	a	matter	of	what	I	
                                                
20	This	example	is	from	Liao	2013. 
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am	unwilling	to	imagine,	and	if	what	I	am	unwilling	to	imagine	comes	in	degrees,	
then	this	is	another	example	of	how	the	will-dependence	of	the	imagination	comes	
in	degrees.		
All	of	the	above	examples	show	that,	because	of	the	various	constraints	on	
imagination,	either	its	will-dependence	is	inoperative	or	that	its	will-dependence	
comes	in	degrees.	The	same	cannot	be	said	of	supposition.		Supposition	is	more	will-
dependent	than	imagination.		If	the	imagination	is	more	constrained	in	its	will-
dependence	than	supposition,	and	if	one	holds	that	supposition	is	a	kind	of	
imagination,	then	one	must	explain	how	we	remove	the	constraints	on	the	will-
dependence.		And	this	seems	to	run	into	the	same	problem	that	Arcangeli	raised	
above:	it	conflicts	with	the	fact	that	supposition	is	effortless	(or	as	I	would	say	it	gets	
the	ESSENCE	and	PHENOMENOLOGY	of	supposition	wrong).		We	simply	do	not	
experience	a	“turning-off”	as	it	were	of	various	constraints	(e.g.	conative,	affective,	
imagery,	and	so	on)	in	order	to	successfully	suppose	a	content.		Thus,	because	
Arcangeli	holds	that	supposition	is	a	kind	of	imagining,	she	is	susceptible	to	the	
same	criticisms	that	she	raised	against	the	cognitivists	views	of	supposition.			
We	can	see	that	this	problem	comes	up	with	the	other	general	feature	of	the	
imaginative	realm—namely,	truth-independence.		Here	again,	I	argue	that	
supposition	and	imagination	differ	in	this	respect.		Recall	that	truth-independence	is	
the	idea	that	the	truth-values	of	a	given	content	is	largely	irrelevant	to	successfully	
taking	an	attitude	towards	that	content.		As	it	was	with	the	feature	of	will-
dependence,	supposition	turns	out	to	be	more	truth-independent	than	imagination.		
Again,	as	we	saw	earlier,	we	can	suppose	anything.	For	instance,	we	can	suppose	
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contents	that	are	true;	I	can	suppose	that	I	am	typing	my	dissertation.		We	can	also	
suppose	contents	that	are	false:	I	can	suppose	that	I	am	typing	my	dissertation	in	an	
undiscovered	alien	language.		Due	to	the	constraints	that	limit	what	we	can	
successfully	suppose,	imagination	is	different.		There	are	true	contents	that	we	
cannot	imagine,	such	as	a	1000-side	polygon.	There	are	false	contents	that	we	
cannot	imagine,	such	as	things	with	contradictory	properties—a	married	bachelor,	I	
am	not	identical	to	myself.		Thus,	imagination	is	less	truth-independent	than	
supposition,	and	as	a	result	we	see	the	same	problem	that	came	from	the	difference	
in	will-dependence.		That	is,	if	the	imagination	is	more	constrained	in	its	truth-
independence	than	supposition,	and	if	one	holds	that	supposition	is	a	kind	of	
imagination,	then	one	must	explain	how	we	remove	the	constraints	on	the	will-
dependence.		Once	again,	this	conflicts	with	the	ESSENCE	and	PHENOMENOLOGY	of	
supposition.	
Apart	from	the	features	that	Arcangeli	notes,	we	can	add	one	more	general	
feature	of	the	imaginative	realm.	Let’s	call	it	modal-independence.		The	contents	that	
we	can	suppose	are	largely	independent	of	their	modal	status.		We	can	suppose	
possible	contents:	suppose	that	I	am	not	a	philosopher.		We	can	suppose	impossible	
contents:	suppose	that	there	is	a	largest	cardinal	number,	or	that	water	is	not	H2O.		
Imagination	is	more	restricted	in	its	modal-independence.		In	fact,	this	might	be	
stated	too	weakly.		Some	would	argue	that	imagination	is	not	characterized	by	
modal-independence,	but	rather	by	modal-dependence.		If	imagining	were	modal-
dependent,	then	it	would	follow	that	we	could	only	imagine	possible	contents	(and	
conversely,	that	we	could	not	imagine	impossible	things).		If	this	were	true	it	would	
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just	add	to	the	problem	for	all	current	one	nature	views,	including	Arcangeli’s:	how	
is	it	that	a	mental	capacity	characterized	by	modal-independence	could	come	from	a	
mental	capacity	characterized	by	modal-dependence?		That	the	imagination	is	modal-
dependent	would	require	a	close	conceptual	tie	between	imagination	and	possibility,	
but	there	is	no	consensus	on	how	to	understand	the	connection	between	
imagination	and	possibility.21		Yet,	even	if	it	were	false,	and	the	imagination	
exhibited	modal-independence,	the	imagination	would	still	be	less	modally-
independent	than	supposition.		As	we	have	already	seen,	we	can	suppose	possible	
and	impossible	contents.		We	cannot	imagine	impossible	contents,	such	as	square-
circles,	and	there	might	be	some	possibilities	that	we	cannot	imagine.			
Take	the	possibility	that	I	am	a	brain-in-a-vat	(from	hereon,	BIV).		Given	the	
perspectival	nature	of	the	imagination,	I	cannot	actually	imagine	myself	as	a	BIV.			If	
I	were	a	BIV,	then	imagining	myself	(from	the	inside)	as	a	BIV	would	look	
indistinguishable	from	imagining	myself	as	a	BIV,	when	I	am	not	one.		This	along	
with	a	plausible	principle	that	we	can	distinguish	perceiving	from	imagining,	
indicates	that	we	actually	cannot	imagine	ourselves	as	BIVs.22		To	be	sure	this	is	not	
to	claim	that	you	cannot	imagine	a	situation	where	you	are	having	an	out-of-body	
experience,	witnessing	an	envatted	brain,	and	being	told	that	that	brain	is	you.		It	is	
the	claim	that	you	cannot	imagine	from	the	inside	that	you	are	a	BIV,	even	though	it	
seems	plausible	to	say	that	it	is	possible	that	you	are	a	BIV.		If	one	finds	this	example	
                                                
21	For	a	good	overview	of	this	debate,	see	the	introduction	to	Gendler	and	Hawthorne	(2002). 
22	Now	of	course	Perky’s	famous	experiment	seems	to	show	that	we	can	confuse	perception	and	
imagination;	this	however	does	not	undermine	a	general	principle	that	we	mostly	can	distinguish	the	
two	activities	(cf.	Langland-Hassan	2015).		 
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unconvincing,	it	is	not	hard	to	come	with	other	examples	that	illustrate	the	point.		
For	instance,	chiliagons	are	possible,	yet	we	cannot	imagine	them,	in	part,	because	
we	cannot	form	an	image	of	them.		Once	again,	the	problem	should	be	evident.		If	the	
imagination	is	more	constrained	in	its	modal-independence	than	supposition,	and	if	
one	holds	that	supposition	is	a	kind	of	imagination,	then	one	must	explain	how	we	
remove	the	constraints	on	the	modal-independence.		
The	features	of	will-dependence,	truth-independence,	and	modal-independence	
all	demonstrate	that	Arcangeli’s	view	suffers	from	the	same	problems	she	raised	
against	the	cognitivist	views	of	supposition.		Supposition	is	maximally	will-
dependent,	truth-independent,	and	modal-independent.	Imagination	is	not.		Yet,	if	
supposition	is	a	kind	of	imagining,	then	it	follows	that	supposition	takes	effort	on	
our	part.		In	order	to	suppose	we	need	to	remove	the	aspect	of	the	imagination	
which	causes	it	to	be	less	will-dependent,	truth-independent,	and	modal-independent	
than	supposition.		But	this,	similar	to	the	cognitivist	views,	gets	facts	of	supposition	
wrong.		Arguably,	this	is	a	problem	for	any	view	that	takes	supposition	to	be	a	kind	
of	imagination.	Given,	as	we	have	just	seen,	that	all	current	one-nature	views	
attempt	argue	that	supposition	is	a	kind	of	imagination,	it	follows	that	all	such	views	
get	facts	about	supposition	wrong—i.e.,	they	imply	that	ESSENCE	and	
PHENOMENOLOGY	are	false.		And	because	of	this	they	fail	to	explain	the	Ability	
Difference	and	the	Emotional	Difference.		
	 The	Relation	Question	asks:	what	is	the	relation	between	supposing	and	
imagining?		I	have	argued	that	any	view	of	the	relation	between	imagination	and	
supposition	ought	to	account	for	the	Ability	Difference,	Emotional	Difference,	
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and	Similarity.		I	have	shown	that	two-nature	views	fail	to	account	for	Similarity	
because	in	positing	that	supposition	and	imagination	are	distinct	cognitive	
capacities,	they	imply	that	Similarity	is	false.		I	have	also	shown	that	one-nature	
views	fail	to	account	for	both	the	Ability	Difference	and	the	Emotional	Difference	
mainly	because	in	positing	that	supposition	is	a	kind	of	imagining,	they	get	facts	
about	supposition	wrong.			In	the	next	chapter,	I	propose	a	new	view	that	succeeds	
in	answering	the	Relation	Question.		Unlike	two-nature	views,	that	view	does	not	
posit	two	distinct	cognitive	capacities	for	supposing	and	imagining.		Unlike	current	
one-nature	views,	that	view	does	not	take	supposing	to	be	a	kind	of	imagining.		
Rather,	this	view	will	argue	that	imagining	is	a	kind	of	supposing.	
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Imagining	is	a	Kind	of	Supposing	
	
Chapter	Two	
	
	 With	respect	to	the	Relation	Question,	we	have	seen	two	views.		Two-nature	
views	argue	that	supposing	and	imagining	are	distinct	mental	capacities.		One-
nature	views	argue	that	supposing	is	a	kind	of	imagining.		To	date,	versions	of	each	
type	of	view	fail	to	account	for	all	of	the	features	central	to	the	relation	between	
supposition	and	imagination.	Two-nature	views	fail	to	account	for	Similarity	
because	in	positing	distinct	capacities	for	supposing	and	imagining,	they	imply	that	
Similarity	is	false.		One-nature	views	fail	to	account	for	the	Ability	Difference	and	
the	Emotional	Difference	because	in	positing	that	supposition	is	a	kind	of	
imagining,	they	get	facts	about	supposition	wrong.			In	this	chapter,	I	propose	a	new	
one-nature	view—the	As-if-true	Attitude	view,	or	AIT	view.		As	I	will	argue	unlike	
two-nature	views,	the	AIT	view	can	account	for	Similarity.		The	AIT	view	also	does	
not	inherit	the	same	problems	as	one-nature	views	to	date:	that	is	to	say,	the	AIT	
view	can	explain	both	the	Ability	Difference	and	the	Emotional	Difference.		In	
section	2.1,	I	develop	the	AIT	view.		In	section	2.2,	I	defend	it.	
	
§	2.1	The	As-If-True	Attitude	View:	A	Proposal	
	
	 Recall	from	chapter	one	that	the	Relation	Question	asks:	what	is	the	relation	
between	imagining	and	supposing?			As	we	have	seen,	both	one-nature	views	and	
two-nature	views	offer	a	model	for	understanding	the	relation.		According	to	two-
nature	views,	supposing	and	imagining	are	distinct	cognitive	capacities.		According	
to	current	one-nature	views,	supposing	is	a	kind	of	imagining.		The	existing	views,	
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however,	do	not	exhaust	the	views	available.		In	particular,	there	is	a	view	available	
that	agrees	with	current	one-nature	views	that	there	is	one	capacity	involved	in	
supposing	and	imagining,	but	offers	a	converse	of	existing	one-nature	views.		
Instead	of	claiming	that	supposing	is	a	kind	of	imagining,	the	view	that	I	will	
propose	in	this	section	holds	that	imagining	is	a	certain	kind	of	supposing.	For	the	
rest	of	this	section,	I	develop	and	argue	for	the	commitments	of	this	view.			 	 	
	 Recall	that	I	am	calling	this	view	the	As-If-True	Attitude	view,	or	AIT	view	for	
short.		Central	to	the	AIT	view	are	two	basic	commitments.	First,	the	AIT	view	claims	
that	there	is	a	basic	cognitive	attitude—what	I	will	call	the	as-if-true	attitude—and	
that	that	attitude	is	distinct	from	other	familiar	attitudes	such	as	belief	and	desire.		
Second,	according	to	the	AIT	view,	this	basic	cognitive	attitude	can	be	constrained	in	
various	ways	by	other	mental	mechanisms,	attitudes,	and	states.		I	argue	that	a	view	
with	these	two	commitments	allows	me	to	answer	the	Relation	Question	without	
inheriting	the	same	problems	of	current	one-nature	and	two-nature	views.		As	I	will	
argue,	the	short	answer	to	the	Relation	Question	is	that	supposing	and	imagining,	as	
we	typically	understand	them,	are	both	instances	of	the	as-if-true	attitude.		The	
difference	between	them	amounts	to	a	difference	in	the	mechanisms,	attitudes,	and	
states	that	constrain	that	attitude.	I	will	argue	for	each	commitment	of	the	AIT	view	
in	turn.		Section	2.1.1	provides	reasons	for	the	first	commitment.		Section	2.1.2	and	
2.1.3	together	provide	reasons	for	the	second	commitment.	
2.1.1	As-if-true	Attitude		
	
	 We	can	gain	a	better	characterization	of	the	as-if-true	attitude	by	answering	
the	following	questions:	(1)	what	reasons	do	we	have	for	positing	such	an	attitude?	
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and	(2)	how	is	it	different	than	belief?		Question	(1)	is	important	for	establishing	
that	there	is	such	an	attitude.		Question	(2)	is	important	because	‘belief’	arguably	is	
the	most	analyzed	and	understood	of	the	cognitive	attitudes.		Getting	clear	on	how	
the	as-if-true	attitude	is	similar	and	dissimilar	to	belief,	then,	will	help	us	to	
understand	the	as-if-true	attitude.			 	
	 Consider,	first,	question	(1).		I	posit	that	the	as-if-true	attitude	is	a	basic	
cognitive	attitude	that	takes	any	content	and	treats	it	as	if	it	were	true.		Why	think	
that	there	is	such	an	attitude?		If	we	look	at	supposition	more	closely,	we	will	see	
that	there	already	is	a	“core”	attitude	in	which	we	treat	a	content	as	if	it	were	true.		
In	order	to	develop	this	further,	consider	what	most	philosophers	mean	by	
‘supposition’.		Most	philosophers	take	supposition	to	be	a	step	in	hypothetical	
reasoning,	where	one	assumes	that	a	certain	content	is	true	for	the	purpose	of	
reasoning	to	the	consequences	of	that	content	(cf.	Flew	1953,	Moran	1994,	White	
1990,	Gendler	2000,	Goldman	2006,	Kind	2013,	Arcangeli	2014,	Ichikawa	and	Jarvis	
2012,	Balcerak	Jackson	2016).		Notice,	however,	that	we	can	make	a	distinction	
between	the	nature	of	supposition—assuming	a	certain	content	to	be	true—and	
what	we	do	with	supposition—using	it	as	an	essential	step	in	hypothetical	
reasoning.		This	distinction	reveals	that	we	have	two	related	but	distinct	meanings	
of	‘supposition’.		‘Supposition’	in	the	broad	sense	refers	to	that	basic	attitude	in	
which	one	takes	a	content	as	if	it	is	true—what	I	have	called	the	nature	of	
supposition.		‘Supposition’	in	the	narrow	sense	refers	to	the	particular	use	to	which	
that	basic	attitude	is	put—e.g.,	reasoning	to	the	consequences	of	taking	a	certain	
content	as	if	true.		Philosophers	tend	to	only	use	‘supposition’	in	the	narrow	sense	
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and	this	is	one	reason	why	the	distinction	between	the	nature	and	purpose	of	
supposition	is	not	always	made	explicit.		
	 To	see	that	this	distinction	is	at	least	implicit	in	the	discussion	of	supposition,	
consider	Balcerak	Jackson	(2016).		Balcerak	Jackson	argues	that	we	treat	
supposition	as	a	type	of	acceptance.		She	argues	that	“to	accept	a	proposition	is	not	
merely	to	treat	it	as	true	as	a	matter	of	coincidence,	or	because	one	has	been	struck	
by	lightning.		It	is	to	treat	it	as	true	for	a	purpose”	(52,	emphasis	hers).23		She	
suggests	that,	in	supposition,	that	purpose	is	typically	to	reason	through	to	the	
consequences	of	the	supposed	proposition.		While	currently,	it	is	not	typical	to	hold	
that	supposition	is	a	type	of	acceptance,	it	is	common	to	hold	that	supposition	is	
some	attitude	towards	a	proposition	for	the	purpose	of	reasoning	through	to	the	
consequences	of	that	proposition.		Because	of	this	we	can	read	Balcerak	Jackson	as	
favoring	a	narrow	sense	of	‘supposition’;	however,	we	can	also	see	that	‘supposition’	
in	the	broad	sense	is	implicit	in	her	definition	of	‘supposition’.		Granting	for	the	
moment	that	supposition	is	a	type	of	acceptance,	then,	Balcerak	Jackson’s	view	
highlights	the	distinction	between	what	supposition	is—the	core	of	supposition—
and	its	use—what	we	do	with	supposition.	That	is,	we	can	treat	a	proposition	as	
true—the	nature	of	the	act	of	supposition—and	we	can	treat	a	proposition	as	true	
for	a	particular	purpose—the	use	to	which	that	act	is	directed.			
	 To	see	an	example	in	which	this	distinction	is	more	explicit	consider	
Ichikawa	and	Jarvis	(2012).		In	this	paper,	Ichikawa	and	Jarvis	argue	for	the	role	of	
                                                
23	She	is	following	Stalnaker’s	technical	notion	of	‘acceptance’,	which	is	a	generic	propositional	
attitude	where	one	treats	a	proposition	as	true	in	various	contexts	and	temporarily	sets	aside	
considerations	of	the	proposition	being	false	(cf.	1984,	2002). 
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imagination	in	modal	epistemology.		Many	philosophers	think	that	imagination	
plays	some	role	in	modal	epistemology.		As	we	will	see	below,	Kind	(2013)	takes	
modal	epistemology	to	be	a	paradigmatic	instance	of	imagination.		In	contrast	to	
other	philosophers,	Ichikawa	and	Jarvis	hold	that	supposition	is	the	basic	attitude	
that	we	take	towards	possibilities—they	do	not	make	a	sharp	distinction	between	
imagination	and	supposition.24		In	doing	so,	they	allow	supposition	to	refer	to	a	
broader	array	of	imaginative	activities.		Because	of	this,	it	is	plausible	to	read	them	
as	making	room	for	‘supposition’	in	the	broad	sense.		For	instance,	they	even	
consider	the	propositional	attitude	that	we	take	towards	fiction	to	be	primarily	that	
of	supposing.	On	the	face	of	it,	the	claim	that	supposing	has	a	role	to	play	in	modal	
epistemology	might	appear	to	be	false.		After	all,	Ichikawa	and	Jarvis	are	attempting	
to	secure	a	robust	connection	between	what	we	can	imagine	and	what	is	possible.		
Given	that	we	can	suppose	anything,	supposition	would	seem	to	be	useless	at	giving	
us	any	knowledge	about	possibility,	necessity,	and	impossibility.		They	are	quick	to	
acknowledge	this,	and	explain	that	it	is	a	particular	type	of	supposing—one	under	
the	constraints	of	rational	coherence—that	can	play	the	appropriate	role	in	our	
modal	epistemologies.		Given	that	they	distinguish	a	particular	type	of	supposing	in	
the	case	of	modal	epistemology,	it	is	plausible	to	read	them	as	proposing	that	there	
is	a	core	attitude—taking	a	certain	content	as	true—that	can	be	put	to	use	under	
certain	rational	constraints	in	order	to	give	us	knowledge	of	possibility.			
                                                
24	The	details	of	their	view	are	not	pertinent	as	I	am	merely	using	them	to	illustrate	the	way	that	they	
exploit	the	distinction	between	what	supposition	is	and	what	we	do	with	it. 
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	 As	we	can	see,	implicit	in	Balcerak	Jackson	and	explicit	in	Ichikawa	and	
Jarvis,	there	is	a	core	to	supposition	that	is	a	basic	attitude	that	takes	any	content	as	
if	it	is	true.		This	I	call	the	as-if-true	attitude.		The	reason	to	accept	the	as-if-true	
attitude	is	that	it	is	already	found	in	supposition,	especially	how	it	is	typically	
understood	by	philosophers,	e.g,	in	its	narrow	sense.		This	fact	has	been	obscured	
because	we	have	not	always	made	the	distinction	between	the	nature,	or	core,	of	
supposition	and	the	purpose	to	which	it	is	put	to	use.		And	one	reason	that	this	
distinction	has	been	obscured	is	due	to	the	fact	that	philosophers	tend	to	only	use	
the	term	‘supposition’	in	its	narrow	sense.		However,	it	is	important	to	see	that	
when	we	use	supposition	in	the	narrow	sense,	it	refers	to	an	activity	that	always	
includes	the	core	attitude	of	taking	content	as	if	it	were	true.		In	other	words,	
supposition	is	the	narrow	sense	always	includes	supposition	in	the	broad	sense.		Or,	
in	other	words,	the	nature	of	supposition	remains	regardless	of	how	we	use	
supposition.		As	Balcerak	Jackson	claims,	the	typical	use	of	supposition	is	
hypothetical	reasoning.		Here	we	hold	a	core	or	basic	attitude	towards	a	content	
treating	it	as	if	it	is	true,	and	we	reason	through	the	consequences	of	that	
proposition	being	true—this	is	the	purpose	to	which	we	put	the	core	attitude.		Given	
this,	hypothetical	reasoning	turns	out	to	be	the	as-if-true	attitude	under	various	
rational	constraints,	such	as	coherence,	consistency,	truth-preservation,	and	so	on.		
Without	these	rational	constraints,	one	cannot	reason	at	all	from	the	proposition	
that	one	takes	to	be	true.		The	same	structure	is	found	in	Ichikawa	and	Jarvis.		As	we	
saw	above,	they	argue	that	one	use	of	supposition	is	to	give	us	access	to	what	is	
possible.		Again,	in	such	cases,	we	hold	a	basic,	or	core,	attitude	towards	
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propositions.		We	consider	these	propositions	true	and	then,	with	the	use	of	various	
constraints	of	rational	coherence,	we	determine	whether	they	inform	us	about	what	
is	possible.		In	both	cases,	then,	the	core	of	supposition	just	is	the	as-if-true	attitude	
put	to	different	uses.		And	in	both	cases,	we	see	‘supposition’	in	the	broad	sense—an	
as-if-true	attitude	toward	any	content—and	in	the	narrow	sense—that	same	as-if-
true	attitude	used	for	different	purposes.	
	 Consider,	next,	question	(2)—how	is	the	as-if-true	attitude	different	than	
belief?		We	can	find	an	answer	by	considering	a	recent	paper	by	Neil	Van	Leeuwen	
(2014).		In	this	article,	Van	Leeuwen	offers	a	way	of	distinguishing	belief	from	a	
group	of	attitudes	that	he	calls	secondary	cognitive	attitudes.		According	to	Van	
Leeuwen,	examples	of	the	secondary	cognitive	attitudes	are	fictional	imagining,	
acceptance	in	a	context,	and	hypothesis.		Van	Leeuwen	calls	these	attitudes	
‘secondary’	because	they	all	share	characteristics	that	contrast	them	with	the	
cognitive	attitude	of	belief.		In	short,	they	are	considered	secondary	because	their	
role	in	eliciting	behavior	is	limited	when	compared	to	the	role	of	belief	in	doing	the	
same.	Belief	can	be	considered	a	primary	cognitive	attitude.		To	demonstrate	this,	
Van	Leeuwen	develops	a	framework	that	consists	of	three	dimensions	by	which	to	
contrast	belief	with	the	secondary	cognitive	attitudes.		These	three	dimensions	are 
cognitive	governance,	practical	setting	independence,	and	evidential	vulnerability.			
	 The	first	dimension	by	which	Van	Leeuwen	distinguishes	belief	from	the	
secondary	cognitive	attitudes	is	cognitive	governance.		We	have	seen	cognitive	
governance	characterized	in	chapter	one.		Recall	that	cognitive	governance	refers	to	
the	informational	background	that	supplies	and	governs	new	inferences	among	
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cognitive	attitudes.		Belief	cognitively	governs	other	cognitive	attitudes	such	as	
imaginings,	supposing,	acceptances,	and	so	on.		However,	those	attitudes	do	not	
cognitively	govern	belief.		Again	consider	the	example	from	Van	Leeuwen:	
	 INITIAL	IMAGINING:	Michelangelo’s	David	falls	off	a	boat	into	the	water.	
	 FACTUAL	BELIEFS:	Michelangelo’s	David	is	marble.		Marble	sinks	in	water.	
	 INFERRED	IMAGINING:	Michelangelo’s	David	is	sinking	in	the	water.	
	
In	this	example,	some	of	our	factual	beliefs	about	the	statue	supply	information	that	
governs	a	new	inference	in	our	imaginings—in	this	case,	given	the	matter	of	which	
the	statue	is	made,	the	statue	would	sink	in	water.		To	show	that	imagining	does	not	
do	this	for	belief,	again	consider	Van	Leeuwen’s	second	example:	
	 INITIAL	FACTUAL	BELIEFS:	Michelangelo’s	David	is	marble.		Marble	sinks	in		
	 	 	 	 	 water.	
	 IMAGINING:	Michelangelo’s	David	falls	off	a	boat	into	the	water.	
	 FACTUAL	BELIEF:	Michelangelo’s	David	is	sinking	in	the	water.	(2014,	702-	
	 	 	 									703)	
	
As	this	example	illustrates,	if	our	imaginings	cognitively	governed	our	beliefs,	then	
we	would	form	absurd	belief	states—in	this	case,	that	Michelangelo’s	David	is	
sinking.	Our	only	reason	for	believing	this	would	be	because	we	imagined	that	it	fell	
off	of	a	boat.		It	is	groundless	in	the	way	that	wishful	thinking	is	and	therefore	
absurd.		Imagining	that	something	is	the	case	is	not	good	grounds	for	taking	it	to	be	
the	case.		Forming	beliefs	in	this	manner	obviously	does	not	happen.		Thus,	Van	
Leeuwen	concludes	that	imagining	does	not	cognitively	govern	belief,	but	belief	
does	cognitively	govern	imagining.		Van	Leeuwen	claims	that	this	generalizes	for	all	
of	the	secondary	cognitive	attitudes.		Thus,	according	to	Van	Leeuwen,	belief	and	the	
secondary	cognitive	attitudes	differ	with	regards	to	the	property	of	cognitive	
governance.			
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	 The	second	dimension	by	which	Van	Leeuwen	distinguishes	belief	from	the	
secondary	cognitive	attitudes	is	practical	setting	independence.		Very	briefly,	
according	to	Van	Leeuwen,	‘practical	setting’	refers	to	the	specific	situation	where	a	
cognitive	attitude	guides	behavior	(2014,	702).		Secondary	cognitive	attitudes	are	
practical	setting	dependent;	they	guide	behavior	only	within	certain	contexts.		One	
example	that	he	gives	is	fictional	imagining.		Fictional	imagining	guides	behavior	in	
the	specific	setting	of	make-believe	play,	or	pretense.		For	instance,	when	I	imagine	
that	I	am	Luke	Skywalker	in	a	light	saber	battle	with	Darth	Vader,	this	imagining	
guides	the	specific	actions	that	I	engage	in	during	this	episode	of	pretense.		In	
contrast,	beliefs	are	practical	setting	independent—they	operate	across	different	
settings	or	contexts	(702).		As	Van	Leeuwen	claims,	“[i]magining	the	furniture	
before	me	is	a	spaceship,	I	continue	to	factually	believe	that	it	is	a	sofa	of	such	and	
such	dimensions	and	cushiness”	(702).		That	this	belief	is	always	there	in	our	
cognitive	background	is	made	evident	by	the	fact	that	we	do	not	attempt	to	“fly”	it	as	
if	it	were	a	spaceship.		According	to	Van	Leeuwen,	then,	belief	and	the	secondary	
cognitive	attitudes	differ	with	regards	to	the	property	of	practical	setting	
independence.	
	 The	third	dimension	by	which	Van	Leeuwen	distinguishes	belief	from	the	
secondary	cognitive	attitudes	is	evidential	vulnerability.		Belief	is	vulnerable	to	
evidence	in	the	sense	that	if	I	believe	that	p	and	come	across	evidence	that	~p,	I	tend	
to	give	up	my	belief	that	p.		If	I	believe	that	my	kids	are	playing	in	the	yard,	but	then	I	
hear	them	fighting	in	the	basement,	I	give	up	my	belief	about	them	being	in	the	yard.		
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Giving	up	such	a	belief	is	not	something	we	do	voluntarily	(704).25		As	Van	Leeuwen	
argues,	“if	contrary	evidence	did	not	extinguish	factual	beliefs,	we	would	be	poor	
survivors.	One’s	factual	beliefs	that	no	hyenas	are	near	must	vanish	on	seeing	fresh	
hyena	tracks,	on	pain	of	being	lunch”	(704).		Other	attitudes	may	be	vulnerable	to	
evidence,	but	they	are	not	vulnerable	in	an	involuntary	sense	like	beliefs.		While	I	
am	imagining	p,	if	I	come	across	evidence	that	~p,	I	need	not	give	up	my	imagining	
of	p.	And	even	if	I	do	give	up	imagining	p,	I	still	have	the	choice	to	stay	with	
imagining	p.		According	to	Van	Leeuwen,	then,	belief	and	the	secondary	cognitive	
attitudes	differ	in	regards	to	the	property	of	evidential	vulnerability.	
	 It	is	important	to	see	that	similar	to	imagining,	supposition	can	be	
distinguished	from	belief	along	Van	Leeuwen’s	three	dimensions.		Supposition	does	
not	cognitively	govern	belief	the	way	that	belief	cognitively	governs	supposition.		If	I	
suppose	p,	and	I	believe	that	if	p,	then	q,	I	might	suppose	q.		In	contrast,	if	I	believe	p,	
and	I	suppose	that	if	p,	then	q,	I	do	not	come	to	believe	q.		Also,	supposition	is	
practically	setting	dependent.		One	only	supposes	for	a	particular	purpose,	in	a	
specific	context.		Finally,	supposition	is	not	evidentially	vulnerable	as	is	belief.		
When	I	suppose	p,	and	I	come	across	evidence	that	~p,	I	need	not	give	up	supposing	
p.		But	as	I	argued	above,	the	as-if-true	attitude	is	the	core	of	supposition.		It	follows	
then	that	the	as-if-true	attitude	can	be	distinguished	from	belief	along	these	three	
dimensions.26		The	as-if-true	attitude,	then,	is	practical	setting	dependent;	whereas	
                                                
25it	is	largely	recognized	that	we	do	not	choose	our	beliefs	(cf.	Williams	1973). 
26	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	fully	argue	that	the	as-if-true	attitude	is	a	secondary	
cognitive	attitude.		I	would	argue	that	the	as-if-true	attitude	is	a	good	candidate	to	unify	the	
secondary	cognitive	attitudes,	but	that	will	have	to	wait	for	another	paper.		 
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belief	is	practical	setting	independent.		The	as-if-true	attitude	is	cognitively	
governed	by	belief,	but	the	reverse	does	not	hold.		The	as-if-true	attitude	is	not	
involuntarily	vulnerable	to	evidence;	whereas,	belief	is	involuntarily	vulnerable	to	
evidence.			
	 To	sum	up	thus	far,	recall	that	the	first	commitment	of	the	AIT	view	is	that	
there	is	a	basic	cognitive	attitude	that	takes	any	content	and	treats	it	as	true—what	I	
call	the	as-if-true	attitude.		This	section	argued	for	that	commitment	by	answering	
two	questions.		Question	(1)	asked	what	reasons	we	have	for	accepting	such	an	
attitude.		My	answer	is	that	we	already	accept	implicitly	it	in	our	conception	of	
supposition.		My	view	makes	it	explicit.		Question	(2)	asked	how	is	the	as-if-true	
attitude	similar	to	belief.		In	comparing	the	as-if-true	attitude	to	belief,	we	have	
gained	a	better	understanding	on	how	to	characterize	that	attitude,	and	we	even	
have	seen	some	preliminary	reasons	to	think	that	imagining	and	supposing	both	
belong	to	the	same	cognitive	capacity—imagining	and	supposing	share	in	the	
properties	that	distinguish	each	of	them	from	belief.			
	 Now	that	we	have	seen	good	reasons	to	accept	the	first	commitment	of	the	
AIT	view,	the	next	two	sections	will	develop	and	argue	for	the	second	commitment	
of	the	AIT	view.		Recall	that	the	second	commitment	is	that	the	as-if-true	attitude	
can	be	constrained	by	different	mental	mechanisms,	attitudes,	and	capacities.		In	the	
literature,	these	are	referred	to	as	‘constraints’.		I	will	develop	the	notion	of	these	
constraints	as	it	applies	to	the	as-if-true	attitude	and	the	Relation	Question,	next.	
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2.1.2	Constraints	
	
	 ‘Constraint’	is	a	technical	term	that	many	philosophers	appeal	to	in	their	
accounts	of	the	imagination.	It	refers	to	a	limit	on	a	cognitive	capacity.		Philosophers	
have	posited	them	for	various	reasons.		Kind	and	Kung	(2016)	have	argued	that	
constraints	are	required	as	a	solution	to	what	is	called	the	puzzle	of	imaginative	use,	
which	is	the	puzzle	of	explaining	how	the	same	capacity	that	allows	us	to	escape	
reality	can	also	inform	us	about	reality.		I	will	turn	to	that	puzzle	below.		Kind	
(2016)	has	argued	that	constraints	are	required	to	give	an	account	of	the	epistemic	
significance	of	imagination—that	the	imagination	can	sometimes	justify	our	
contingent	beliefs	about	the	world.27		Kung	(2010,	2016),	Ichikawa	and	Jarvis	
(2012)	and	Balcerak	Jackson	(2016)	have	all	argued	that	constraints	are	required	to	
give	a	plausible	account	of	the	relation	between	imagination	and	possibility.		If	our	
imaginings	are	not	constrained,	then	we	could	come	to	believe	the	wrong	modal	
facts.		This	is	because	an	unconstrained	imagination	allows	us	to	“imagine”	
scenarios	that	are	impossible	such	as	“water	is	not	H2O”	or	“Hesperus	is	not	
Phosphorus”.		Many	philosophers	share	the	intuition	with	Kripke	that	we	are	not	
really	imagining	such	scenarios.28						 	 	
	 According	to	Kind	and	Kung	(2016)	the	idea	that	something	like	constraints	
have	a	critical	role	to	play	in	a	complete	account	of	the	imagination	can	be	found	in	
both	historical	and	contemporary	treatments	of	the	imagination.		Still,	they	claim,	
none	of	the	treatments	have	sufficiently	developed	the	notion.		Given	that	Kind	and	
                                                
27	See	also,	Currie	(2016).	 
28	Cf.	Kripke	(1980). 
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Kung	(2016)	give	a	relatively	developed	account	of	constraints,	I	will	summarize	
their	account	in	what	follows.		This	summary	will	provide	an	initial	understanding	
of	the	role	that	constraints	will	play	in	the	AIT	view	below.	
	 As	I	mentioned	above,	Kind	and	Kung	see	constraints	as	being	critical	to	
solving	the	puzzle	of	imaginative	use.		This	puzzle	arises	from	the	fact	that	there	
seems	to	be	two	incompatible	uses	of	the	imagination.		The	first	is	what	they	call	the	
transcendent	use.		We	employ	this	transcendent	use	when	the	imagination	
“enable[s]	us	to	escape	or	look	beyond	the	world	as	it	is,	as	when	we	daydream,	
fantasize,	or	pretend”	(Kind	and	Kung	2016,	1).		The	second	is	what	they	call	the	
instructive	use.		We	employ	the	instructive	use	when	the	imagination	“enable[s]	us	
to	learn	about	the	world	as	it	is,	as	when	we	plan	or	make	decisions,	or	predict	the	
future”	(Kind	and	Kung	2016,	1).		The	puzzle	of	imaginative	use	arises	from	
considering	the	following	question:	how	can	the	same	mental	activity	that	allows	us	
to	fly	completely	free	of	reality,	as	in	its	transcendent	use,	also	teach	us	something	
about	it,	as	in	its	instructive	use?		
	 Their	answer	lies	in	the	notion	of	constraints.		They	suggest	that	if	the	
capacity	that	allows	for	the	transcendent	use	is	somehow	reined	in,	then	that	
capacity	can	instruct	us	about	the	world.		As	they	say,	the	instructive	use	of	the	
imagination	requires	constraints	in	order	to	keep	the	imagination	tracking	reality.		If	
our	imagination	was	always	unconstrained,	as	it	is	in	the	transcendent	use,	then	it	
would	be	difficult	for	imagination	to	inform	us	about	reality	(Kung	and	Kind	2016,	
21).		That	is,	it	would	be	an	unreliable	guide	to	reality.	There	is	nothing	about	
imagination	per	se	that	requires	it	to	reliably	track	reality.		We	do	not	tend	to	fault	
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our	imaginings	if	such	imaginings	misinform	us	about	reality.		In	contrast,	we	tend	
to	fault	our	perceptions	if	such	perceptions	misinform	us	about	reality.		Given	that	it	
does	inform	us	about	reality—and	reliably	so	in	certain	circumstances—it	must	do	
so	as	a	result	of	constraints	placed	on	it	from	the	world	and	other	mental	
mechanisms	or	capacities,	such	as	belief.	
	 Kind	and	Kung	discuss	two	primary	classes	of	constraints	that	are	central	to	
imaginative	use.		The	first	class	of	constraints	are	what	they	call	architectural	
constraints.		These	are	constraints	that	result	from	our	cognitive	architecture.		
Various	aspects	of	our	cognitive	architecture,	such	as	our	imagery	mechanism—
responsible	for	forming	mental	images—,	may	limit	what	can	be	imagined.		For	
example,	consider	that	act	of	trying	to	image	a	chiliagon—a	1000	sided	polygon.		
Intuitively,	we	cannot	form	an	image	of	a	chiliagon	qua	chiliagon	because	we	cannot	
perceive	a	chiliagon	qua	chiliagon—we	simply	see	it	as	a	circle.		I	return	to	this	idea	
below.		
	 The	second	class	of	constraints	that	Kind	and	Kung	discuss	are	non-
architectural	constraints.		One	source	of	these	constraints,	they	suggest,	is	our	will.		
Unlike	architectural	constraints,	these	are	constraints	that	we	can	voluntarily	
impose	on	our	imaginative	projects.		In	order	to	see	an	example	of	at	least	two	
architectural	constraints,	consider	Kind	(2016).							
	 As	I	noted	above,	in	this	paper,	Kind	gives	an	explanation	of	the	role	that	our	
imaginings	have	in	justifying	our	contingent	beliefs	about	the	world	(Kind	2016,	
146).		Kind	provides	an	account	of	the	imagination	called	imagining	under	
constraints.	She	argues	that	this	account	can	explain	the	epistemic	significance	of	the	
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imagination	in	these	circumstances.			According	to	Kind,	there	are	two	constraints	
that	provide	our	imaginings	with	epistemic	significance:	the	reality	constraint	and	
the	change	constraint.		Our	imaginings	are	constrained	by	the	reality	constraint	
when	our	imaginings	are	guided	by	the	world	as	it	really	is.		For	instance,	when	I	am	
imagining	whether	a	new	sofa	will	fit	into	my	living	room,	my	imagining	follows	the	
reality	constraint.		Based	on	memory,	I	form	images	of	the	space	of	my	living	room	
and	I	attempt	to	form	an	image	of	the	new	sofa	in	relation	to	the	space	of	that	room.		
In	contrast,	when	I	am	imagining	that	I	can	fly	by	flapping	my	arms	really	hard,	my	
imagining	is	not	being	guided	by	the	reality	constraint.		
	 Our	imaginings	are	constrained	by	the	change	constraint	when,	in	imagining	
a	change	in	the	world,	such	an	imaginative	change	is	the	result	of	a	logical	
consequence.		For	instance,	I	might	imagine	the	following	propositions,	<if	it	is	
raining,	then	the	game	will	be	cancelled>	and	<it	is	raining>.		In	such	an	imagining,	I	
will	likely	infer	<the	game	is	cancelled>.		In	making	this	inference	in	my	imagining,	
my	imagining	is	guided	by	the	change	constraint.		The	change	in	the	imagining	is	
that	the	game	has	been	cancelled.		When	our	imaginings	are	guided	by	the	reality	
and	change	constraints,	those	imaginings	do	provide	epistemic	justification	for	
some	of	our	contingent	beliefs	about	the	world—e.g.,	one’s	imaginings	may	justify	
one’s	belief	that	the	new	sofa	will	fit	and	that	the	game	will	be	cancelled.		Thus,	
according	to	Kind,	imagining	under	certain	constraints	provides	epistemic	
significance	to	some	of	our	imaginings.		
	 I	am	sympathetic	to	Kind	and	Kung’s,	and	Kind’s	account	of	constraints.			
However,	there	are	at	least	two	questions	that	need	to	be	addressed	to	flesh	out	
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their	account	for	the	purposes	of	developing	and	arguing	for	the	AIT	view.		These	
two	questions	are	the	following:		(1)	how	do	the	constraints	constrain?		Kind	and	
Kung	(2016)	do	not	directly	address	this	question,	nor	does	Kind	(2016),	although	it	
seems	implicit	in	her	discussion	of	the	reality	and	change	constraints.		(2)	Do	
distinct	constraints	interact	with	one	another	in	any	interesting	way?			
	 Consider	(1)	first.		I	argue	that	there	are	two	ways	in	which	the	constraints	
constrain.		Let’s	consider	the	non-architectural	constraints	first.		Non-architectural	
constraints	constrain	in	a	normative	manner.		To	say	that	such	constraints	constrain	
in	a	normative	manner	means	that	such	constraints	place	limits	of	consistency	or	
appropriateness	on	our	imaginative	activities.		For	instance,	Kind’s	reality	constraint	
provides	norms	of	how	we	should	imagine	certain	content.	The	norms	are	derived	
from	the	way	that	world	is	and	demand	that	our	imaginings	fit	with	the	way	the	
world	is.		If	we	are	imagining	that	humans	can	fly	by	flapping	their	arms	vigorously,	
then	such	imagining	would	violate	the	reality	constraint.		Kind’s	change	constraint	is	
another	example	of	a	non-architectural	constraint.		It	provides	logical	norms	that	
guide	our	imaginings.		If	in	our	imaginings,	we	imagine	<if	it	is	snowing,	then	the	
game	will	be	cancelled>	and	<the	game	has	been	cancelled>,	and	infer	in	our	
imaginings	<it	is	snowing>,	then	our	imaginings	are	violating	the	change	constraint.		
	 As	another	example	of	a	non-architectural	constraint,	consider	genre.			
According	to	Liao	(2016),	“[g]enre	influences	the	propositions	that	are	warranted	to	
be	fictional	in	a	narrative	and	the	ways	that	one	ought	to,	and	actually	does,	engage	
with	a	narrative”	(470).		As	this	quote	makes	clear,	genre	constrains	one’s	
imaginings	in	the	normative	sense.		By	establishing	norms	of	convention	and	
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expectation,	genres	establish	what	is	appropriate	to	imagine	while	one	is	engaging	
some	narrative,	and	what	is	not	appropriate	to	imagine	while	engaging	the	same	
narrative.		From	this,	we	see	that	in	the	case	of	genre,	as	in	the	other	cases	of	non-
architectural	constraints	that	Kind	and	Kung	highlight,	the	non-architectural	
constraints	constrain	by	providing	norms	for	successfully	undertaking	a	particular	
imaginative	project.	
	 Next,	consider	the	architectural	constraints.		In	contrast	to	the	non-
architectural	constraints,	architectural	constraints	constrain	in	virtue	of	the	various	
relations	that	obtain	between	various	mental	mechanisms	and	mental	states.		Our	
cognitive	architecture	has	a	particular	structure,	and	this	structure	places	limits	on	
which	relations	obtain	between	various	mental	mechanisms	and	mental	states.	For	
instance,	consider	the	imagery	mechanism.		There	are	certain	contents	that	the	
imagery	mechanism	cannot	bring	about.		It	is	not	that	our	imagery	mechanisms	
ought	not	to	image	a	square-circle;	it	is	rather	that	our	imagery	mechanism	cannot	
image	a	square-circle.		If	one	is	worried	that	a	square-circle	is	an	impossible	object,	
and	so	think	that	the	imagery	mechanism	cannot	be	faulted	for	failing	to	image	such	
an	object,	then	we	can	use	the	example	of	a	chiliagon	or	myriagon,	which	are	
possible	objects	that	cannot	be	imaged.		
	 	We	can	gain	traction	on	the	idea	that	the	imagery	mechanism	constrains	in	
this	manner	by	considering	a	view	recently	defended	by	Bence	Nanay	(2010a,	2013,	
2015,	2016).		Nanay	defends	a	version	of	the	Similar	Content	view—a	view	that	
attempts	to	explain	the	phenomenal	similarities	between	perception	and	mental	
imagery.			
 62 
	 According	to	Nanay,	we	should	think	of	the	content	of	perception	and	mental	
imagery	as	predicative—that	is,	as	involving	the	attribution	of	properties	to	objects.		
Perceptual	states	attribute	properties	to	perceived	objects,	and	mental	imagery	
states	attribute	properties	to	imagined	objects	(Nanay,	2016).		Whether	I	am	
perceiving	my	black	iPhone	on	the	table	or	imagining	it	on	the	table,	Nanay	argues	
that	the	content	of	each	state	is	exactly	the	same,	and	it	is	this	sameness	in	content	
that	grounds	the	sameness	in	phenomenology	between	perceived	objects	and	
imagined	objects.		However,	there	are	also	differences	between	perception	and	
mental	imagery.		Most	notably,	there	is	what	has	been	called	a	difference	in	the	
“feeling	of	presence”.		When	I	see	my	laptop	before	me,	I	have	a	feeling	that	it	is	
present	before	me,	but	when	I	form	a	mental	image	of	my	laptop,	I	do	not	have	a	
feeling	that	it	is	present	before	me.		Some	argue	that	this	difference	can	be	explained	
in	terms	of	a	difference	in	intensity—the	properties	attributed	in	perception	are	
more	determinate	than	the	properties	attributed	in	mental	imagery	(Nanay	2016).			
	 Nanay	disagrees.		According	to	Nanay,	the	difference	is	not	do	to	a	difference	
in	determinacy	where	perceptual	content	is	more	determinate	than	imagined	
content.		He	argues	that	imagined	content	can	be	just	as	determinate	if	not	more	
determinate	than	perceptual	content.		Rather,	he	argues	that	the	difference	in	
determinacy	comes	from	the	different	ways	in	which	properties	are	attributed	in	
perception	and	mental	imagery.		In	perception,	the	properties	are	attributed	to	the	
object	in	a	bottom-up	manner—the	properties	are	“read	off”	of	your	experience;	but	
in	mental	imagery,	the	properties	are	attributed	to	the	object	in	a	top-down	
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manner—the	properties	come	from	your	memories,	beliefs,	and	so	on.		Nanay	
(2016)	claims:	
	 If	you	are	looking	at	the	apple	and	you	are	attending	to	the	exact	shade	of	red		
	 of	the	patch	on	its	righthand	side,	the	high	determinacy	of	this	attributed		
	 color	property	comes	in	a	bottom-up	manner	from	what	you	see.		But	if	you	
	 close	your	eyes	and	visualize	an	apple,	you	can	still	attribute	this	very	
	 determinate	property	to	the	patch	on	the	righthand	side	of	the	apple,	but	in	
	 this	case,	this	determinacy	comes	in	a	top-down	manner:	from	our	memory	
	 or	belief	or	expectations	(129).	
	
	 Nanay’s	Similar	Content	view	illustrates	how	the	imagery	mechanism	can	
constrain	what	can	be	imagined.		Suppose	Nanay	is	correct.		It	follows	that	our	
imagery	mechanism	is	constrained	by	our	perception.				
	 In	order	to	see	this,	consider	the	difference	between	forming	a	mental	image	
of	a	triangle	on	my	kitchen	table	and	forming	a	mental	image	of	a	chiliagon	on	my	
kitchen	table.		The	former	activity	takes	minimal	effort	for	us	to	do.		However,	it	is	
not	clear	that	we	can	successfully	do	the	latter.		In	the	case	of	the	triangle,	one	can	
“see”	the	mental	image	as	that	of	a	triangle.		In	the	case	of	a	chiliagon,	one	cannot	
simply	“see”	from	the	mental	image	that	it	is	a	chiliagon.		This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	
chiliagons	(depending	on	their	size)	are	virtually	indistinguishable	from	circles.		
When	perceiving	most	chiliagons,	our	visual	system	sees	them	as	circles;	though	
with	sufficient	zoom,	we	could	be	shown	that	the	object	is	actually	a	1000-sided	
polygon.			
	 It	is	in	this	way	that	we	can	say	the	imagery	mechanism	constrains	according	
to	its	relation	within	our	cognitive	architecture.		The	imagery	mechanism	primarily	
receives	inputs	from	perception.		In	this	way,	it	cannot	image	an	object,	which	has	
not	yet	been	experienced	by	perception.		Thus,	perception	acts	as	a	constraint	on	
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our	mental	imagery,	and	mental	imagery	acts	as	a	constraint	on	our	imaginings.		In	a	
slogan:	If	you	cannot	perceive	it,	you	cannot	image	it.		Does	this	answer	generalize	to	
other	architectural	constraints?		I	argue	that	it	does.		Plausibly,	the	conative	and	
affective	mechanisms,	due	to	their	relations	within	our	cognitive	architecture,	can	
constrain	our	imaginative	activities.29		For	example,	if	we	are	invited	to	imagine	a	
world	where	justice	is	a	fiction,	we	might	resist	complying	because	we	have	an	
aversion	to	such	worlds—we	do	not	desire	to	imagine	such	worlds.			
	 Thus,	we	have	answer	to	the	question	of	how	the	constraints	constrain.		The	
architectural	constraints	constrain	in	virtue	of	their	relation	to	our	overall	cognitive	
architecture.		And	non-architectural	constraints	constrain	by	providing	norms	to	
guide	the	imaginative	activity.	
	 	We	are	now	in	a	position	to	answer	question	(2):	do	distinct	constraints	
interact	in	any	interesting	way?		The	answer	to	this	is	yes,	and	we	can	see	that	it	is	
so	if	we	consider	the	example	of	genre.		As	we	saw	above,	genre	as	a	non-
architectural	constraint	provides	norms	for	what	is	appropriate	to	imagine.		Given	
the	way	that	our	affective	and	conative	mechanisms	relate	within	our	cognitive	
architecture,	there	are	some	things	we	are	unable	or	unwilling	to	imagine.		Although	
these	are	architectural	constraints,	they	are	sensitive	to	non-architectural	
constraints,	such	as	genre.		More	specifically,	some	non-architectural	constrains	can	
influence	how	the	architectural	constraints	constrain.		For	example,	my	conative	and	
affective	mechanisms	ordinarily	resist	finding	a	head	decapitation	scene	to	be	funny,	
                                                
29	Though	as	we	will	see	below,	this	claim	will	be	modified	to	make	room	for	cases	where	we	desire	
things	in	a	fiction	that	we	would	not	desire	in	the	real	world. 
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whether	in	reality	or	in	my	imagination.		However,	genre	can	have	a	disarming	affect	
on	those	mechanisms.		When	I	learn	the	conventions	of	dark	comedy,	my	
expectations	change.		I	come	to	see	that	the	appropriate	response	to	a	head	
decapitation	scene	can	be	one	of	laughter.30		My	conative	and	affective	mechanisms	
follow	suit	and	they	do	not	resist,	though	they	would	resist	in	most	ordinary	
situations.		It	follows,	then,	that	some	non-architectural	constraints	can	put	a	
temporary	hold	on	certain	architectural	constraints.31		This	is	at	least	one	example	
of	how	distinct	constraints	can	interact	in	interesting	ways.	
	 Thus	far,	we	have	seen	examples	of	both	architectural	and	non-architectural	
constraints,	their	differences,	and	how	they	constrain	in	certain	key	cases.		At	this	
point,	however,	one	may	wonder	if	talk	of	‘constraints’	is	misleading.		After	all,	when	
we	are	engaging	a	novel,	we	are	not	really	thinking	about	the	things	that	we	cannot,	
or	will	not,	imagine.		Rather,	we	are	focusing	on	the	story	and	enjoying	the	
imaginative	activity.		Part	of	what	makes	the	imaginative	activity	worthwhile	and	
enjoyable	are	the	ways	in	which	the	activity	moves	us.		It	is	difficult	to	understand	
what	we	mean	by	‘being	moved’	if	we	are	not	at	least	in	part	referring	to	the	
conative	and	affective	mechanisms.		Now,	even	though	the	conative	and	affective	
mechanisms	responsible	for	this	affective	response	can	be	referred	to	as	
‘constraints’,	this	characterization	seems	to	leave	something	out.		Such	mechanisms	
are	not	merely	restricting	or	constraining	what	can	be	imagined;	they	are—more	
importantly—coloring	or	embellishing	the	content	of	our	imagining.		It	is	more	
                                                
30	This	example	comes	from	Liao	(2013). 
31	Weinberg	(2008)	modifies	an	account	from	Weinberg	and	Meskin	(2006)	showing	that	genre	can	
reconfigure	our	architectural	mechanisms. 
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appropriate	to	refer	to	them	as	“decor”	or	“flourishes”	than	it	is	to	refer	to	them	
merely	as	constraints.			
	 Given	these	considerations,	I	agree	that	referring	to	such	mechanisms	as	
constraints	runs	the	risk	of	being	misleading.		To	mitigate	this	risk,	it	is	important	to	
see	that	the	same	mental	mechanisms	responsible	for	constraining	our	imaginings	
are	also	responsible	for	adding	decor	to	our	imaginings.		We	could	think	of	the	
constraint/decor	as	two	sides	of	the	same	coin.		Yet,	to	explain	the	metaphor,	a	
better	way	to	think	of	it	is	in	terms	of	cause	and	effect.		One	effect	of	the	constraints	
is	to	embellish	our	imaginative	activities.		The	other	effect,	as	we	have	seen,	is	to	
rein	in	what	we	can	successfully	imagine.		Different	activities	will	make	each	effect	
more	salient.	For	instance,	if	we	are	beginning	with	an	unconstrained	imaginative	
activity	such	as	the	core	of	supposition,	then	when	we	add	more	mental	
mechanisms,	what	we	can	successfully	imagine	becomes	constrained.		So	it	would	
be	natural	to	refer	to	them	as	‘constraints’.		However,	when	we	are	beginning	with	
an	imaginative	activity	such	as	engaging	a	narrative,	already	a	constrained	
imaginative	activity,	the	mental	mechanisms	are	clearly	seen	to	be	responsible	for	
coloring	or	embellishing	the	content	of	our	imaginings.		And	here,	it	would	of	course	
be	natural	to	refer	to	them	as	décor	rather	than	constraints.			
	 With	this	much	characterization,	we	are	in	a	better	position	to	see	the	role	
that	they	play	in	the	AIT	view.		We	have	seen	that	constraints	are	called	upon	to	
solve	the	puzzle	of	imaginative	use.	They	also	are	used	to	explain	how	the	
imagination	can	have	epistemic	significance.		And	they	are	used	to	explain	how	the	
imagination	can	give	evidence	for	what	is	possible.		In	all	of	these,	constraints	are	
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necessary	in	order	to	solve	a	problem	or	explain	a	feature.		My	AIT	view	is	that	
constraints	are	also	necessary	to	properly	characterize	the	relation	between	
supposition	and	imagination.		To	be	sure,	I	am	not	the	first	to	suggest	that	
constraints	have	a	role	in	explaining	the	differences	between	supposition	and	
imagination.		Many	have	discussed	constraints	either	implicitly	or	explicitly	in	their	
discussions	of	supposition	and	imagination	(Balcerak	Jackson	2016,	Meskin	and	
Weinberg	2006,	Currie	and	Ravenscroft	2002,	Arcangeli	2014).		The	problem—as	
we	saw	in	chapter	one—is	that	they	have	wrongly	argued	either	that	supposition	
and	imagination	are	distinct	capacities	or	that	supposition	is	a	kind	of	imagining.		
While	I	agree	with	these	philosophers	that	constraints	play	a	necessary	role	in	
explaining	the	differences	between	supposing	and	imagining,	what	is	distinctive	
about	my	view	is	that	certain	constraints	are	essential	to	the	imagining;	all	
imaginings	are	due	to	constraints	on	the	as-if-true	attitude.			
2.1.3	As-If-true	Attitude	under	Constraints	
	
As	I	mentioned	above,	the	AIT	view	has	two	basic	commitments:	first,	there	
is	a	basic	cognitive	attitude	that	I	call	the	as-if-true	attitude,	which	is	distinct	from	
other	familiar	cognitive	attitudes	such	as	belief.		Second,	this	basic	cognitive	attitude	
can	be	constrained	in	various	ways.		When	this	as-if-true	attitude	is	unconstrained,	
it	can	entertain	any	content	as	if	it	were	true.		Here,	as	I	argued	above,	this	attitude	
just	is	the	core	of	supposition.	When	this	same	as-if-true	attitude	is	limited	by	
various	constraints,	the	result	is	one	of	the	more	familiar	variety	of	imaginings.		So	
in	one	specific	sense	of	the	term	‘supposition’—supposition	in	the	broad	sense—,		
imagination	is	simply	supposition	under	constraints.		The	rest	of	this	section	will	
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develop	and	argue	for	this	claim.		Doing	this	will	give	us	reason	to	accept	the	second	
commitment	of	the	AIT	view.		
It	is	important	to	see	that	on	this	view,	supposition	and	imagination	share	
the	same	cognitive	attitude:	the	as-if-true	attitude.		It	is	the	same	attitude	whether	
we	are	supposing	that	there	are	a	finite	number	of	prime	numbers	or	whether	we	
are	imagining	Dorian	Gray’s	Faustian	bargain.		What	makes	these	activities	distinct	
are	the	various	constraints	that	limit	that	attitude.		Supposing	that	there	are	a	finite	
number	of	prime	numbers	is	clearly	an	unconstrained	attitude.		One	simply	takes	
that	proposition	and	considers	it	to	be	true.		Imagining	Dorian	Gray’s	Faustian	
bargain	is	very	clearly	a	constrained	attitude.		It	requires	being	guided	by	the	
narrative	that	triggers	all	sorts	of	imagery,	affective	and	conative	mechanisms.		Yet,	
even	in	this	case,	it	is	important	to	see	that	one	still	minimally	holds	the	as-if-true	
attitude	to	the	propositions	of	the	story	The	Picture	of	Dorian	Gray.		I	think	that	a	
similar	idea	can	be	found	in	other	cognitive	attitudes.		Seeing	this	will	bring	clarity	
to	the	AIT	view.		Thus,	by	way	of	analogy,	let’s	consider	belief.			
Arguably,	it	is	orthodoxy	in	philosophy	of	mind	to	understand	‘belief’	as	the	
is-true	attitude.		When	I	believe	that	there	is	a	vase	of	roses	on	my	kitchen	table,	I	
hold	the	is-true	attitude	toward	the	proposition	<there	is	a	vase	of	roses	on	my	
kitchen	table>.		This	view	is	plausible	because	it	gives	us	a	natural	way	to	explain	
our	behavior.		For	instance,	my	belief	that	there	are	roses	on	the	table—my	holding	
that	proposition	to	be	true—can	explain	my	rose-appreciating-behavior	as	when	I	
tell	my	wife	how	lovely	the	roses	are.			
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This	same	attitude	admits	of	minimal	sorts	and	complex	sorts.		The	attitude	
remains	minimal	when	it	is	merely	holds	a	proposition	as	true.			It	becomes	a	
complex	attitude	when	it	carries	with	it	various	conative	and	affective	stances.32		As	
an	example	of	the	former,	suppose	that	after	checking	the	weather	on	my	phone,	I	
form	the	belief	that	it	will	rain	tomorrow.		I	hold	the	is-true	attitude	to	the	
proposition	<it	will	rain	tomorrow>.		This	attitude	will	explain	much	of	my	behavior	
the	following	day,	such	as	carrying	an	umbrella,	or	leaving	earlier	to	allow	for	extra	
drive	time	behavior.		Such	a	belief	is	minimal	in	that	it	does	not	and,	in	fact,	need	not	
carry	with	it	various	conative	and	affective	stances.		This	can	be	seen	by	realizing	
that,	though	I	do	hold	the	is-true	attitude	(i.e.,	belief)	towards	the	proposition	<it	
will	rain	tomorrow>,	I	do	not	have	to	be	for	the	truth	of	the	proposition.		That	is,	I	
need	not	really	care	about	the	truth	of	the	proposition	per	se.		(Although	I	might	care	
about	not	getting	wet,	which	explains	how	the	minimal	belief	can	interact	with	my	
desires	to	explain	my	behavior.)		As	a	result,	the	is-true	attitude	in	the	minimal	
sense	is	compatible	with	being	indifferent	to	the	truth	value	of	the	proposition	that	
is	the	object	of	that	attitude.			
This	is	not	the	case	with	the	is-true	attitude	in	the	complex	sense.	Consider	
the	following	belief.		I	believe	that	my	wife,	Randi,	is	honest.		The	full	meaning	of	this	
propositional	attitude	is	not	captured	by	saying	that	I	hold	the	proposition	<my	
wife,	Randi,	is	honest>	as	true.		There	is	also	a	real	sense	in	which	I	am	for	the	truth	
                                                
32	What	I	am	proposing	here	is	largely	influenced	by	Howard-Snyder	(2013)	whose	paper	in	the	
philosophy	of	religion	delineates	a	notion	he	calls	propositional	faith.		He	proposes	that	propositional	
faith	is	an	attitude	that	always	includes	certain	affective	and	conative	stances	towards	the	
proposition.		Thus	propositional	faith	would	always	be	a	propositional	attitude	in	the	complex	sense	
on	my	view. 
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of	this	proposition.		I	have	strong	conative	and	affective	stances	towards	this	
proposition.		I	do	not	merely	take	it	as	true,	I	also	desire	and	care	that	it	be	true.		I	
would	be	pained	if	it	turned	out	to	be	false.		Thus,	belief,	or	the	is-true	attitude	in	the	
complex	sense,	is	not	compatible	with	being	indifferent	to	the	truth	value	of	the	
proposition	that	is	the	object	of	that	attitude.		One	cannot	explain	all	of	my	wife-
related	behavior	with	just	belief	in	the	minimal	sense.	
It	is	important	to	stress	that	I	take	a	minimal	belief	like	the	belief	<it	will	rain	
tomorrow>	and	my	belief	that	<my	wife,	Randi,	is	honest>	to	involve	the	same	
attitude.		We	can	talk	of	their	differences	in	the	same	manner	that	I	do	for	supposing	
and	imagining—by	employing	the	notion	of	constraints.		Minimal	belief	is	the	is-true	
attitude	without	conative	and	affective	constraints.		Belief	in	the	complex	sense	is	
the	is-true	attitude	under	certain	conative	and	affective	constraints.		This,	prima	
facie,	is	a	plausible	way	to	characterize	belief.		It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	
fully	defend	this	view	of	belief.		As	I	mentioned	above,	I	use	it	here	for	illustrative	
purposes.		In	particular,	it	serves	as	an	analogy	for	how	we	can	have	the	same	
cognitive	attitude—in	this	case,	belief—that	can	be	unconstrained	or	constrained	
and	so	it	can	admit	of	a	minimal	and	a	complex	sense.		What	I	call	the	core	of	
supposition	is	the	as-if-true	attitude	without	constraints.		It	is	an	attitude	in	a	
minimal	sense	because	it	is	merely	concerned	with	taking	a	certain	content	as	if	it	is	
true.		Imagination	is	the	same	as-if-true	attitude	under	various	constraints.		It	is	an	
attitude	in	a	complex	sense	because	it	is	not	merely	concerned	with	taking	a	content	
as	if	it	is	true.		It	is	also	concerned	with	forming	an	experiential	perspective	of	the	
content	or	as	Moran	(1994)	put	it,	such	imagining	“involves	something	more	like	a	
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genuine	rehearsal,	“trying	on”	the	point	of	view”	(105).		This	will	include	forming	
various	images,	taking	certain	affective	and	conative	stances	towards	the	content,	
and	so	on.		
This,	then,	gives	us	reasons	to	accept	the	second	commitment	of	the	AIT	
view—the	as-if-true	attitude	can	be	constrained	by	various	mental	mechanisms	and	
capacities.		When	it	is	so	constrained,	it	is	imagining.		Recall	that	the	as-if-true	
attitude	is	a	kind	of	supposition—the	core	of	supposition.		Thus,	all	imagining	is	a	
kind	of	supposing.		In	the	next	section,	I	will	defend	this	claim	further	by	showing	
that	the	AIT	view	can	explain	all	of	the	features	(Similarity,	Ability	Difference,	and	
the	Emotional	Difference).		Before	that,	however,	I	want	to	discuss	how	the	AIT	
view	can	be	modeled	in	a	very	natural	way	using	possible	worlds.			
As	has	been	rehearsed	many	times,	we	can	use	possible	worlds	to	analyze	the	
different	kinds	of	modality	in	natural	language.		As	the	story	typically	goes,	we	can	
think	of	modal	like	“must”	and	“can”	as	quantifiers	over	possible	worlds.		“Must	p”	is	
true	just	in	case	p	is	true	at	all	possible	worlds.		“Can	p”	is	true	just	in	case	p	is	true	
at	some	world	or	other.		But	as	has	often	been	observed,	‘must’	can	mean	different	
things.		“I	must	pay	my	parking	ticket”	means	something	different	than	“if	I	drop	the	
ball,	it	must	go	down”.		These	both	differ	in	meaning	from	“because	the	van	is	in	the	
driveway,	my	wife	must	be	home”.		In	order	to	capture	this	difference,	we	posit	
different	accessibility	relations	which	gives	us	different	sets	of	possible	worlds.		
These	different	sets	of	possible	worlds	are	different	“modal	bases”	for	the	modals	to	
quantify	over	in	different	contexts.		In	restricting	the	overall	sets	of	possible	worlds	
to	different	modal	bases,	we	are	able	to	model	different	modalities	(e.g.,	logical,	
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epistemic,	nomological,	physical,	and	so	on).		“If	I	drop	the	ball,	it	must	go	down”	is	
true	just	in	case	in	all	of	the	accessible	worlds—in	this	case,	worlds	that	share	our	
physical	laws—where	I	drop	the	ball,	it	goes	down.33		This	is	a	case	of	physical	
possibility.		In	such	a	case,	the	modal	base	is	restricted	to	the	set	of	possible	worlds	
that	share	our	physical	laws.		In	the	case	of	logical	possibility	the	modal	base	is	
much	more	expansive,	arguably,	it	is	the	set	of	all	possible	worlds.		
	 The	AIT	view	can	be	modeled	in	a	similar	way.	Recall	that,	according	to	the	
AIT	view,	all	imaginings	are	different	kinds	of	supposings.		We	can	distinguish	
between	the	different	kinds	of	supposition	in	the	same	way	that	we	distinguish	
between	different	forms	of	modality—logical,	physical,	deontic,	and	so	on—,	
namely,	with	sets	of	possible	worlds	or	“modal	bases”.		This	is	not	to	say	that	the	
different	kinds	of	supposition	correspond	to	the	different	forms	of	modality.34		
Rather,	it	is	to	say	that	the	same	process,	or	processes,	that	generate	different	forms	
of	modality,	can	also	generate	the	different	kinds	of	supposition,	namely	the	
processes	that	restrict	the	set	of	possible	worlds.		That	is,	just	as	one	can	model	the	
difference	between	logical	possibility	and	physical	possibility	by	restricting	the	set	
of	possible	worlds,	resulting	in	different	modal	bases	over	which	to	quantify,	so	too	
can	you	model	the	difference	between	the	core	of	supposition	and	robust	imagining	
by	restricting	the	set	of	possible	worlds.		These	different	“modal	bases”	represent	
                                                
33	These	ideas	are	based	on	Kratzer	(1977).		In	her	analysis,	in	addition	to	a	modal	base,	she	argues	
that	we	need	to	posit	an	ordering	source—a	partial	ordering	of	worlds	in	the	modal	base	relative	to	
each	other,	but	this	complication	does	not	matter	for	my	purposes. 
34	If	this	turned	out	to	be	true	it	would	be	a	very	interesting	fact	about	ourselves	and	our	world.		It	
would	require	more	argument	to	establish	this	than	is	possible	in	this	project,	so	it	will	have	to	wait	
for	a	future	project.		It	is	worth	noting	that	something	similar	to	this	might	be	correct	as	some	
philosophers	have	already	argued	that	certain	constraints	help	the	imagination	track	what	is	
metaphysically	possible	(cf.	Kung	2010,	Ichikawa	and	Jarvis	2012,	Balcerak	Jackson	2016).		
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the	available	possibilities	that	one	could	hold	the	as-if-true	attitude	towards.		
Because	we	can	suppose	anything,	the	as-if-true	attitude	without	constraints	will	
have	a	very	expansive	“modal	base”—the	set	of	all	possible	worlds.			
	 However,	when	we	add	constraints	to	the	as-if-true	attitude,	the	“modal	
base”	becomes	more	restricted.		As	an	example,	consider	the	imagery	constraint.		
When	the	imagery	constraint	is	triggered,	all	of	the	propositions	that	cannot	be	
imaged	get	shut	out—the	imagery	constraint	restricts	the	accessibility	relations	to	
those	possible	worlds.		To	illustrate,	we	can	again	use	the	example	of	the	chiliagon.		
There	is	nothing	logically	impossible	about	a	chiliagon.		But	for	beings	like	us,	it	is	
impossible	to	form	an	image	of	one.		So	the	possible	worlds	available	for	the	as-if-
true	attitude—when	the	imagery	constraint	is	triggered—do	not	include	chiliagon	
possible	worlds.		
	 Although	this	model	seems	to	have	explanatory	power,	there	is	a	significant	
problem	with	it.		The	problem	is	that	the	model	of	‘supposition’	is	incomplete.		This	
is	because	on	the	standard	possible	worlds	semantics,	a	given	content,	or	
proposition,	is	a	set	of	possible	worlds	at	which	the	content	is	true.		However,	we	
can	suppose	anything	including	impossible	contents.		For	instance,	in	Euclid’s	
famous	proof,	one	supposes	that	there	are	a	finite	number	of	prime	numbers.		From	
this	supposition,	one	derives	a	contradiction.		The	proposition	that	there	are	a	finite	
number	of	prime	numbers	is	false	and	necessarily	false.			
	 Moreover,	it	is	not	only	that	we	can	suppose	impossible	contents,	we	often	
believe	contents	that	are	impossible.		That	is,	we	sometimes	believe	things	that	turn	
out	to	be	necessarily	false.		On	the	standard	possible	worlds	model,	all	of	these	
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beliefs	would	be	modeled	on	the	null	set.		But	this	does	not	seem	right	as	we	want	to	
make	distinctions	between	impossible	beliefs,	or	even	better,	we	want	to	make	
distinctions	between	the	impossible	contents	of	any	representational	state	(e.g.,	
beliefs,	supposings,	desires,	and	so	on).			
	 Following	an	example	from	Nolan	(2013),	suppose	someone,	as	a	result	of	an	
arithmetical	error,	comes	to	believe	a	wrong	sum,	say	492+365=757.		Suppose	also	
that	someone,	captivated	by	naïve	set	theory,	comes	to	believe	that	there	is	a	set	of	
sets	that	are	not	members	of	themselves.		Both	of	these	contents	are	necessarily	
false.		However,	as	Nolan	points	out,	it	does	not	follow	that	one	who	believes	one	of	
these	must	also	believe	the	other.		The	null	set	does	not	allow	us	to	make	these	
intuitive	distinctions.		
	 This	problem	has	motivated	some	philosophers	to	posit	impossible	worlds	
(cf.	Jago	2014;	Nolan	2013).		If	we	add	impossible	worlds,	then	we	can	keep	these	
intuitive	distinctions	between	different	impossible	contents.		The	impossible	world	
where	there	is	a	set	of	all	sets	that	are	not	members	of	themselves	is	intuitively	
different	than	the	impossible	world	where	492+365=757.		The	different	impossible	
worlds	allow	us	to	represent	distinct	impossible	contents.			
	 Possible	(and	impossible)	worlds	offer	a	plausible	model	of	the	AIT	view.		
When	we	start	with	the	as-if-true	attitude	without	constraints,	the	content	to	which	
we	can	bear	the	as-if-true	attitude	is	the	set	of	all	possible	worlds	and	the	set	of	all	
impossible	worlds.		And	when	the	constraints	are	added,	this	“modal	base”	becomes	
more	restricted.		
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In	developing	the	AIT	view,	we	have	seen	a	plausible	proposal	of	the	relation	
between	supposition	and	imagination.		What	remains	to	be	seen	is	why	we	should	
accept	it.		I	show	this	next.	
	
§	2.2	All	Imagining	is	a	Kind	of	Supposing:	A	Defense	
	
In	this	section,	I	defend	the	AIT	view.		As	mentioned	above,	this	view	is	a	
version	of	a	one-nature	view.		Unlike	Balcerak	Jackson	and	other	two-nature	views,	I	
endorse	the	common	nature	thesis.		However,	unlike	current	one-nature	views,	I	do	
not	argue	that	supposition	is	a	kind	of	imagining.	Instead,	I	argue	imagining	is	a	kind	
of	supposition.		More	specifically,	imagining	and	supposing,	as	they	are	typically	
understood,	both	belong	to	the	as-if-true	attitude.		Yet,	because	I	argued	that	the	as-
if-true	attitude	is	the	core	of	supposition,	the	AIT	view	implies	that	there	are	many	
kinds	of	supposition—many	of	which	are	distinct	imaginings.		The	AIT	view	is	able	
to	explain	all	of	the	features	that	any	view	of	the	relation	between	supposition	and	
imagination	must	explain.		As	we	saw	in	chapter	1,	both	two-nature	and	one-nature	
views	fail	to	do	this.		Two-nature	views	fail	to	explain	Similarity.		One-nature	views	
fail	to	explain	both	the	Ability	Difference	and	the	Emotional	Difference.		My	
defense	comes	in	two	stages.		First,	I	show	how	the	AIT	view	explains	Similarity,	
the	Ability	Difference,	and	the	Emotional	Difference.		Second,	I	offer	a	response	to	
an	argument	from	Kind	(2013).	Kind	offers	an	argument	that	can	be	read	as	
undermining	the	common	nature	thesis,	which	would	undermine	all	one-nature	
views.	Offering	a	response	to	her	argument	further	vindicates	my	view.			
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Finally,	I	return	to	the	Unification	Question.		Recall	that,	in	general,	that	
question	asks:	what	is	the	imagination?		More	specifically,	the	question	is	concerned	
with	whether	there	is	an	account	of	the	imagination	that	can	unify	all	of	the	different	
activities	that	we	call	‘imagination’.	Recall	also	that	I	indicated	that	much	of	my	
argument	would	focus	on	answering	the	Relation	Question	and	that	the	AIT	view	
that	provides	an	answer	to	the	Relation	Question	would	also	provide	an	answer	to	
the	Unification	Question.		I	end	this	chapter	by	demonstrating	that	in	offering	a	
response	Kind’s	argument, the	AIT	view,	also,	provides	an	answer	to	the	Unification	
Question—namely,	the	question	of	what	the	imagination	is.		
2.2.1	Explaining	the	Features		
	
Recall	the	set	of	features	that	any	view	of	the	relation	between	supposition	
and	imagination	must	account	for:	 	
	 Similarity:	Given	that	there	are	vague	boundaries	between	supposition	and		
	 	 									imagination,	it	is	possible	to	confuse	one	with	the	other.	
	
	 Ability	Difference:	We	are	able	to	suppose	more	propositional	contents	than		
	 	 	 												we	can	imagine;	however,	in	our	imaginings,	we	are	able		
	 	 	 												to	experience	in	fine-grained	ways	phenomenal	contents.	
	
	 Emotional	Difference:	Supposition	rarely	triggers	affect	and	desire;		
	 	 	 	 						imagination	very	often	triggers	both	affect	and		
	 	 	 	 					desire,	and	can	even	motivate	us	to	action.	
	
According	to	the	AIT	view,	supposition	and	imagination	share	the	same	
cognitive	capacity.		In	particular,	I	have	argued	that	they	are	in	fact	the	same	
cognitive	attitude.		This	allows	for	a	natural	explanation	of	Similarity.		Given	that	
supposition	and	imagination	are	both	the	same	as-if-true	cognitive	attitude,	it	
should	not	come	as	a	surprise	that	we	can	often	confuse	one	for	the	other.		What	
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starts	off	as	the	as-if-true	attitude	without	constraints	can	easily	slide	into	the	as-if-
true	attitude	under	constraints.		Recall	my	use	of	Jackson’s	“Mary”	from	chapter	one.		
I	can	easily	suppose	that	Mary	is	in	her	black	and	white	room	while	engaging	in	
Jackson’s	thought	experiment.		At	this	point,	all	that	is	required	is	the	as-if-true	
attitude	without	constraints.		As	I	reflect	on	the	propositions	of	the	thought	
experiment,	I	may	sense	irritation	or	annoyance	arising	at	the	thought	of	a	girl	being	
“imprisoned”	in	a	black	and	white	room.		At	this	point,	it	would	be	clear	that	I	was	
no	longer	merely	engaging	in	a	thought	experiment.		In	such	a	circumstance,	the	as-
if-true	attitude	has	triggered	affective	mechanisms.		According	to	the	AIT	view,	these	
mechanisms	have consequently	constrained	my	as-if-true	attitude.		Even	if	my	
affective	mechanisms	were	not	triggered	by	this	thought	experiment,	at	the	very	
least	imagery	would	be	triggered.		This	is	because,	as	I	argued	in	chapter	one,	the	
force	of	the	thought	experiment	comes	from	imagining	what	it	would	be	like	for	
Mary	to	see	red	for	the	first	time.	This	would	be	a	case	of	sliding	from	a	
suppositional	activity	to	a	more	robust	imaginative	activity,	and	we	easily	could	
confuse	the	one	activity	for	the	other.		Even	though,	it	may	not	be	very	easy	to	know	
when	the	as-if-true	attitude	became	constrained,	it	is	still	the	same	as-if-true	
attitude	throughout	the	thought	experiment.		Because	it	is	the	same	attitude	in	both	
activities,	the	AIT	view	does	not	inherit	the	same	problems	from	two-nature	
views—namely,	there	is	no	worry	about	functionally	distinct	capacities	implying	
that	Similarity	is	false.	As	a	result,	the	AIT	view	has	a	simple	explanation	for	
Similarity.	
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The	AIT	view	can	also	explain	the	differences,	but	before	seeing	that	it	is	
important	to	see	that	the	AIT	view,	unlike	all	current	one-nature	views,	does	not	
conflict	with	the	ESSENCE	and	PHENOMENOLOGY	of	supposition.		Recall,	I	
described	these	as	follows:	
	 ESSENCE:	We	can	suppose	just	about	anything.	
	 PHENOMENOLOGY:	We	experience	as	if	we	can	suppose	just	about	anything.	
As	we	saw	above,	all	current	one-nature	views	imply	that	these	are	false.		As	I	
argued	above,	this	is	a	problem	because	ESSENCE	and	PHENOMENOLOGY	together	
give	us	good	reasons	to	accept	the	differences	between	supposition	and	
imagination.		In	implying	this,	I	argued,	all	current	one-nature	views	fail	to	explain	
the	Ability	Difference	and	the	Emotional	Difference.				
It	should	be	evident	that	the	AIT	view	does	not	imply	that	ESSENCE	and	
PHENOMENOLOGY	are	false.		This	is	because	according	to	the	AIT	view,	the	core	of	
supposition	is	as-if-true	attitude	without	constraints.		As	a	result,	the	as-if-true	
attitude	does	not	need	to	turn	off	some	mechanism	in	order	to	successfully	suppose	
some	content.		When	the	as-if-true	attitude	is	unconstrained,	we	can	suppose	just	
about	anything,	as	in	ESSENCE,	and	we	experience	as	if	we	can	suppose	just	about	
anything,	as	in	PHENOMENOLOGY.		It	follows	that	the	AIT	view	can	explain	the	
differences.	
Consider,	first,	the	Ability	Difference.		Again,	the	core	of	supposition	is	the	
as-if-true	attitude	without	constraints.		Imagination	is	the	as-if-true	attitude	under	
constraints.		Supposition	and	imagination	belong	to	the	same	basic	cognitive	
capacity.		According	to	the	AIT	view,	then,	the	differences	between	supposition	and	
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imagination	come	naturally	from	the	different	constraints	on	the	core	of	
supposition,	or	the	as-if-true-attitude.		For	instance,	when	the	as-if-true	attitude	is	
constrained	by	the	imagery	mechanism,	then	there	are	contents	that	we	cannot	
imagine	simply	because	we	cannot	form	an	image	of	such	content.		However,	
imagery	provides	phenomenal	content	or	a	what	it	is	like	that	the	as-if-true	attitude	
unconstrained	does	not	provide.		In	this,	we	see	the	duel	effects	of	the	constraints—
namely,	a	limiting	effect	and	an	embellishing	effect.		Additionally,	when	the	as-if-
true	attitude	is	constrained	by	the	conative	and	affective	mechanisms,	we	might	be	
unwilling	to	imagine	certain	contents	because	imagining	such	contents	would	move	
us	to	have	desires	and	affections	towards	such	contents	that	we	do	not	want	to	have.		
For	instance,	imagining	that	one	of	my	kids	is	missing	may	cause	fear	and	anxiety.		It	
is	not	simply	that	I	do	not	want	to	experience	fear,	it	is	fear	in	relation	to	certain	
contents—e.g.,	one	of	my	kids	being	abducted.		This	is	an	example	of	the	limiting	
effects	of	constraints,	but	again	many	of	those	same	constraints	have	an	
embellishing	effect	on	our	imaginings.		For	example	some	novels	trigger	desires	and	
affections	within	us	in	such	a	vivid	way	that	we	experience	what	it	is	like	to	be	in	the	
world	of	the	novel.		
In	contrast,	when	the	as-if-true	attitude	is	unconstrained	by	other	mental	
mechanisms,	then	we	can	take	any	content	as	if	it	is	true,	especially	for	the	purpose	
of	seeing	what	follows	logically	from	it	being	true.		In	such	a	case	there	are	no	(or	
few)	constraints	to	provide	limiting	and	embellishing	effects	on	our	imaginative	
activities.		In	this	way,	the	AIT	view	offers	an	explanation	for	the	Ability	Difference.	
 80 
Consider,	next,	how	it	also	offers	an	explanation	of	the	Emotional	
Difference.		We	are	affected	and	moved	in	various	ways	by	imagination.		We,	at	
times,	may	be	motivated	by	our	imaginings.		Supposition	neither	moves	us	nor	does	
it	usually	motivate	us	to	do	anything	(except	maybe	to	deliberate	as	Balcerak	
Jackson	(2016)	claims).		This	difference	is	easily	explained	on	the	AIT	view.		Given	
that	imagination	is	the	as-if-true	attitude	constrained	by	other	mechanisms—among	
them,	the	conative	and	affective	mechanisms—it	is	unsurprising	that	we	can	be	
affected	and	moved	by	our	imaginings.		For	instance,	imaginatively	engaging	a	
movie	may	trigger	one’s	cognitive	mechanism	as	when	we	feel	desire	for	the	
protagonist	to	win,	and	it	also	may	trigger	the	affective	mechanism	as	when	we	feel	
anger	towards	the	antagonist.		In	contrast,	given	that	supposition	is	the	as-if-true	
attitude	unconstrained	by	those	same	mechanisms,	it	also	is	unsurprising	that	we	
are	not	moved	by	supposition.		Supposition	does	not	usually	take	inputs	from	the	
conative	and	affective	mechanisms.		In	this	way,	the	AIT	view	offers	an	explanation	
for	the	Emotional	Difference.	
The	AIT	view—unlike	all	current	one-nature	views	and	all	two-nature	
views—explains	all	of	the	features.		Because	of	this,	I	argue	that	it	is	the	correct	
answer	to	the	Relation	Question.		In	a	slogan:	imagining	is	a	kind	of	supposing.		In	
the	final	two	sections,	I	reply	to	some	objections	to	my	view	and	I	offer	a	response	to	
an	argument	from	Amy	Kind	(2013).	
2.2.2	Objections:	
	
	 Objection	1:	At	this	point,	one	might	object	like	as	follows:		In	claiming	that	
supposing	is	a	kind	of	imagining,	it	need	not	follow	that	we	hold	that	imagining	is	
 81 
always	a	constrained	activity.		All	we	are	claiming	is	that	once	we	turn	off	the	
mechanisms	responsible	for	constraining	the	activity,	we	are	still	left	with	an	
imaginative	activity.		And	we	simply	grant	that	what	remains	is	supposition,	thus	
supposition	is	a	kind	of	imagination	after	all.			
	 Reply	1:	I	think	this	is	merely	terminological.		I	can	concede	that	left-over	
activity	supposition-imagining.		However,	the	AIT	view	still	holds.		All	imaginings	
are	supposition-imaginings,	but	not	all	supposition-imaginings	are	imagining-
imaginings,	where	an	imagining-imagining	is	the	imaginative	activity	under	various	
constraints.		So	while	there	might	be	a	verbal	agreement	with	other	one-nature	
views	when	they	state	that	supposition	is	a	kind	of	imagination,	there	is	also	a	
substantive	disagreement.		They	are	not	committed	to,	as	I	am,	the	view	that	all	
imaginings	are	a	kind	of	supposition.		Supposition,	or	better	the	core	of	supposition,	
is	a	constitutive	part	of	all	imaginative	activities.		All	robust	imaginings	are	also	
suppositions,	but	not	all	suppositions	are	robust	imaginings.			
	 Objection	2:	According	to	the	AIT	view	all	imagining	is	a	kind	of	supposing.		
But	supposing	is	clearly	a	voluntary	activity;	we	engage	in	it	for	the	purpose	of	
reasoning	and	deliberating	about	some	content.		However,	imagining	is	not	always	a	
voluntary	activity.		We	experience	unbidden	daydreams	and	imagery,	such	as	
earworms,	rather	frequently.		Therefore,	not	all	imagining	is	a	kind	of	supposing.35	
	 Reply	2:	This	objection	fails	because	it	does	not	take	into	account	the	
distinction	I	made	above	between	the	core	of	supposition	and	the	purpose	to	which	
that	core	is	put.		And	because	it	fails	to	take	this	distinction	into	account,	it	also	fails	
                                                
35	Thanks	to	Anna	Ichino	for	raising	this	objection	to	my	view	in	conversation. 
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to	recognize	that	there	are	at	least	two	distinct	meanings	for	the	term	‘supposition’.		
‘Supposition’	in	the	broad	sense	refers	to	what	I	have	been	calling	the	as-if-true	
attitude.		‘Supposition’	in	the	narrow	sense	refers	to	that	same	attitude	being	used	
for	a	specific	purpose,	i.e.,	reasoning	to	the	consequences	of	taking	some	content	as	
if	it	is	true.		This	objection	would	work	if	I	intended	to	claim	that	all	imagining	is	a	
kind	of	supposing,	where	supposing	is	construed	in	the	narrow	sense.		It	is	only	in	
this	sense	of	the	term	that	supposition	is	a	voluntary	activity.		The	AIT	view	is	not	
committed	to	that;	rather,	the	AIT	view	holds	that	all	imagining	is	a	kind	of	
supposing,	where	supposing	is	construed	in	the	broad	sense.		Supposition	in	the	
broad	sense	is	simply	an	attitude	that	treats	content	as	if	true.		The	voluntary	aspect	
of	supposing	that	the	objection	cites	is	tied	to	the	purpose	to	which	one	uses	the	
core	of	supposition—in	this	case,	it	is	the	as-if-true	attitude	under	certain	rational	
constraints.		There	is	no	reason	to	think	that	this	as-if-true	attitude	with	or	without	
constraints	does	not	make	room	for	involuntary	imaginings.			
	 As	one	example,	consider	an	unbidden	day	dream.		An	unbidden	daydream	is	
of	a	content	that	is	not	true.		Although	one	does	not	voluntarily	conjure	up	this	
content,	arguably	it	still	is	an	instance	of	the	as-if-true	attitude.		Our	architecture	
certainly	treats	it	like	an	imagining.		If	not,	we	might	exhibit	strange	behavior.		For	
instance,	if	we	are	stuck	in	traffic	daydreaming	that	we	are	on	the	beach	and	then	
act	according	to	the	daydream	by	laying	on	a	beach	blanket	on	top	of	our	car,	this	
would	indicate	that	our	architecture	is	not	functioning	properly	treating	a	daydream	
as	something	more	than	an	imagining—in	such	a	case	it	would	be	treating	it	more	
like	a	belief.		Because	of	this,	it	is	plausible	to	treat	involuntary	imaginings	as	a	kind	
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of	supposing,	where	supposing	is	construed	in	the	broad	sense.		Therefore,	the	
objection	does	not	go	through.	 	 	 	
	 Objection	3:		The	as-if-true	attitude	takes	propositions	as	its	content.		Yet,	
arguably,	we	can	have	an	image	the	content	of	which	is	not	propositional.		For	
instance,	as	we	saw	above,	Bence	Nanay	(2016)	argues	that	the	content	of	mental	
imagery	is	the	attribution	of	properties	to	a	particular	object.		The	image	might	
depict	information	rather	than	describe	information.		But	according	to	the	AIT	view,	
imagery	is	a	constrained	as-if-true	attitude.		But	then	similar	to	objection	2,	we	have	
an	instance	of	imagination	(forming	an	image)	that	is	not	a	kind	of	supposition	(as-
if-true	attitude	without	constraints).	
	 Reply	3:		This	objection	only	goes	through	if	the	content	of	imagery	is	wholly	
non-propositional.		My	reply,	then,	is	just	to	reject	this.		Granted,	the	nature	of	
content	for	experiential	states	is	still	alive	and	contentious	(cf.	Fish	2010).		Imagery,	
like	perception,	includes	more	fine-grained	content	than	say	supposition,	but	that	
does	not	rule	out	propositional	content.	In	fact,	arguably	the	dominant	view	in	the	
philosophy	of	perception	is	that	perceptual	experiences	have	representational	
content	(cf.	Crane	and	Craig	2017).		Our	experiences	represent	the	way	the	world	is	
(or	appears)	to	us.		And	the	content	of	such	representations	just	is	a	proposition.		
Taking	propositions	as	content	offers	a	plausible	view	of	how	different	attitudes	can	
share	the	same	content.		I	can	perceive	that	I	am	watching	the	Cubs	at	Wrigley	Field.		
I	can	believe	that	I	am	watching	the	Cubs	at	Wrigley	Field.		I	can	remember	that	I	
watched	the	Cubs	at	Wrigley	Field,	and	I	can	have	a	mental	image	of	watching	the	
Cubs	at	Wrigley	Field.		All	of	these	share	the	same	propositional	content	<I	am	
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watching	the	Cubs	at	Wrigley	Field>.			Now	the	fine-grained	content	of	imagery	
could	be	exhausted	by	the	propositional	content,	or	it	could	be	due	to	something	like	
qualia,	which	refer	to	the	phenomenal	character	of	experience	that	is	not	reducible	
to	representational	content	(cf.	Block	2003).		Both	views	are	argued	for	in	the	
literature,	and	either	way,	the	above	objection	will	fail	to	go	through.		This	is	
because	on	either	view,	the	content	of	imagery	is	propositional.		Until	we	have	good	
reasons	to	accept	that	the	content	of	imagery	is	wholly	non-propositional,	this	
objection	does	not	go	through.			
	 In	the	final	section,	I	further	vindicate	the	AIT	view	by	offering	a	response	to	
an	argument	from	Kind	(2013).		Many	philosophers	(e.g.,	Balcerak	Jackson	(2016),	
Miyazono	and	Liao	(2016))	have	credited	this	argument	with	showing	us	that	there	
is	not	one	capacity	that	can	do	all	of	the	work	that	we	call	upon	the	imagination	to	
do.		The	upshot	of	such	an	argument	is	that	the	common	nature	thesis	is	false	and	
with	it	all	one-nature	views	of	the	imagination	and	supposition.		While	I	agree	that	
Kind’s	argument	threatens	all	current	one-nature	views,	I	will	show	that	my	one-
nature	view	is	immune	from	such	a	worry.			
2.2.3	A	Kind	Worry	
	
Kind’s	argument	is	straightforward.		She	highlights	four	paradigmatic	
instances	of	imagination	and	proceeds	to	show	that	there	is	a	tension	between	the	
different	explanatory	roles	of	the	imagination.	She	demonstrates	how	these	four	
paradigmatic	instances	of		imagination	have	very	little	in	common.		She	refers	to	the	
lack	of	commonality	between	the	instances	of	imagination	as	the	heterogeneity	of	
the	imagination.	The	result,	according	to	Kind,	is	that	there	is	no	way	to	unify	the	
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distinct	explanatory	roles.		The	problem	from	this	is	that	we	should	question	
whether	there	is	one	capacity	that	is	the	imagination.		I	will	briefly	summarize	her	
argument	and	then	show	that	this	heterogeneity	is	not	a	problem	for	the	AIT	view.	
As	a	foil,	Kind	focuses	on	a	group	of	theories	that	she	refers	to	as	the	
simulationist	treatment	of	imagination.	Central	to	the	simulationist	treatment	of	
imagination	is	the	idea	of	imaginative	projection.		We	met	with	such	a	view	in	
chapter	one,	when	considering	Currie	and	Ravenscroft’s	one-nature	view.			
According	to	Currie	and	Ravenscroft,	‘imaginative	projection’	can	be	defined	as	
follows:	
Imaginative	Projection	involves	the	capacity	to	have,	and	in	good	measure	to		
control	the	having	of,	states	that	are	not	perceptions	or	beliefs	or	decisions	or		
experiences	of	movements	of	one's	body,	but	which	are	in	various	ways	like		
those	states—like	them	in	ways	that	enable	the	states	possessed	through		
imagination	to	mimic	and,	relative	to	certain	purposes,	to	substitute	for		
perceptions,	beliefs,	decisions,	and	experiences	of	movements	(Currie	and		
Ravenscroft	2002,	11).	
	
Important	from	this	quote	is	that	the	imagination	has	an	ability	to	simulate	other	
mental	states.		As	we	will	see,	it	is	this	ability	that	allows	it	to	play	an	explanatory	
role	in	both	our	cognitive	economy	and	our	behavior.			
Kind,	then,	highlights	three	aspects	of	the	simulationist	program.	The	first	is	
that	simulationists	do	not	make	a	sharp	distinction	between	supposition	and	
imagination.	Second,	on	the	simulationist	view,	imagination	produces	many	
different	states	that	mimic	other	mental	states.		There	are	belief-like	imaginings,	
desire-like	imaginings,	perception-like	imaginings,	and	so	on.	Third,	when	desire-
like	imaginings	engage	with	belief-like	imaginings,	they	do	not	produce	action	on	
the	part	of	the	imaginer.		Sometimes	this	is	described	as	the	desire-like	imaginings	
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and	the	belief-like	imaginings	interacting	“off-line”	from	the	action-generating	
mechanism.	Having	characterized	the	simulationist	view,	Kind	then	turns	to	her	
argument	for	heterogeneity.	
First,	Kind	has	us	consider	four	paradigmatic	instances	of	the	imagination:	
	
i. Engagement	with	fiction		
	
Dennis	is	reading	Harry	Potter	and	the	Goblet	of	Fire,	and	he’s	completely		
caught	up	in	the	story.	At	the	denouement,	when	Cedric	dies	in	the	graveyard		
in	Little	Hangleton,	Dennis	finds	himself	overcome	by	sadness.	Then,	as		
Voldemort	begins	to	fight	Harry,	he	feels	anxious	and	desperately	wants		
Harry	to	get	away	safely.	
	
ii. Pretense		
	
Christopher	is	pretending	to	be	Obi-Wan	Kenobi	and	his	brother	Sean	is		
pretending	to	be	Darth	Vader.		Each	boy	also	pretends	that	the	long	tree		
branch	in	his	hand	is	a	light	saber.	Christopher	forcefully	swings	his	tree		
branch	at	Sean,	who	parries	it	with	his	own	tree	branch.	
	
iii. Mindreading	
	
Carole	is	playing	the	board	game	Settlers	of	Catan.		In	order	to	place	her		
settlement	in	the	most	strategic	location	possible,	she	wants	to	determine		
what	her	opponent	is	likely	to	do	on	his	next	turn.	
	
iv. Modal	epistemology	
	
Sam	plans	to	rearrange	the	furniture	in	his	living	room,	but	before	he	moves		
any	of	the	very	heavy	pieces,	he	wants	to	determine	whether	it’s	possible	for		
the	piano	to	fit	where	the	couch	currently	is	(Kind	(2013),	142).	
	
According	to	Kind,	all	of	these	are	instances	of	the	imagination.		Yet,	each	of	these	
instances	are	quite	different.		This	difference,	alone,	is	not	quite	the	heterogeneity.		
That	comes	next.	
	 Kind	demonstrates	the	heterogeneity	in	two	ways:	(1)	she	shows	that	there	
is	a	tension	among	the	explanatory	roles	of	imagination	in	Engagement	with	Fiction,	
Mindreading,	and	Modal	Epistemology.		And	(2)	there	is	a	difference	in	the	role	of	
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desire	and	action	between	Engagement	with	Fiction	and	Pretense.		In	both	cases,	
Kind	argues	that	the	simulationists	need	to	posit	many	distinct	mental	capacities	in	
order	to	explain	the	imaginative	activity,	but	this	undermines	the	notion	that	there	
is	one	mental	capacity	that	is	imagination.	
	 Consider	(1)	first.		In	this	first	way	of	demonstrating	the	heterogeneity,	Kind	
focuses	on	the	first	aspect	of	the	simulationists—namely,	that	they	do	not	make	a	
sharp	distinction	between	supposition	and	imagination.		On	the	simulationist	
account,	according	to	Kind,	supposition	will	have	an	explanatory	role	to	play	in	
Mindreading.		This	is	because	in	mindreading,	one	is	simulating	beliefs	and	other	
mental	states	of	another	person,	and	supposition	is	belief-like	imagining	according	
to	the	simulationists.		However,	Kind	argues	that	supposition	does	not	have	an	
explanatory	role	to	play	in	Modal	Epistemology.		This	is	because,	in	modal	
epistemology,	our	imagination	is	said	to	play	a	role	in	our	judgments	of	what	is	
possible.		Given	that	one	can	suppose	anything,	if	supposition	is	found	in	modal	
epistemology,	we	would	seemingly	judge	anything	to	be	possible.		But	we	do	not	do	
so.		It	follows	then,	according	to	Kind,	that	supposition	does	not	play	an	explanatory	
role	in	Modal	Epistemology.			
	 Continuing,	Kind	also	argues	that	supposition	does	not	have	an	explanatory	
role	to	play	in	Engagement	with	Fiction.		This	is	because	imaginatively	engaging	
fiction	causes	vivid	affections	and	desires	within	us.		As	we	have	seen,	supposition	
rarely	ever	causes	affections	and	desires.		It	follows	that	whatever	the	explanatory	
role	imagination	plays	in	causing	affect	in	Engagement	with	Fiction,	that	explanatory	
role	will	not	include	supposition.			While	imagination	has	an	explanatory	role	to	play	
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in	causing	affections	in	Engagement	with	Fiction,	it	does	not	play	such	a	role	in	
Modal	Epistemology.		As	Kind	argues,	we	can	imagine	philosophical	zombies	without	
being	afraid,	and	we	can	imagine	Jackson’s	color	scientist,	Mary,	without	feeling	
anger	at	her	imprisonment	(Kind	2013,	154).		According	to	Kind,	the	simulationists’	
view	that	supposition	is	a	kind	of	imagining,	causes	a	tension	in	the	explanatory	
roles	of	imagining.			According	to	her,	it	appears	as	if	the	simulationists	need	to	posit	
different	mental	capacities	for	each	of	these	paradigmatic	instances	of	imagination.			
	 Next,	consider	(2)	the	second	way	that	she	demonstrates	the	heterogeneity.		
By	focusing	on	the	second	and	third	aspects	of	the	simulations	treatment	of	
imagination,	Kind	draws	attention	to	a	difference	in	the	role	of	desire	and	action	
between	Engagement	with	Fiction	and	Pretense.		Recall	that	the	second	aspect	of	
simulationists	is	that	they	posit	various	imaginative	states	that	mimic	other	mental	
states,	and	the	third	aspect	is	that	when	desire-like	imaginings	interact	with	belief-
like	imaginings,	they	do	not	cause	action	on	the	imaginer’s	part—they	are	run	“off-
line”.		This	aspect	of	the	simulationists	works	well	as	an	explanatory	role	for	our	
desires	and	our	engagement	with	fiction.	When	we	engage	fictions,	as	already	
mentioned,	our	imaginings	bring	about	all	sorts	of	desires,	but	these	desires	do	not	
lead	to	any	particular	action	or	behavior.		When	you	are	imaginatively	engaged	in	a	
play,	you	might	have	desires	that	the	“good	guys”	win,	but	those	desires	do	not	move	
you	to	“join	the	fight”.		According	to	the	simulationists,	given	that	desire-like	
imagining	and	belief-like	imagining	interact	“off-line”,	it	should	not	surprise	us	that	
our	desires	from	fiction	do	not	cause	any	particular	action	on	the	part	of	our	
imaginings.		In	contrast,	though,	the	simulationists	cannot	offer	the	same	account	as	
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an	explanatory	role	in	Pretense.		This	is	because	in	pretend	play,	our	imaginings	
often	bring	about	desires	that	do	usher	in	particular	actions	and	behaviors.		When	
you	are	pretending	to	be	Luke	Skywalker	fighting	Darth	Vader,	you	presumably	
have	the	desire	to	win	and	your	actions	convey	such	a	desire.		As	Kind	argues,	if	the	
desire-like	and	belief-like	imaginings	are	run	offline,	then	they	do	not	play	an	
explanatory	role	in	Pretense.		We	see	the	same	problem	as	above:	the	simulationists	
need	to	posit	different	mental	capacities	in	order	to	account	for	the	distinct	
explanatory	roles	of	imagination.			
	 It	follows	that	the	imagination	is	marked	by	a	problematic	heterogeneity.		
Because	of	this	heterogeneity,	Kind	concludes	that	we	have	reason	to	doubt	that	the	
imagination	constitutes	one	mental	kind	or	that	there	is	one	capacity	that	is	the	
imagination.		Kind’s	argument	is	a	problem	for	any	theory	of	imagination	that	sees	it	
as	one	mental	capacity.		If	Kind	is	right,	then,	it	follows	that	all	one-nature	views—
including	my	own—are	false.		In	fact,	her	argument	is	especially	problematic	for	the	
AIT	view	because,	as	she	argues,	she	has	identified	instances	of	the	imagination	that	
do	not	involve	supposition.		And,	of	course,	the	AIT	view	is	that	all	imaginings	are	
various	kinds	of	supposings.			
The	AIT	view	offers	a	response	to	Kind’s	argument	by	providing	an	alternate	
explanation	for	the	facts	of	her	four	cases.		When	we	think	of	the	core	of	supposition	
as	the	as-if-true	attitude	without	constraints,	and	all	other	imaginings	as	the	as-if-
true	attitude	under	various	constraints,	then	we	really	have	no	reason	to	think	that	
supposition	is	absent	in	most	of	Kind’s	cases.		According	to	the	AIT	view,	
supposition,	or	the	core	of	supposition,	is	actually	present	in	all	of	them.		It	is	just	
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that	supposition,	as	we	typically	understand	the	term—where	all	we	are	concerned	
with	is	what	logically	follows	from	the	content	taken	as	true—is	absent	in	all	of	
them.		All	of	Kind’s	four	cases	are	instances	of	the	as-if-true	attitude	under	
constraints;	each	of	them	are	different	because	of	different	constraints	on	the	as-if-
true	attitude.			
First,	consider	Engagement	with	Fiction.		Dennis	is	holding	the	as-if-true	
attitude	towards	the	propositions	of	Harry	Potter	and	the	Goblet	of	Fire.		But	he	is	
not	merely	concerned	with	taking	them	as	true.		He	is	especially	concerned	or	
interested	in	taking	on	the	perspective	as	a	character	in	the	story.		That	is	to	say,	he	
himself	wants	to	experience	the	unfolding	of	events	at	Hogwarts.		Because	of	this,	
his	attitude	is	constrained	by	all	sorts	of	imagery.		And	his	as-if-true	attitude	
towards	those	propositions	is	also	constrained	by	his	affections	and	desires.		Dennis	
is	not	an	indifferent	observer	on	the	sideline.		He	feels	certain	desires—e.g.,	that	
Harry	Potter	win—,	and	he	feels	certain	affections—e.g.,	fear	towards	Voldemort.		
While	engaging	fiction,	the	as-if-true	attitude	is	clearly	constrained,	but	the	core	of	
supposition	remains.				
Next,	consider	Pretense.		Christopher	and	his	brother	Sean	both	have	the	as-
if-true	attitude	towards	relevant	propositions	(e.g.,	I	am	Obi	Wan	Kenobi)	as	well	as	
towards	the	content	of	their	true	perceptual	experiences.		Both	of	them	strive	to	
imitate	their	respective	characters;	both	of	them	desire	to	win	in	the	battle.		So	like	
Dennis	above,	Christopher	and	Sean	are	not	merely	concerned	with	what	follows	
logically	from	taking	various	propositions	as	true.		Their	as-if-true	attitude	is	
constrained	by	their	intention	to	engage	in	this	activity	of	pretense	as	opposed	to	
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some	other	activity.		Their	as-if-true	attitude	is	also	constrained	by	their	desires	that	
follow	from	partaking	in	such	a	pretense.		While	engaged	in	pretense,	the	as-if-true	
attitude	is	clearly	constrained,	but,	according	to	the	AIT	view,	the	core	of	
supposition	remains.					
Next,	consider	Mindreading.		Carole	is	holding	the	as-if-true	attitude	towards	
the	propositions	most	relevant	to	reading	her	opponent’s	mind.		However,	again,	she	
is	not	merely	concerned	with	what	follows	logically	from	taking	these	propositions	
as	true.		Her	as-if-true	attitude	is	constrained	by	her	desire	to	figure	out	what	her	
opponent	will	likely	do	on	his	turn	in	the	game.		Her	as-if-true	attitude	is	also	
constrained	by	all	of	the	constraints	relevant	to	experiencing	what	it	is	like	to	think	
and	decide	according	to	her	opponent.		While	engaged	in	reading	other	minds,	the	
as-if-true	attitude	is	clearly	constrained,	but,	according	to	the	AIT	view,	the	core	of	
supposition	remains.			
Finally,	consider	Modal	Epistemology.		Sam	holds	the	as-if-true	attitude	
towards	the	propositions	relevant	to	discovering	which	furniture	arrangements	are	
possible.		In	this	case,	like	the	first	three,	it	should	be	clear	that	he	is	not	merely	
concerned	with	what	follows	logically	from	taking	these	certain	propositions	as	
true.		His	as-if-true	attitude	is	constrained	by	relevant	imagery,	as	well	as	by	the	
practical	desire	to	fit	specific	furniture	in	a	particular	room.		His	as-if-true	attitude	is	
also	constrained	by	non-architectural	constraints,	such	as	Kind’s	Reality	Constraint.		
While	engaged	in	thinking	about	what	is	possible,	the	as-if-true	attitude	is	clearly	
constrained,	but	the	core	of	supposition	remains.			
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It	follows,	then,	that	on	the	AIT	view,	the	heterogeneity	that	Kind	alleges	is	
not	threatening	at	all.		It	does	not	give	us	a	reason	to	reject	that	there	is	one	capacity	
for	both	supposing	and	imagining.		All	of	these	paradigmatic	imaginative	activities	
are	instances	of	the	as-if-true	attitude.		The	heterogeneity	comes	from	the	different	
constraints	on	that	same	as-if-true	attitude.			
This	concludes	the	defense	of	the	AIT	view.		As	I	have	argued,	this	view	offers	
the	correct	answer	to	the	Relation	Question	(i.e.,	what	is	the	relation	between	
supposition	and	imagination).		Both	imagining	and	supposing,	as	the	terms	
‘imagining’	and	‘supposing’	are	typically	used,	belong	to	the	as-if-true	attitude.		As	I	
have	argued,	there	is	a	core	of	supposition,	which	is	the	as-if-true	attitude	without	
any	constraints.		With	this,	one	can	take	any	content	and	treat	it	as	true.	Imagining,	
as	it	is	usually	understood,	is	the	as-if-true	attitude	under	various	constraints.		
Because	of	this,	we	might	sum	up	the	AIT	view	as	the	view	that	all	imagining	is	a	
kind	of	supposing.			
2.2.4	The	Unification	Question	
	
Having	answered	the	Relation	Question,	and	having	also	responded	to	Kind	
(2013),	I	am	now	in	a	position	to	show	how	the	AIT	view	also	provides	an	answer	to	
the	Unification	Question	(i.e.,	what	is	the	imagination).		Recall	from	the	dissertation	
overview,	where	I	discussed	Amy	Kind’s	suggestion	that	one’s	answer	to	the	
Relation	Question	will	likely	depend	on	one’s	answer	to	the	Unification	Question.		
There	is	dependency	relation	between	these	two	questions.		However,	unlike	Kind’s	
suggestion,	the	answer	to	the	Unification	Question	instead	depends	on	the	answer	to	
the	Relation	Question.		The	bulk	of	this	paper	has	developed	and	argued	for	an	
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answer	to	this	question:	the	AIT	view—all	imagining	is	a	kind	of	supposing.		I	argue	
that	the	AIT	view	also	provides	an	answer	to	the	Unification	Question.		The	
imagination	just	is	the	as-if-true	attitude—the	core	of	supposition—under	various	
constraints.		This	provides	a	way	of	unifying	all	paradigmatic	instances	of	the	
imagination.		All	are	instances	of	the	as-if-true	attitude.		It	also	provides	a	way	of	
accounting	for	the	differences	between	various	paradigmatic	instances	of	the	
imagination.		Each	are	different	instances	of	this	as-if-true	attitude	because	of	the	
different	constraints.			
Many	will	object	that	this	answer	is	too	easy.		My	response	is	that	we	have	
missed	seeing	an	easy	answer	to	the	Unification	Question	because	we	have	not	had	
the	correct	answer	to	the	Relation	Question.		The	AIT	view—that	all	imagining	is	a	
kind	of	supposing—provides	answers	to	both.		
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Resisting	under	Constraints	
	
Chapter	Three	
	
We	have	seen	that	the	Relation	Question	is	motivated	in	part	by	the	differences	
between	supposition	and	imagination.		And	we	have	seen	that	one	of	these	
differences	concerns	imaginative	resistance.		In	short,	imaginative	resistance	refers	
to	the	systematic	difficulties	that	people	have	in	engaging	in	certain	prompted	
imaginative	activities	(Liao	and	Gendler	2016	and	Liao	2016).		In	this	chapter,	I	
argue	that	the	AIT	view36	can	explain	a	set	of	features	of	imaginative	resistance	that	
current	views	cannot.			The	set	of	features—to	be	developed	fully	below—is	this:		
imaginative	resistance	varies	from	person	to	person	in	that	some	people	report	
experiencing	it	and	some	do	not.		Even	among	those	who	report	experiencing	
imaginative	resistance,	it	seems	to	arise	from	different	causes.		And	also	among	
those	who	report	experiencing	resistance,	the	resistance	varies	in	degrees.		Finally,	
even	within	one	person,	imaginative	resistance	can	vary	in	degrees.	For	ease	of	
reference,	call	these	four	features	Variation.		As	I	will	argue,	some	views	of	
imaginative	resistance	cannot	explain	any	of	the	four	features	of	Variation	and	
some	views	can	only	explain	some	of	the	four	features	of	Variation.		I	will	argue	that	
the	AIT	view	can	explain	all	four	features	of	Variation.		
	 Earlier	views	of	imaginative	resistance	were	primarily	concerned	with	
explaining	the	nature	or	cause	of	resistance—namely,	why	is	it	the	case	that	we	
even	experience	resistance.		For	reasons	that	will	be	clear	below,	many	think	that	
                                                
36	Recall	that	AIT	is	short	for	“as-if-true	attitude”. 
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trying	to	establish	one	nature	or	cause	of	imaginative	resistance	fails	because	there	
seem	to	be	many	different	causes	of	resistance	for	different	people.		In	light	of	this,	it	
is	important	to	not	read	me	as	offering	the	AIT	view	as	a	theory	about	the	nature	of	
imaginative	resistance.		However,	I	will	argue	below	that	the	AIT	view	makes	room	
for	all	of	the	causes	of	resistance.		Because	these	earlier	views	were	focused	on	
establishing	the	nature	or	cause	of	resistance,	such	views	did	not	attempt	to	explain	
Variation.			
	 However,	recently	there	has	been	an	emerging	group	of	views	that	are	
concerned	with	explaining	Variation.		Each	of	the	views	have	explored	the	role	that	
contextual	factors	such	as	genre	play	in	imaginative	resistance.37		Because	of	this,	I	
call	these	Contextual	Variant	Views.		While	I	think	that	these	views	have	made	
progress,	I	argue	that	they	cannot	fully	explain	Variation.		The	AIT	view	draws	our	
attention	to	another	view	that	I	call	the	Constraint	Variant	View.		As	the	name	
implies,	the	variation	of	imaginative	resistance	is	due	to	the	constraints.	I	argue	that	
this	view	does	explain	all	of	Variation.	
	 This	chapter	proceeds	in	three	sections.		In	section	3.1,	I	focus	on	set-up	by	
giving	a	brief	overview	of	the	phenomenon	of	imaginative	resistance.		I	also	
summarize	the	earlier	views.		I	argue	that	either	they	did	not	have	the	resources	to	
explain	Variation,	or	they	did	not	exploit	those	resources.		In	section	3.2,	I	elaborate	
on	Variation	and	discuss	those	emerging	views	that	offer	explanations	of	it.		I	argue	
that	they	fall	short	of	fully	explaining	Variation.		In	section	3.3,	I	complete	my	
                                                
37	Context	gives	a	cohesiveness	to	any	text	providing	cues	to	proper	understanding	and	
interpretation.		Genre	gives	a	cohesiveness	to	works	of	art.		We	could	think	of	genre	as	a	broad	
contextual	factor. 
 96 
argument.		Building	on	the	AIT	view	of	imagining,	I	propose	a	view	that	explains	all	
of	Variation.	
	
§	3.1		Imaginative	Resistance:	An	Overview	
	
Recall	from	chapter	one	that	Gendler	(2000)	uses	the	phenomenon	of	
imaginative	resistance	as	a	way	to	distinguish	imagination	from	supposition.		Unlike	
some	imaginative	activities,	people	do	not	experience	systematic	difficulties	when	
prompted	to	engage	in	supposition.		By	way	of	illustration,	recall	that	Gendler	has	us	
consider	the	following	two	statements:	
(1)	I	am	asked	to	make-believe	that	P	holds	(where	P	is	some	non-moral		
proposition	that	I	do	not	believe	holds).	
(2)	I	am	asked	to	make-believe	that	M	holds	(where	M	is	some	moral		
proposition	that	I	do	not	believe	holds).	
	
Consider	an	example	of	(1).		Suppose	that	I	am	asked	to	make-believe	that	Hobbits	
live	in	Middle	Earth.	I	do	not	believe	that	there	are	Hobbits	or	that	there	is	a	Middle	
Earth,	yet	I	have	no	trouble	complying	with	the	request.		Now	consider	an	example	
of	(2).		Suppose	that	I	am	asked	to	make-believe	that	female	infanticide	is	a	good.		I	
do	not	believe	that	female	infanticide	is	good,	and	I	face	resistance	(in	some	pre	
theoretical	sense)	to	complying	with	this	request.		This	is	the	phenomenon	of	
imaginative	resistance.			
Interestingly,	other	hypothetical	attitudes	such	as	supposition	seem	immune	
to	this	phenomenon.		In	order	to	illustrate	this,	Gendler	has	us	consider	the	
following	two	statements:	
(3)	I	am	asked	to	suppose	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	P	holds	(where	P	is		
some	non-moral	proposition	that	I	do	not	believe	holds).	
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(4)	I	am	asked	to	suppose	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	M	holds	(where	M	is		
some	moral	proposition	that	I	do	not	believe	holds).	
	
Consider	an	example	of	statement	(3).		With	no	difficulty,	I	can	suppose	for	the	sake	
of	argument	that	Cantor’s	Theorem	is	false,	even	though	I	do	not	believe	that	Cantor’s	
Theorem	is	false.		And	as	an	example	of	statement	(4),	I	can	suppose	for	the	sake	of	
the	argument	that	female	infanticide	is	a	good	likewise	with	no	difficulty	even	
though	I	do	not	believe	that	female	infanticide	is	a	good.		It	follows	that	supposition	
is	immune	to	imaginative	resistance,	whereas,	the	imagination	is	not.			
	 Given	that	imaginative	resistance	is	one	of	the	differences	between	
supposition	and	imagination,	and	given	that	the	AIT	view	explains	the	differences	by	
appealing	to	constraints,	the	AIT	view	also	appeals	to	constraints	in	explaining	the	
phenomenon	of	imaginative	resistance.		In	general,	the	AIT	view	implies	that	the	
phenomenon	of	imaginative	resistance	is	due	primarily	to	the	constraints.		I	will	
return	to	that	idea	in	section	3.3.		In	the	remainder	of	this	section,	I	give	an	overview	
of	the	phenomenon	and	the	different	accounts	of	the	nature	of	resistance.	
3.1.1	The	Phenomenon	of	Resistance	
	
	 According	to	Gendler	and	Liao	(2016),	imaginative	resistance	is	a	
phenomenon	in	which	competent	imaginers	have	difficulty	engaging	in	some	
prompted	imaginative	activities.			As	we	will	see,	the	exact	nature	and	cause	of	this	
phenomenon	is	unclear.		Most	credit	Hume	with	first	describing	this	phenomenon	
near	the	end	of	his	“Of	the	Standard	of	Taste”	(1757):	
Where	speculative	errors	may	be	found	in	the	polite	writings	of	any	age	or		
country,	they	detract	little	from	the	value	of	those	compositions.		There	
needs	to	be	but	a	certain	turn	of	thought	or	imagination	to	make	us	enter	into	
all	the	opinions	which	then	prevailed	and	relish	the	sentiments	or	
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conclusions	derived	from	them.		But	a	very	violent	effort	is	requisite	to	
change	our	judgments	of	manners,	and	excite	sentiments	of	approbation	or	
blame,	love	or	hatred,	different	from	those	to	which	the	mind	from	long	
custom	has	been	familiarized…I	cannot,	nor	is	it	proper	that	I	should	enter	
into	such	[vicious]	sentiments.					
	
Hume	acknowledges	that	there	are	cases	that	are	easy	to	imagine	(e.g.,	“speculative	
errors”)	and	cases	that	are	difficult	to	imagine	(e.g.,	“changes	in	judgments	of	
manner”).		Examples	of	easy	cases	are	ones	in	which	we	are	asked	to	imagine	factual	
errors,	such	as	imagining	that	humans	can	fly	like	Superman.		Examples	of	hard	
cases	are	ones	in	which	we	are	asked	to	imagine	what	we	would	take	to	be	
deviations	from	our	moral,	and	even	aesthetic,	norms.	Contemporary	philosophical	
literature	provides	us	with	examples	of	hard	cases:	
	 Walton	(1994)	
Giselda:	In	killing	her	Baby,	Giselda	did	the	right	thing;	after	all,	it	was	a	girl.	
	 Weatherson	(2004)	
Death	on	a	Freeway.		Jack	and	Jill	were	arguing	again.		This	was	not	in	itself		
unusual,	but	this	time	they	were	standing	in	the	fast	lane	of	I-95	having	their	
argument.		This	was	causing	traffic	to	bank	up	a	bit.		It	wasn’t	significantly	
worse	than	normally	happened	around	Providence,	not	that	you	could	have	
told	that	from	the	reactions	of	the	passing	motorists.		They	were	convinced	
that	Jack	and	Jill,	and	not	the	volume	of	traffic,	were	the	primary	cause	of	the	
slowdown.		They	all	forgot	how	bad	traffic	normally	is	along	there.		When	
Craig	saw	that	the	cause	of	the	bankup	had	been	Jack	and	Jill,	he	took	his	gun	
out	of	the	glove	box	and	shot	them.		People	then	started	driving	over	their	
bodies,	and	while	the	new	speed	hump	caused	some	people	to	slow	down	a	
bit,	mostly	traffic	returned	to	its	normal	speed.		So	Craig	did	the	right	thing,	
because	Jack	and	Jill	should	have	taken	their	argument	somewhere	else	
where	they	wouldn’t	get	in	anyone’s	way.		
	
Both	Giselda	and	the	last	sentence	of	Death	on	a	Freeway	are	puzzling	when	we	
attempt	to	imagine	them	as	true	in	the	respective	stories.		Weatherson	has	argued	
that	reaction	to	the	last	sentence	of	Death	on	a	Freeway	gives	rise	to	at	least	four	
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distinct,	but	related	puzzles.		Gendler	and	Liao	(2016)	give	a	succinct	summary	of	
each	puzzle:	
(1) One	has	difficulty	imagining	that	Craig’s	action	is	really	morally	right.	This	
raises	the	imaginability	puzzle:	why,	in	certain	cases,	do	readers	display	
a	reluctance	or	inability	to	engage	in	some	mandated	act	of	imagining	so	
that	typical	invitations	to	make-believe	are	insufficient?	(2)	One	has	
difficulty	accepting	that	it	is	fictional,	or	true	in	the	story	world,	that	
Craig’s	action	is	really	morally	right.		This	gives	rise	to	the	fictionality	
puzzle:	why,	in	certain	cases,	does	the	default	position	of	authorial	
authority	break	down,	so	that	mere	authorial	say-so	is	insufficient	to	
make	it	the	case	that	something	is	true	in	the	story?	(3)	One	experiences	a	
sense	of	jarring	confusion	in	response	to	the	sentence.		This	raises	the	
phenomenological	puzzle:	why	do	certain	propositions	tend	to	evoke	a	
particular	phenomenology,	sometimes	described	as	‘doubling	of	the	
narrator’	or	‘pop-out’	(Gendler	2000,	2006a)	(4)	One	thinks	that	the	story	
would	be	aesthetically	superior	if	its	final	sentence	were	deleted.		This	
gives	rise	to	the	aesthetic	value	puzzle:	why,	in	certain	cases,	are	texts	
that	evoke	other	sorts	of	imaginative	resistance	thereby	aesthetically	
compromised?	(406)	
	
Given	that	there	are	now	four	distinct	but	related	puzzles,	it	should	not	be	
surprising	that	there	are	disputes	over	the	nature	of	imaginative	resistance.		As	we	
will	see	below,	different	theories	of	imaginative	resistance	disagree	over	which	of	
the	four	puzzles	are	fundamental	to	the	phenomenon.		I	turn	to	those	theories	next.	
3.1.2	Which	Nature?	
	
	 Gendler	and	Liao	(2016)	discuss	three	distinct	theories	of	the	nature	of	
imaginative	resistance:	what	they	call	cantian	theories,	wontian	theories,	and	
eliminativist	theories.		As	we	will	see,	cantian	and	wontian	theories	have	not	
traditionally	been	concerned	with	Variation.		However,	as	we	will	see,	the	worries	
raised	by	the	eliminativists	began	to	force	philosophers	to	consider	Variation.		I	
summarize	each	of	these	theories	next.	
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	 According	to	cantian	theories,	imaginative	resistance	is	due	to	some	sort	of	
impossibility	to	engaging	in	the	prompted	imaginative	activity.		One	somehow	can’t	
imagine	what	one	has	been	invited	to	imagine.		According	to	Gendler	and	Liao	
(2016),	cantian	theories	take	the	fictionality	puzzle	as	more	fundamental	than	the	
other	three	puzzles	suggesting	that	the	other	puzzles	derive	from	the	breakdown	of	
authorial	authority.		What	causes	the	breakdown	such	that	we	are	unable	to	engage	
in	the	prompted	imaginative	activity?	Some	cantian	theories	suggest	that	the	
inability	is	due	to	an	impossible	dependence	or	supervenience	claim	that	the	author	
is	attempting	to	make.		For	instance,	it	is	plausible	to	think	that	moral	facts	are	
higher-level	facts	that	supervene	lower-level	non-moral	facts.		Change	the	lower-
level	facts	and	you	also	change	the	higher-level	facts.		Yet	if	an	author	of	a	story	tries	
to	keep	the	lower-level	facts	intact	and	change	the	higher-level	facts,	then	she	
creates	an	impossible	supervenience	claim.		Gendler	(2000)	attributes	such	a	view	
to	Walton	(1994)38		Here	is	Walton’s	explanation:	
	 Moral	Properties	depend	or	supervene	on	“natural”	ones	and,	I	believe,	in	the		
	 relevant	manner	(whatever	that	is);	being	evil	rests	on,	for	instance,	the		
	 actions	constituting	the	practices	of	slavery	and	genocide.		This,	I	suggest,	is	
	 what	accounts	(somehow)	for	the	resistance	to	allowing	it	to	be	fictional	that	
	 slavery	and	genocide	are	not	evil…Our	reluctance	to	allow	moral	principles	
	 we	disagree	with	to	be	fictional	is	just	an	instance	of	a	more	general	point	
	 concerning	dependence	relations	of	a	certain	kind	(1994:	45-46).	
	
Gendler	names	this	view	The	Impossibility	Hypothesis.		According	to	this	view,	
imaginative	resistance	can	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	cases	that	evoke	imaginative	
resistance	are	conceptually	impossible.		If	supervenience	is	a	necessary	relation,	
then	there	is	no	possible	world	where	that	relation	fails	to	hold—it	is	impossible	to	
                                                
38	Though	she	admits	that	he	only	tentatively	endorses	it.		 
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conceive	of	a	situation	where	the	supervenience	relation	is	different.		This	is	what	
makes	them	unimaginable.39				
	 Related	to	Walton’s	view,	Weatherson	(2004)	argues	that	imaginative	
resistance	is	due	to	a	violation	of	a	principle	about	dependence	relations.		He	calls	
the	principle	Virtue:		
	 If	p	is	the	kind	of	claim	that,	if	true,	must	be	true	in	virtue	of	lower-level	facts,		
	 and	if	the	story	is	about	those	lower-level	facts,	then	it	must	be	true	in	the	
	 story	that	there	is	some	true	proposition	r	which	is	about	those	lower-level	
	 facts	such	that	p	is	true	in	virtue	of	r	(Weatherson	2004:	18).	
	
According	to	this	principle,	an	author	cannot	create	just	any	dependency	relation.		
Given	that	it	is	plausible	to	think	that	moral	facts	depend	on	lower-level	facts,	we	
have	a	plausible	explanation	of	imaginative	resistance,	at	least	in	terms	of	a	
breakdown	in	authorial	authority—authors	cannot	just	create	any	dependency	
relation.	For	instance,	Death	on	a	Freeway	violates	Virtue—the	author	attempts	to	
create	a	deviant	dependency	relation	between	moral	and	non-moral	facts.			That	is,	
the	author	tries	to	keep	lower-level	facts	(a	world	similar	to	our	in	terms	of	cars,	
roads,	drivers,	traffic	jams,	and	so	on)		intact	while	changing	the	higher-level	facts	(it	
being	permissible	to	murder	someone	who	causes	a	traffic	jam).	
	 Weinberg	and	Meskin	(2006)	provide	a	different	answer	to	what	causes	
authorial	breakdown	such	that	we	are	unable	to	comply	with	the	prompted	
imaginative	activity.	They	develop	a	cantian	theory	according	to	which	the	inability	
arises	from	a	conflict	between	distinct	cognitive	mechanisms.		In	chapter	one,	I	
                                                
39	This	explanation,	of	course,	presupposes	some	kind	of	conceivability-possibility	thesis.		The	
relation	between	conceivability	and	possibility	is	still	a	live	and	contentious	debate	(for	a	good	
overview,	cf.	Hawthorne	and	Gendler,	2002).		 
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summarized	their	cognitive	architecture	account	of	the	relation	between	
supposition	and	imagination.		They	also	use	that	account	to	explain	how	
imagination,	but	not	supposition,	is	susceptible	to	imaginative	resistance.			
	 Central	to	their	explanation	of	imaginative	resistance	(what	they	call	the	
puzzle	of	imaginative	blockage)	is	a	claim	that	there	is	a	conflict	between	select	
cognitive	mechanisms	interacting	with	the	imagination	box.		These	select	cognitive	
mechanisms	are	what	they	call	our	moral	judgment	system,	the	Inputter,	and	the	
Updater.		Recall	that	the	imagination	box	is	where	propositions	central	to	our	
imaginative	activities	functionally	interact	with	distinct	cognitive	and	conative	
mechanisms.		The	moral	judgment	system	contains	our	folk	moral	beliefs,	and	the	
Inputter	is	what	allows	us	to	insert	just	about	any	content	into	the	imagination	box,	
and	the	Updater	is	responsible	for	maintaining	order	and	consistency	within	the	
imagination	box.		The	Updater	does	this	by	deleting	or	altering	imaginings	when	
new	imaginings	are	inserted.			
	 With	these	mechanisms	in	place,	here	is	how	they	describe	a	case	of	
imaginative	resistance.		Suppose	a	person	is	engaging	a	novel	and	is	invited	to	
imagine	some	morally	absurd	proposition	p	(e.g.,	that	female	infanticide	is	good).		At	
the	cognitive	architecture	level,	the	Inputter	attempts	to	insert	p	into	the	
imagination	box.		According	to	Weinberg	and	Meskin,	the	moral	judgment	system	
responds	to	the	scenario	and	automatically	places	~p	(e.g.,	that	it	is	false	that	female	
infanticide	is	good)	into	the	imagination	box.		The	Updater	then	registers	the	conflict	
between	p	and	~p	and	so	tries	to	remove	the	conflict.		If	this	account	is	correct,	then	
it	reveals	that	the	conflict	is	not	easily	dissipated	because	the	Inputter	keeps	
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attempting	to	insert	p,	while	the	moral	judgment	system	keeps	attempting	to	insert	
~p,	and	the	Updater	keeps	attempting	to	remove	the	conflict.		The	tension	created	
by	these	distinct	cognitive	processes	lead	to	what	they	call	imaginative	blockage.		
This	illustrates	why	we	should	group	them	as	cantian—the	imaginative	blockage	
makes	us	unable	to	imagine	the	puzzling	propositions.		The	conflict	between	the	
mechanisms	prevents	the	puzzling	propositions	from	remaining	in	the	imagination	
box.	
	 As	this	summary	makes	clear,	the	cantian	views	to	date	have	not	been	
concerned	with	explaining	Variation.	In	fact,	I	argue	that	cantian	views	cannot	
explain	Variation.		This	is	primarily	because	such	views	predict	that	there	should	
not	be	any	variation.		Imaginative	resistance	is	an	all	or	nothing	phenomenon.		The	
resistance	arises	either	because	the	author	asks	you	to	imagine	some	impossible	
proposition,	or	it	arises	because	of	a	conflict	within	one’s	cognitive	architecture.		But	
impossibility	does	not	admit	of	variation.		And	it	is	not	clear	that	the	conflict	within	
one’s	cognitive	architecture	admits	of	variation.		But	as	we	will	see	below,	there	are	
good	reasons	to	think	that	Variation	is	true,	and	that	we	should	be	able	to	explain	it.		
It	follows,	then,	that	cantian	views	cannot	explain	Variation.		I	next	turn	to	the	
second	group	of	theories	which	Gendler	and	Liao	(2016)	call	wontian.			
According	to	Gendler	and	Liao	(2016),	wontian	theories	hold	that	central	to	
imaginative	resistance	is	an	unwillingness	to	engage	in	the	prompted	imaginative	
activity.		According	to	them,	wontian	theories	take	the	imaginability	puzzle	as	
fundamental.		One	experiences	the	other	puzzles	because	one	simply	won’t	imagine	
what	one	has	been	prompted	to	imagine—one	finds	the	request	to	be	improper.			
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Gendler	(2000)	argues	that	resistance	arises	when	a	person	takes	the	author	
to	be	asking	her	to	export	a	way	of	looking	at	this	world	(as	opposed	to	the	world	of	
the	fiction)	that	she	does	not	want	to	imagine.	Central	to	this	explanation	is	the	idea	
that	storytelling	is	similar	to	conversations	with	regards	to	certain	Gricean	
assumptions.		That	is,	storytelling	is	a	shared	activity	between	narrator	and	reader	
that	is	guided	by	a	sort	of	cooperative	principle.		Different	acts	of	storytelling	might	
be	guided	by	different	cooperative	principles.	Related	to	this	Gricean	notion,	
Gendler	discusses	how	different	fictions	or	genres	operate	with	different	laws	of	
import	and	export.		‘Import’	refers	to	the	truths	or	background	beliefs	that	we	bring	
in	to	a	story.		‘Export’	refers	to	the	fictional	truths	from	the	story	that	we	take	as	also	
being	true	in	the	actual	world.		A	realistic	fiction	will	allow	us	to	both	import	and	
export	more	truths	than,	say,	science	fiction.		Gendler	makes	a	distinction	between	
what	she	calls	distorting	and	non-distorting	realistic	fictions.		A	realistic	fiction	is	
‘non-distorting’	when	I	am	free	to	export	truths	from	the	story	in	a	rather	
straightforward	manner.		For	instance,	when	reading	certain	realistic	fictions,	I	may	
learn	(export)	truths	about	a	particular	time	in	history.		A	realistic	fiction	is	
‘distorting’	when	the	relation	between	the	fictional	world	and	the	actual	world	is	
more	complex.		The	result	is	that	there	are	more	restrictions	on	what	we	readers	
can	export.		Distorting	fictions	tend	to	indicate	that	the	reader	is	not	meant	to	export	
certain	truths	from	the	story.		As	an	example	of	this,	Gendler	modifies	Walton’s	
Giselda	to	read	like	this:	
(7)	“In	killing	her	baby,	Giselda	did	the	right	thing;	after	all	it	was	a		
changeling	(2000:	77).			
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Gendler	considers	this	modified	Giselda	to	be	an	instance	of	a	distorting	fiction.		It	is	
clear	that	we	are	not	supposed	to	export	a	truth	about	the	actual	world—there	are	
no	such	things	as	changelings.		However,	the	original	Giselda	is	understood	as	a	non-
distorting	fiction.		There	is	no	indication	that	we	should	not	export	that	as	a	truth	
about	the	actual	world	and	because	we	are	unwilling	to	export	such	a	truth,	we	
resist	imagining	it.			
Similar	to	Gendler,	Currie	(2002)	and	Stokes	(2006)	offer	views	that	can	be	
grouped	as	wontian.		They	argue	that	we	resist	imagining	in	ways	that	diverge	from	
our	actual	values	and	desires.		Both	Currie	and	Stokes	posit	imaginative	analogues	
to	our	conative	attitudes.		As	we	saw	in	chapter	one,	Currie	holds	that	there	is	what	
he	calls	desire-like	imaginings.		And	although	we	do	not	have	a	problem	imagining	
things	that	we	do	not	believe,	we	do	have	a	difficult	time	imagining	things	that	we	
do	not	desire.		Stokes	(2006)	posits	what	he	calls	value-like	imaginings.		Following	
Lewis	(1989),	Stokes	holds	that	to	value	something	is	to	desire	to	desire	it.		Value-
like	imagining	can	be	thought	of	as	second-order	desire-like	imagining.		Thus	Stokes’	
explanation	is	similar	to	Currie,	we	find	it	difficult	to	imagine	things	that	we	do	not	
value.		For	instance,	I	would	never	desire	to	desire	that	the	world	be	such	that	
female	infanticide	is	a	good.		Given	my	value-system,	I	am	unwilling	to	imagine	such	
a	world.			
Gendler	(2006a)	offers	a	refinement	to	her	earlier	view	(2000).		Her	more	
recent	view	concedes	a	point	from	Weatherson	(2004).		She	acknowledges	that	
imaginative	resistance	does	involve	an	impossibility;	though,	she	still	argues	that	
the	impossibility	is	due	to	our	unwillingness	to	imagine	certain	content.		Cases	of	
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imaginative	resistance	(what	she	now	calls	Humean	Resistance)	are	now	analyzed	
as	having	two	features:	imaginative	impropriety	and	imaginative	barriers.		She	
states,	“[i]maginative	impropriety	is	present	because	the	content	in	question	strikes	
us	as	somehow	repugnant;	and	imaginative	barriers	are	present	because	the	content	
in	question	strikes	us	as	somehow	incoherent”	(Gendler	2006a:	157).		The	
“imaginative	impropriety”	is	the	wontian	aspect;	whereas,	the	“imaginative	barrier”	
is	the	cantian	aspect.		Although	the	problems	of	imaginative	barriers	and	
imaginative	impropriety	are	central	to	Humean	Resistance,	the	two	can	come	apart.		
We	can	experience	one	without	the	other.		According	to	Gendler,	then,	there	are	four	
distinct	types	of	cases	to	consider:			
(i) Cases	that	evoke	feelings	of	imaginative	impropriety	without	imaginative	
barriers:	call	these	pure	won’t	cases;	
(ii) Cases	that	evoke	imaginative	barriers	without	feelings	of	imaginative	
impropriety:	call	these	pure	can’t	cases;	
(iii) Cases	that	evoke	both	feelings	of	imaginative	impropriety	and	imaginative	
barriers,	but	where	it	is	the	imaginative	impropriety	that	explains	our	failure	
to	imagine	the	world	(the	felt	imaginative	impropriety	eclipses	the	
imaginative	barriers,	so	the	doomed	imaginative	project	is	not	even	
attempted):	call	these	won’t-couldn’t	cases;	
(iv) Cases	that	evoke	both	feelings	of	imaginative	impropriety	and	imaginative	
barriers,	but	where	it	is	the	imaginative	barriers	that	explain	our	failure	to	
imagine	the	world	(the	imaginative	barrier	eclipses	the	motivating	force	of	
the	imaginative	impropriety,	so	that	the	unappealingness	of	imagining	such	a	
world	does	not	become	apparent);	call	these	can’t-wouldn’t	cases.	(Gendler	
2006a:	156)	
	
According	to	Gendler,	examples	of	(i)	are	invitations	to	adopt	metaphorical	
perspectives	that	we	do	not	want	to	adopt.		For	instance,	as	she	describes,	it	is	not	
impossible	to	imagine	your	child	as	a	dung	beetle,	but	most	of	us	would	rather	not	
imagine	such	a	thing.		Some	examples	of	(ii)	that	She	considers	is	Weatherson’s	fork-
tables	(2004)—where	the	reader	is	invited	to	imagine	that	an	actual	dinner	fork	is	a	
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table—,	and	Yablo’s	five-pointed	oval	(2002)—where	the	reader	is	invited	to	
imagine	that	what	counts	as	an	oval	in	the	story	is	a	maple	leaf.		It	is	not	that	we	are	
unwilling	to	imagine	such	things;	we	just	simply	cannot.		 	
	 Gendler’s	modified	wontian	view	now	takes	instances	of	(iii)	to	be	
paradigmatic	cases	of	imaginative	resistance.40		In	such	cases,	the	impossibility	is	
due	to	the	impropriety.		This	is	primarily	because	she	still	holds	that	fundamental	to	
imaginative	resistance	arises	is	unwilling	to	export	a	way	of	looking	at	the	actual	
world,	and	she	takes	the	fiction	to	be	inviting	such	an	exportation.		In	her	revised	
view,	she	calls	this	invitation	to	export	a	way	of	looking	at	the	actual	world,	‘pop-
out’.		Pop-out	happens	when	a	reader	takes	the	author	to	be	asking	her	to	not	only	
imagine	the	puzzling	proposition	in	the	story,	but	also	to	believe	that	the	same	
proposition	is	true	or	that	it	applies	in	the	actual	world.		Recall	above	Gendler’s	
distinction	between	distorting	and	non-distorting	fictions.		Distorting	fictions	have	
indicators	that	prevent	pop-out—such	indicators	signal	that	the	reader	is	not	
supposed	to	export	this	way	of	looking	at	the	actual	world.			
	 As	we	saw	above,	Gendler	also	thinks	that	supposition	is	similar	to	distorting	
fictions	in	that	it	prevents	pop-out	from	happening.	Instead	of	talking	about	laws	of	
import	and	export,	Gendler	now	just	refers	to	them	as	‘principles	of	generation.’		
When	the	principles	of	generation	preclude	the	puzzling	proposition	from	being	
true	in	the	story,	the	result	is	imaginative	barriers.		When	the	reader	refuses	to	
                                                
40	Gendler	does	not	offer	an	example	of	case	(iv).		If	there	were	examples	of	this	case,	they	might	be	
explained	by	Weinberg	and	Meskin’s	imaginative	blockage.		Because	of	the	conflict	between	the	
cognitive	mechanisms,	one	cannot	imagine	the	proposition.		Though	if	one	could,	one	would	not	want	
to.	 
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adopt	the	requisite	set	of	generation	principles	that	would	allow	the	proposition	to	
be	true,	the	result	is	imaginative	impropriety.		According	to	Gendler,	it	is	the	latter	
that	causes	the	former—imaginative	resistance	arises	when	we	can’t	imagine	some	
proposition	as	true	because	we	won’t	imagine	that	proposition	as	true.		
	 This	concludes	the	summary	of	wontian	views.		Similar	to	cantian	views,	
none	of	the	wontian	views	have	been	concerned	with	explaining	Variation.		Yet,	
unlike	cantian	views,	arguably,	wontian	views	have	the	resources	to	explain	some	of	
Variation.		Given	that	according	to	wontian	views,	the	primary	cause	of	resistance	is	
due	to	an	unwillingness	on	our	part	to	comply	with	the	invitation	to	imagine	a	
certain	content	and	given	that	what	we	are	unwilling	to	do	varies,	it	follows	that	
wontian	views	can	give	an	explanation	of,	at	least,	some	of	Variation.		This	is	also	
evident	in	Gendler’s	ideas	about	principles	of	generation	causing	or	diminishing	
imaginative	resistance.		Such	ideas,	as	we	will	see	below,	play	a	critical	role	in	
helping	us	both	to	see	Variation	and	to	account	for	Variation.		I,	next,	turn	to	the	
last	group	of	theories	that	Gendler	and	Liao	(2016)	call	eliminativists.		
	 The	eliminativists	are	skeptics	when	it	comes	to	imaginative	resistance.		They	
are	not	convinced	that	it	is	a	real	phenomenon.		Todd	(2009),	Stock	(2005),	
Mothersill	(2003),	and	Tanner	(1994)	all	give	reasons	to	question	whether	the	
puzzle	of	imaginative	resistance	is	a	genuine	puzzle.		For	instance,	Stock	argues	that	
the	right	context	can	make	puzzling	propositions	such	as	Giselda,	imaginable:	
	 To	demonstrate	the	conceptual	coherence	for	[Giselda],	the	right	sort	of		
	 fictional	context	needs	to	be	supplied:	for	instance,	the	conceptual	coherence	
	 of	[Giselda]	is	demonstrated	once	one	imagines	that	in	the	town	in	which	
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	 Giselda	lives,	girl	children	inevitably	face	atrocious	lives—are	placed	in	to	
	 unspeakable	slavery,	for	instance—it	they	are	allowed	to	live	(2005:	617).41		
	
With	the	right	context,	we	do	not	resist	imagining	Giselda;	thus,	the	phenomenon	of	
imaginative	resistance	is	not	very	puzzling.		Stock	argues	that	any	imaginative	
failure	that	we	experience	is	due	to	the	fact	that	with	so	little	context,	there	is	what	
she	calls	a	‘contingent	incomprehensibility’	for	the	proposition—we	simply	fail	to	
understand	the	proposition.			
		 Building	on	observations	such	as	these	from	Stock,	Todd	(2009)	argues	that	
the	so-called	examples	of	imaginative	resistance	arise	from	single	propositions	or	
one-page	stories	created	to	make	a	philosophical	point.		Todd	(2009)	articulates	this	
well:		
For	fictional	worlds	in	general	do	not	consist	of	isolated,	a-contextual	single		
propositions,	and	the	few	that	have	been	mustered—or	rather	invented—in		
the	literature	as	supposed	examples	of	the	phenomenon	of	imaginative	
	 resistance	are	testimony	rather	to	the	paucity	of	such	cases	in	genuine	
	 fiction,	whatever	the	situation	might	be	in	respect	of	propagandistic,	
	 simplistic	and	straightforwardly	poor	creations	of	impoverished	skill	and	
	 imagination	(191).	
	
According	to	Todd,	every	puzzling	proposition	is	the	result	of	philosophers’	poor	
attempts	at	writing	fiction.		The	point	is	that	the	phenomenon	of	imaginative	
resistance	seems	contrived	and	therefore	not	a	genuine	puzzle.		It	is	the	creation	of	
philosophers	who	cannot	offer	genuine	examples	from	fiction	or	who	cannot	write	
good	fiction.		If	there	few	if	any	examples	from	genuine	fiction,	and	if	the	alleged	
cases	disappear	when	appropriate	context	is	given,	then	we	have	little	reason	to	
think	that	the	phenomenon	of	imaginative	resistance	is	a	genuine	puzzle.		
                                                
41	Tanner	(1994)	and	Mothersill	(2003)	both	make	similar	points	regarding	context. 
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	 Although	the	eliminativists	have	raised	significant	problems,	proponents	of	
imaginative	resistance	take	these	problems	as	warrant	for	the	need	to	revise	the	
puzzle	rather	than	as	warrant	for	eliminating	it.		Proponents	of	imaginative	
resistance	have	begun	developing	accounts	of	imaginative	resistance	that	build	on	
the	insights	of	the	eliminativists.		By	developing	accounts	that	take	context	into	
consideration,	these	more	recent	views	have	also	begun	to	offer	(even	if	implicitly)	
explanations	for	the	variation	of	imaginative	resistance.		In	the	next	section,	I	say	
more	about	this	variation.		I	also,	briefly,	characterize	these	recent	accounts,	and	I	
show	that	these	accounts	fall	short	of	fully	explaining	the	variation	in	resistance.			
	
§	3.2	Imaginative	Resistance,	Context,	and	Variation	
	
	 Building	on	insights	from	the	eliminativists,	philosophers	are	now	treating	
the	variation	in	imaginative	resistance	as	a	feature	in	need	of	explanation.		Weinberg	
(2008),	Nanay	(2010),	Willard	(2013),	Liao,	et	al.	(2014),	and	Liao	(2013,	2016)	
have	all	offered	accounts	that	focus	on	contextual	factors,	especially	genre,	in	
attempting	to	explain	variation.		Hence,	I	label	them	Contextual	Variant	Views	of	
imaginative	resistance.		As	I	mentioned	above,	these	views	offer	insights	that	bring	
much	progress	in	explaining	Variation.		However,	I	argue	that	they	fail	to	explain	all	
of	the	variation	that	is	characteristic	of	imaginative	resistance.		In	order	to	see	why,	I	
need	to	clarify	what	is	this	variation.			
	 As	I	mentioned	above,	one	feature	of	this	variation	is	that	imaginative	
resistance	varies	from	person	to	person.		Some	people	report	experiencing	it	and	
some	don’t.		This	can	be	seen	among	the	eliminativists	who	doubt	whether	it	is	a	
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real	phenomenon.		Similar	to	this,	I	have	engaged	in	conversations	with	
philosophers	and	non-philosophers	who	are	insist	that	they	do	not	experience	
resistance.		The	second	feature	is	that	the	causes	of	resistance	seem	to	vary.		For	
instance,	some	people	may	resist	because	they	have	an	aversion	to	the	content	of	
the	puzzling	proposition.		Others	may	resist	because	of	some	conflict	of	architectural	
mechanisms	as	Weinberg	and	Meskin	(2006)	describe.		Others	may	resist	because	
they	do	not	understand	what	the	author	is	asking	them	to	do.	The	third	feature	of	
variation	of	imaginative	resistance	is	that	even	among	those	who	report	
experiencing	imaginative	resistance,	the	resistance	varies	in	degrees.		As	an	example	
of	this,	it	is	likely	that	two	people	might	have	varying	degrees	of	resistance	towards	
the	same	invitation	to	imagine	some	morally	alien	world.		The	degrees	of	resistance	
might	be	due	to	their	differing	perspectives	of	the	nature	of	norms.		Arguably,	an	
absolutist	is	going	to	experience	a	more	vivid	resistance	than,	say,	a	conventionalist.		
The	fourth	feature	is	that	even	within	one	person,	imaginative	resistance	can	vary	in	
degrees	across	encounters	with	the	same	fiction.		Such	a	person	might	have	an	
initial	resistance	towards	a	puzzling	proposition	within	a	story,	but	that	person	
might	be	motivated	to	work	through	the	resistance.		What	may	be	an	initially	
puzzling	proposition	for	this	one	person	may	become	less	puzzling	through	effort	
and	over	time.		For	ease	of	reference,	we	can	name	this	set	of	features:	
Variation:	
	
	 (i)	Interpersonal	Variation:	Not	every	person	experiences	resistance.	
	
	 (ii)	Cause	Variation:	There	are	different	causes	of	resistance	for	different		
	 	 	 															people.	
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	 (iii)	Degree	Variation:	Not	every	person	experiences	resistance	to	the	same		
	 	 	 	 					degree.	
	
	 (iv)	Intrapersonal	Variation:	One	person	can	experience	varying	degrees	of	
	 																																																												resistance	for	any	particular	case.		
	
Some	of	these	are	discussed	in	the	literature,	though	not	as	I	name	them	(Nanay	
2010,	Willard	2013,	Liao	2013,	Gendler	and	Liao	2016).		Nanay	(2010)	argues	that	
the	“set	of	sentences	that	trigger	imaginative	resistance	varies	from	person	to	
person	and	context	to	context”	(589).		Nanay’s	person	variation	and	context	
variation	captures	my	Interpersonal	Variation	and	at	least	part	of	Cause	
Variation,	respectively.		I	say	part	of	Cause	Variation	because	context	would	be	
just	one	cause	of	variation.		One	example	of	this	is	how	puzzling	propositions	in	one	
context	might	not	be	so	puzzling	in	another	context.		As	a	result,	some	contexts	
cause	resistance	and	some	contexts	mitigate	the	resistance.		Nanay	adds	that	any	
solution	to	the	problem	of	imaginative	resistance	ought	to	explain	this	variation.		
Finally,	no	view	currently	discusses	Degree	Variation	or	Intrapersonal	Variation.		
There	are	good	reasons	to	think	that	there	both	is	degrees	of	resistance	and	that	
there	is	intrapersonal	variation.		I	show	this	below	as	it	requires	some	development.			
	 Together	(i)-(iv)	comprise	a	set	of	features	of	imaginative	resistance	that	we	
should	be	able	to	explain.		While	different	views	of	imaginative	resistance	can	offer	
different	insights	that	can	explain	some	of	the	aspects	of	Variation,	none	can	offer	a	
unified	explanation	for	all	of	Variation.			In	the	rest	of	this	section,	I	discuss	what	I	
call	the	Contextual	Variant	Views,	and	I	argue	that	they	fail	to	explain	all	of	
Variation.		In	the	final	section	of	this	paper,	I	establish	what	I	call	the	Constraint	
Variant	View	and	argue	that	it	can	explain	all	of	Variation.	
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3.2.1		Contextual	Variant	Views	
	
	 For	reasons	that	will	become	clear,	some	preliminary	remarks	are	required.		
One	concerns	the	name,	Contextual	Variant	Views.		I	consider	any	view	a	Contextual	
Variant	View	if	it	appeals	to	contextual	factors	in	order	to	account	for	the	whole	or	
any	part	of	Variation.		Most	Contextual	Variant	Views	appeal	to	the	contextual	factor	
of	genre	in	order	to	explain	some	of	the	variation	of	imaginative	resistance.		Because	
of	this,	one	may	wonder	why	I	don’t	simply	call	the	views	Genre	Variant	Views.		
There	are	two	reasons	for	this.		The	first	reason	is	that	there	are	nuanced	
differences	about	the	role	of	genre	between	some	of	the	views.		For	instance,	as	we	
will	see	below,	for	Liao	(2016),	genre	plays	a	primary	role	both	to	account	for	the	
existence	and	the	variation	of	imaginative	resistance.		In	contrast,	for	Nanay	(2010),	
the	work	of	genre	is	not	primary	in	accounting	for	the	existence	of	imaginative	
resistance,	though	on	his	account	it	does	play	role	in	explaining	the	variation	of	
imaginative	resistance	between	persons	and	across	contexts.		Thus	naming	them	
Genre	Variant	Views	can	be	misleading	in	terms	of	the	role	of	genre	in	each	account.		
	 The	second	reason	is	that	there	are	contextual	factors	other	than	genre	that	
play	a	role	in	imagination	and	imaginative	resistance.		For	instance,	Liz	Camp	(2009)	
makes	a	distinction	between	literary	imagining	and	metaphorical	imagining.		To	see	
this	distinction,	consider	the	proposition	“Bill	is	a	snake”.		Imagining	this	
proposition	in	the	context	of	make-believe	requires	that	we	imagine	Bill	as	a	snake.		
But	if	in	an	ordinary	conversation	with	co-workers,	someone	utters	that	“Bill	is	a	
snake,”	imagining	Bill	as	a	snake	would	result	in	misunderstanding.		The	point	of	the	
utterance	is	to	reveal	something	about	Bill.		According	to	Camp	(2006,	2009),	
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metaphors,	in	general,	use	characterizations	about	certain	objects	to	structure	our	
thinking	about	other	objects.		Thus,	with	the	utterance	“Bill	is	a	snake”	we	use	one	
salient	characterization	of	snakes	(sneaky)	to	frame	how	we	think	about	Bill	
(untrustworthy).		Suppose	she	is	right.		Then	metaphor	may	be	an	example	of	a	non-
genre	contextual	factor	that	guides	our	imaginings	and	presumably	can	play	a	role	
in	imaginative	resistance.			
	 The	second	preliminary	remark	concerns	justifying	an	intentional	restriction	
of	the	discussion	that	follows.		My	main	foil	in	this	section	is	Liao	(2016).		This	is	
primarily	because	it	is	one	of	the	most	developed	of	the	Contextual	Variant	Views.		
This	is	also	because,	as	I	will	argue	below,	there	is	no	amount	of	contextual	factors	
that	can	account	for	all	of	Variation.		In	light	of	these	preliminary	remarks,	I	offer	a	
summary	of	Liao’s	Contextual	Variant	View.	
	 Recall	first,	that	it	was	the	eliminativists	who	brought	our	attention	to	the	
importance	of	context	in	the	debate	over	imaginative	resistance.		Liao,	et.	al.,	(2014)	
calls	them	imaginative	resistance	doubters.		They	are	opposed	to	imaginative	
resistance	believers.		As	with	most	skeptical	arguments,	rather	than	convince	the	
believers,	the	doubters’	arguments	have	forced	the	“believers”	to	refine	their	
understanding	of	the	phenomenon.		Such	refinement	has	been	proffered	in	both	Liao	
(2016)	and	Liao,	Strohminger,	and	Sripada	(2014).		The	latter	uses	methods	of	
experimental	philosophy	in	order	to	shine	light	on	the	debate	between	the	
doubters	and	the	believers.		And	the	former	develops	one	of	the	findings	of	the	
latter.		I	summarize	each	of	them	below.	
 115 
	 Liao,	Strohminger,	and	Sripada	(2014)	use	empirical	methods	to	adjudicate	
between	imaginative	resistance	doubters	and	imaginative	resistance	believers.		
The	results	are	somewhat	inconclusive.		Rather	than	declaring	a	clear	winner,	their	
studies	reveal	that	both	believers	and	doubters	get	some	things	right	and	some	
things	wrong	about	imaginative	resistance.		They	conducted	two	studies	where	they	
had	participants	read	one	or	two	short	stories	and	then	answer	questions	based	on	
the	readings.		In	study	2,	they	used	stories	with	the	same	plot,	but	couched	them	in	
clearly	distinct	genres.42		Here	is	study	2:	
	 (police	procedural)	
	 Seeing	the	Light.	February	14th,	2010.		Texas.		There	was	only	darkness.			
	 Everyone	gathered	around	the	preacher,	Wayne	Howell,	for	an	
	 announcement.		“A	message	from	the	almighty	came	to	me.		The	youngest	girl	
	 must	be	sacrificed	in	order	to	bring	back	the	light.”		They	believed	his	every		
	 word.		All	eyes	then	turned	to	Mary,	who	had	just	given	birth	to	a	baby	girl.		
	 Reluctantly,	Mary	gave	her	baby	to	the	preacher	to	be	sacrificed.		
	
	 (Aztec	myth)	
	 The	Sun	of	the	Second	Creation.		A	long,	long	time	ago,	in	the	valley	of	Mexico,		
	 there	was	only	darkness.		Everyone	gathered	around	the	high	priest,	
	 Cihuacoatl,	for	an	announcement.		“A	message	from	the	gods	came	to	me.		
	 The	youngest	girl	must	be	sacrificed	in	order	to	renew	the	sun.”		They	
	 believed	his	every	word.		All	eyes	then	turned	to	Ixchel,	who	had	just	given	
	 birth	to	a	baby	girl.		Reluctantly,	Ixchel	gave	her	baby	to	the	high	priest	to	be	
	 sacrificed.		
	
Participants	read	the	two	stories	and	were	then	asked	to	rate	whether	or	not	they	
agreed	with	the	following	two	statements:	
	 Belief.	Mary/Ixchel	believed	she	did	the	right	thing.	
	 Morality.	In	the	world	of	the	story,	Mary/Ixchel	did	the	right	thing.	 	
                                                
42	I	focus	only	on	the	results	of	Study	2	because	they	are	clearer	and	more	pertinent	to	my	argument.		 
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Most	of	the	participants	agreed	that	both	Mary	and	Ixchel	believed	that	they	did	the	
right	thing.		The	participants	also	agreed	that	Ixchel	did	the	right	thing	in	The	Sun	of	
the	Second	Creation;	however,	the	participants	disagreed	that	Mary	did	the	right	
thing	in	Seeing	the	Light.		According	to	Liao,	et	al	(2014),	these	results	demonstrate	
the	existence	of	imaginative	resistance	as	a	real	phenomenon,	which	seems	to	
vindicate	the	imaginative	resistance	believers.		This	is	because	the	participants	
rejecting	that	Mary	did	the	right	thing	reveals	that	they	do	not	accept	everything	
that	the	author	claims	as	fictional.		This	is	at	least	a	version	of	the	fictionality	
puzzle.		However,	the	results	also	show,	at	least	in	this	case,	that	the	imaginative	
resistance	is	mostly	triggered	in	the	“police	procedural”	genre,	and	this	vindicates	
the	imaginative	resistance	doubters43	at	least	in	their	contention	that	given	the	
right	context,	the	so-called	imaginative	resistance	is	not	triggered.		This	is	because	
the	participants	did	not	have	trouble	following	the	author	in	regards	to	Ixchel,	but	
did	have	difficulty	in	regards	to	Mary.		As	a	result,	this	study	can	be	read	as	offering	
empirical	support	for	the	claim	that	genre	can	make	or	break	imaginative	resistance.		
Liao	(2016)	develops	this	idea	systematically	into	what	he	calls	the	Genre	Account	
of	Imaginative	Resistance.		I	turn	to	that	next.	
	 In	his	(2016),	Liao	defines	‘genre’	in	a	broad	sense	as	“simply	groupings	of	
narratives	that	are	recognized	by	the	relevant	community	as	special”	(2016,	469).	
Genre	is	“special”	for	two	reasons:	(1)	the	role	it	plays	in	classifying	works	of	art,	
and	(2)	the	role	it	plays	in	the	normativity	and	psychology	of	narrative	engagement.		
According	to	Liao,	the	normative	role	of	genre	is	to	establish	conventions	that	
                                                
43	Recall	that	these	are	formerly	known	as	eliminativists. 
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constrain	what	can	be	made	fictional,	and	the	psychological	role	of	genre	is	to	
provide	readers	with	expectations	that	govern	their	imaginings.		Liao	suggests,	
admittedly	speculatively,	that	genre	expectations	are	story	schemas	that	readers	
generally	employ	with	high	fluency,	meaning	that	it	is	quick,	automatic,	and	
unconscious.		The	presence	of	such	schemas	allows	readers	to	be	carried	along	in	
the	story.		And	of	course,	the	absence	of	such	schemas	would	make	it	difficult	for	
certain	readers	to	be	carried	along;	such	readers	would	lack	the	fluency	to	engage	
with	the	narrative.		This	would	make	it	difficult	for	them	to	engage	and	would	
increase	the	chances	that	they	would	simply	disengage	from	the	narrative.			
	 Liao,	next,	uses	these	features	of	genre	along	with	the	two	stories	from	study	
2	in	order	to	refine	three	of	the	four	puzzles	discussed	in	section	3.1	above.		Recall	
that	central	to	the	fictionality	puzzle	is	the	difficulty	in	accepting	certain	
propositions	as	fictional.		Central	to	the	imaginative	puzzle	is	the	difficulty	is	
actually	imagining	certain	propositions.		And	central	to	the	phenomenological	
puzzle	is	fact	the	people	experience	a	jarring	sense	of	confusion	when	they	attempt	
to	imagine	a	puzzling	proposition.						
	 	According	to	Liao,	the	proposition	that	Mary	did	the	right	thing	by	giving	up	
her	baby	to	be	sacrificed	causes	the	fictionality	puzzle	because	it	is	convention-
discordant.		The	conventions	that	govern	the	fictional	world	of	Seeing	the	Light	do	
not	permit	such	violations	of	real-world	norms.		The	conventions	that	govern	the	
fictional	world	of	The	Sun	of	the	Second	Creation,	on	the	other	hand,	do	permit	such	
violations	of	real-world	norms.		As	a	result,	the	proposition	that	Ixchel	did	the	right	
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thing	by	giving	up	her	baby	to	be	sacrificed	does	not	cause	the	fictionality	puzzle.		
This	proposition	is	what	Liao	calls	convention-concordant.				
	 Liao	gives	a	similar	explanation	of	the	imaginative	puzzle.		In	this	case,	the	
proposition	Mary	did	the	right	thing	by	giving	up	her	baby	to	be	sacrificed	would	
cause	the	imagination	puzzle	because	the	proposition	would	be	expectation-
discordant.		The	proposition	is	one	that	we	do	not	expect,	given	the	genre.		Thus	
Mary	did	the	right	thing	by	giving	up	her	baby	to	be	sacrificed	in	the	genre	of	Seeing	
the	Light	strikes	us	as	odd	in	that	we	do	not	expect	it,	and	so	we	have	a	comparative	
difficulty	imagining	it.		Whereas	Ixchel	did	the	right	thing	by	giving	up	her	baby	to	be	
sacrificed	in	the	genre	of	“The	Sun	of	the	Second	Creation”	does	not	strike	as	odd;	it	
is	expectation-concordant.			
	 And	finally,	Liao	suggests	that	genre	expectations	play	a	role	in	explaining	
the	phenomenological	puzzle	as	well.		When	we	lack	the	requisite	genre	
expectations,	or	schemas,	our	narrative	engagement	becomes	less	fluent.		This	
demands	more	effort	than	we	are	used	to	and	this,	at	least,	partly	contributes	to	the	
jarring	sense	of	confusion,	which	characterizes	the	phenomenological	puzzle.			
	 As	Liao	argues,	the	attraction	of	his	account	is	that	it	can	show	why	earlier	
diagnoses	of	imaginative	resistance	remain	incomplete.		Recall	from	above	that	even	
though	there	are	differences	between	accounts,	they	all	emphasize	that	there	is	a	
certain	dissonance	between	the	puzzling	proposition,	on	the	one	hand,	and	real-
world	norms	and	reader’s	actual	evaluative	attitudes	on	the	other.		Different	
accounts	appeal	to	different	mechanisms	in	order	to	explain	the	dissonance.		As	Liao	
notes,	Gendler	(2000,	2006)	and	Yablo	(2002)	focus	on	the	concepts	that	are	central	
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to	the	puzzling	propositions.		The	dissonance,	then,	follows	from	authors	applying	
moral	concepts	in	a	deviant	way.		Liao	also	mentions	Walton	(1994,	2006)	and	
Weatherson	(2004)	who	focus	on	supervenience	relations	between	higher-level	
claims	and	lower-level	bases.		According	to	them,	the	dissonance	is	a	result	of	
authors	attempting	to	change	the	supervenience	relations.		The	problem,	according	
to	Liao,	is	that	by	focusing	on	the	real	world	norms	and	actual	responses,	these	
earlier	accounts	cannot	explain	why	the	same	moral	proposition	can	evoke	
imaginative	resistance	in	“Seeing	the	Light”	but	may	not	when	it	is	in	“The	Sun	of	the	
Second	Creation.”		Or	to	put	it	more	simply,	as	I	argued	above,	these	earlier	accounts	
cannot	account	for	variation.	The	Genre	Account	avoids	the	problem	because	
distinct	genre	conventions	can	allow	for	fictional	worlds	to	have	different	concept-
applicability	conditions	and	different	fictional	supervenience	relations.		As	a	result,	
the	Genre	Account	is	able	to	explain	why	some	contexts	cause	imaginative	
resistance	and	others	do	not.	
	 This	constitutes	Liao’s	Genre	Account.		As	he	argues,	any	explanation	of	
imaginative	resistance	that	does	not	accept	it	will	remain	incomplete.		Liao	sees	
himself	as	complementing	earlier	views.		In	fact,	he	calls	for	an	“explanatory	
cosmopolitanism”.		Complete	explanations	must	take	into	account	many	factors	
given	the	complex	nature	of	the	normativity	and	psychology	of	narrative	
engagement.					
	 I	am	inclined	to	think	that	all	of	this	is	correct.		Yet,	I	think	that	Liao’s	
“explanatory	cosmopolitanism”	needs	to	be	broadened.		This	is	because	the	Genre	
Account	is	incomplete	with	regards	to	Variation.		I	show	this	in	the	next	section.			
 120 
3.2.2	Contextual	Variant	Views	and	Variation	
	
	 It	is	clear	that	the	Genre	Account	has	the	resources	to	explain	some	of	the	
aspects	of	Variation.		Consider	(i)	Interpersonal	Variation.		For	any	particular	
puzzling	proposition,	there	will	be	people	that	experience	resistance	and	people	
that	do	not.44		A	simple	explanation,	according	to	the	Genre	Account,	is	that	those	
who	experience	resistance	lack	the	requisite	genre	schema,	while	those	who	do	not	
experience	resistance	do	have	the	requisite	genre	schema.		For	instance,	consider	
the	variation	over	the	Aztec	Myth:	The	Sun	of	the	Second	Creation.			Those	who	
understand	that	the	genre	of	an	Aztec	Myth	carries	its	own	normative	principles	
would	likely	not	experience	resistance	to	The	Sun	of	the	Second	Creation.		In	
contrast,	those	who	do	not	understand	that	the	genre	of	an	Aztec	Myth	carries	its	
own	normative	principles	would	likely	experience	resistance	to	The	Sun	of	the	
Second	Creation.		It	follows	that	the	Genre	Account	offers	a	good	explanation	of	(i)	
Interpersonal	Variation.		This	strength,	however,	may	in	fact	also	be	a	weakness.		
This	is	because,	in	certain	cases,	the	Genre	Account	predicts	no	variation	when	there	
is	in	fact	variation	of	a	certain	kind.		That	variation	is	what	I	called	(ii)	Cause	
Variation:	there	are	different	causes	of	resistance	for	different	people.				
	 To	be	clear,	the	Genre	Account	can	explain	some	aspects	of	(ii).		This	is	
because,	as	I	said	above,	some	aspects	of	cause	variation	concerns	the	same	puzzling	
proposition	causing	resistance	in	one	context	and	not	causing	resistance	in	another	
context.		It	should	be	obvious	that	the	Genre	Account	has	an	explanation	of	that	type	
of	cause	variation.		In	order	to	see	this,	let’s	focus	on	those	who	experience	
                                                
44Cf.	Nanay	(2010)	and	Liao,	et	al.	(2014). 
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resistance	to	Seeing	the	Light.		According	to	the	Genre	Account,	those	who	do	
experience	resistance	to	Seeing	the	Light	have	the	requisite	genre	schema.	Those	
who	experience	resistance,	do	so	because	the	last	sentence	of	Seeing	the	Light	is	
both	genre	convention-discordant	and	genre	expectation-discordant.		Yet,	those	
same	people	will	not	normally	experience	resistance	to	The	Sun	of	the	Second	
Creation.		This	is	because	the	last	sentence	is	both	genre	convention-concordant	
and	genre	expectation-concordant.		However,	some	causes	of	resistance	are	
independent	of	genre.		It	is	plausible	to	suppose	that	someone	might	experience	
resistance	to	Seeing	the	Light	without	having	the	requisite	genre	schema.		Maybe	
they	find	the	last	sentence	repulsive	and	simply	won’t	imagine	such	a	thing	even	in	a	
story.		Here	the	cause	of	the	resistance	does	not	have	anything	to	do	with	genre.		
Additionally,	it	is	also	plausible	to	suppose	that	some	people	might	have	the	
requisite	genre	schema	and	realize	that	what	they	are	being	asked	to	imagine	is	
concordant	with	that	genre,	but	they	still	might	resist	for	other	reasons.		For	
instance,	they	simply	do	not	desire	to	imagine	what	they	are	being	asked	to	imagine.		
As	a	result,	the	Genre	Account	can	explain	some	of	the	variation	due	to	different	
causes,	but	it	is	unable	to	explain	all	of	(ii)	Cause	Variation.			
	 The	Genre	Account,	on	its	own,	also	cannot	explain	the	last	two	aspects	of	
Variation.		Recall	that	these	are	the	following:	
	 (iii)	Degree	Variation:	Not	every	person	experiences	resistance	to	the	same		
	 	 	 	 					degree.	
	
	 (iv)	Intrapersonal	Variation:	For	any	particular	case,	one	person	can		
	 	 																																														experience	varying	degrees	of	resistance.	
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Consider	(iii)	first.		It	is	likely	that,	among	those	who	experience	resistance	within	a	
particular	genre,	not	all	will	experience	the	same	degree	of	resistance.		Here	is	an	
argument:	
	 Premise	1:	The	Genre	Account	explains	variation	of	resistance	by	appealing		
	 	 								to	genre.		
	 Premise	2:	There	can	be	degrees	of	resistance	between	two	people	within		
	 	 								one	particular	genre	(iii)	Degree	Variation.	
	
	 Therefore,	the	Genre	Account	cannot	explain	(iii)	Degree	Variation.		
	
As	a	way	to	see	that	(iii)	Degree	Variation	is	true,	consider	the	following	example.		
Suppose	that	there	is	a	person	named	Sally	who	has	a	strong	moral	belief	that	all	
female	infanticide	is	immoral	and	should	never	be	permitted	for	any	reason.		This	
belief	influences	the	things	that	she	values	(all	humans,	which	include	females,	have	
a	right	to	life),	and	it	influences	the	things	that	she	desires	(a	world	free	of	female	
infanticide).		Suppose	further	that	she	understands	that	the	genre	conventions	of	
The	Sun	of	the	Second	Creation	include	a	sort	of	divine	command	morality	and	that	it	
is	inappropriate	to	import	her	norms	into	the	story.		Yet,	she	still	experiences	
resistance.		In	such	a	case,	the	resistance	is	due	to	her	specific	beliefs	and	desires	
concerning	female	infanticide.		It	is	not	due	to	a	misunderstanding	of	the	genre.		 	
	 We	can	contrast	Sally	with	another	person	who	experiences	resistance	to	The	
Sun	of	the	Second	Creation.		This	person,	call	her	Jane,	agrees	with	Sally	about	female	
infanticide.		However,	she	is	not	so	absolute.		Though	it	makes	her	uncomfortable	to	
think	about	it,	she	does	admit	that	there	might	be	exceptions	that	would	allow	for	
female	infanticide.		Jane,	like	Sally,	understands	the	genre	conventions	of	The	Sun	of	
the	Second	Creation.		Here	it	is	plausible	to	suppose	that	because	Jane’s	beliefs	and	
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desires	concerning	female	infanticide	vary	slightly	from	Sally’s,	Jane	would	not	
experience	the	same	degree	of	resistance	as	Sally.	This,	then,	reveals	that	the	
resistance	can	vary	by	degrees	between	persons.		Some	will	experience	a	more	vivid	
resistance	than	others	within	a	particular	genre.			
	 The	Genre	Account,	on	its	own,	cannot	explain	this	aspect	of	Variation.		
Nothing	about	genre	per	se	can	explain	why	resistance	within	one	genre	can	vary	in	
degrees.		Finally,	I	also	think	that	the	Genre	Account	fails	to	explain	the	last	aspect	of	
Variation—Intrapersonal	Variation.		My	reasons	for	why	this	is	the	case,	
however,	will	come	out	in	the	next	section	when	I	show	that	my	view	can	explain	
this	aspect	of	Variation.		The	reason	for	this	delay	will	be	apparent	below.	
	 In	general,	we	can	summarize	the	problem	for	the	Genre	Account	like	so:	the	
Genre	Account	has	too	few	resources	to	account	for	all	four	aspects	of	Variation.		
While	it	does	offer	resources	to	explain	(i)	Interpersonal	Variation	well,	and	while	
it	can	explain	some	of	(ii)	Cause	Variation,	it	cannot	account	for	all	of	(ii)	Cause	
Variation,	and	further	it	cannot	account	for	aspects	(iii)	and	(iv)	of	Variation.		In	
the	next	section,	I	develop	a	view	that	can	account	for	all	four	aspects	of	Variation.					
	
§	3.3	Imaginative	Resistance,	Constraints,	and	Variation				
	
	 In	this	final	section,	I	apply	the	AIT	view	of	imagining	in	order	to	account	for	
all	of	Variation.		Recall	that	central	to	this	view	is	the	notion	of	‘constraints’.		
Appealing	to	these	allowed	me	to	explain	the	differences	(and	similarities)	between	
supposition	and	imagination.		I	argue	that	it	is	constraints	that	also	allow	me	to	
explain	the	forms	of	Variation	that	escape	analysis	of	the	Genre	Account.		For	this	
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reason,	I	call	the	view	the	Constraint	Variant	View.		In	what	follows,	I	first	review	the	
notion	of	‘constraints’	showing	that	this	notion	is	particularly	apt	for	applying	to	the	
phenomenon	of	imaginative	resistance	(3.3.1).		I,	then,	review	my	As-If-True	
Attitude	view	of	imagining	showing	that	the	Constraint	Variant	View	naturally	
follows	from	it	(3.3.2).		Finally,	I	argue	that	the	Constraint	Variant	View	can	explain	
all	of	Variation	(3.3.3).		
3.3.1	Constraints	and	Resistance	
	
Miyazono	and	Liao	(2016)	characterize	imaginative	resistance	as	follows:	
[it	is]	the	phenomenon	in	which	we,	who	are	otherwise	competent	imaginers,		
experience	a	constraint	in	taking	part	in	an	imaginative	activity	(233,		
emphasis	mine).	
	
This	is	a	standard	way	of	characterizing	imaginative	resistance.		However,	what	is	
interesting	about	this	characterization	is	that	they	are	the	first	to	explicitly	mention	
‘constraint’	as	central	to	imaginative	resistance.		As	we	we	have	seen	in	chapter	two,	
appealing	to	constraints	to	solve	or	clarify	problems	related	to	the	imagination	is	
becoming	more	prevalent.		Kind	and	Kung	(2016)	have	argued	that	constraints	are	
required	as	a	solution	to	what	is	called	the	puzzle	of	imaginative	use,	which	is	the	
puzzle	of	explaining	how	the	same	capacity	that	allows	us	to	escape	reality	can	also	
inform	us	about	reality.		Kind	(2016)	has	also	argued	that	they	are	required	to	give	
an	account	of	the	epistemic	significance	of	imagination.		One	meaning	of	‘epistemic	
significance’	is	that	the	imagination	can	sometimes	justify	our	contingent	beliefs	
about	the	world.45		Kung	(2010,	2016),	Ichikawa	and	Jarvis	(2012),	and	Balcerak	
Jackson	(2016)	have	all	argued	that	constraints	are	required	to	give	a	plausible	
                                                
45	See	also,	Currie	(2016).	 
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account	of	the	relation	between	imagination	and	possibility.		Finally,	we	have	seen	
that,	on	my	view,	constraints	are	essential	to	properly	characterizing	the	relation	
between	supposition	and	imagination	and	the	nature	of	imagination	itself.		
	 Given	this	workload	for	the	constraints,	it	should	not	be	surprising	that	they	
can	speak	to	the	puzzle	of	imaginative	resistance.		Recall	from	chapter	two,	a	
constraint	is	something	that	limits	or	prevents	us	from	imagining	certain	content.		
This	is	a	natural	way	to	characterize	the	puzzle	of	imaginative	resistance—
imaginative	resistance	occurs	when	something	constrains	or	prevents	us	from	
partaking	in	an	imaginative	activity.		While	it	is	natural	to	connect	imaginative	
resistance	to	constraints,	it	has	not	always	been	made	explicit	as	to	why	or	how	
imaginative	resistance	is	connected	to	constraints.		The	AIT	view	of	imagining	
makes	this	explicit	or	so	I	will	argue	below.		
	 Recall	from	chapter	two	that	according	to	Kind	and	King	(2016),	there	are	
two	classes	of	constraints:	architectural	and	non-architectural.	Architectural	
constraints	are	mechanisms	of	our	cognitive	architecture	such	as	the	imagery	or	the	
conative	mechanism.		In	chapter	two,	I	argued	that	these	constraints	constrain	in	
virtue	of	the	various	relations	that	obtain	between	various	mental	mechanisms	and	
mental	states	that	make	up	our	cognitive	architecture.		I	also	argued	that	the	
imagery	mechanism	is	limited	by	our	perceptual	mechanisms.		Because	of	this,	we	
cannot	form	images	of	content	that	we	could	not	also,	in	principle,	perceive.		We	do	
not	have	direct	control	over	the	architectural	constraints.	These	are	the	kinds	of	
constraints,	as	we	saw	above	in	Weinberg	and	Meskin,	that	some	cantian	views	
appeal	to	in	order	to	explain	imaginative	resistance.			
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	 In	contrast,	the	non-architectural	class	of	constraints	constrain	by	providing	
norms	that	guide	the	imagining.		As	we	saw	in	chapter	two,	both	the	reality	and	the	
change	constraints	of	Kind	(2016)	belong	to	the	non-architectural	class.		The	reality	
constraint,	for	instance,	provides	a	norm	that	demands	that	our	imaginings	must	
track	the	world	as	it	really	is.		And,	as	we	have	seen	in	chapter	two,	genre	is	also	a	
non-architectural	constraint.		By	establishing	norms	of	convention	and	expectation,	
genres	establish	what	is	appropriate	to	imagine	and	what	is	not	appropriate	to	
imagine	while	one	is	engaging	some	narrative.			
	 Finally,	recall	also	from	chapter	two,	that	I	demonstrated	how	some	of	the	
distinct	types	of	constraints	relate	and	interact.		Given	the	way	that	our	affective	and	
conative	mechanisms	relate	within	our	cognitive	architecture,	there	are	some	things	
we	are	unable	or	unwilling	to	imagine.		Although	these	are	architectural	constraints,	
they	are	sensitive	to	non-architectural	constraints,	such	as	genre.		More	specifically,	
the	non-architectural	constrains	can	influence	how	the	architectural	constraints	
constrain.		Recall	from	chapter	two,	the	example	from	Liao	(2013)	about	laughing	at	
a	head	decapitation.		
	 In	light	of	this	review	of	the	constraints,	it	is	important	to	see	that,	because	
imaginative	resistance	is	a	complex	phenomenon,	for	any	particular	case,	
imaginative	resistance	can	be	due	either	to	architectural	constraints,	non-
architectural	constraints,	or	the	interaction	between	the	two.		This	is	another	reason	
why	earlier	views	remain	incomplete.		Arguing	for	the	nature	of	resistance	as	
consisting	of	one	cause	(e.g.,	architectural	constraints)	overly	simplifies	what	we	
have	seen	is	a	complex	phenomenon.			In	the	next	section,	I	show	that	from	the	AIT	
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view	of	imagining	comes	what	I	call	the	Constraint	Variant	View	of	imaginative	
resistance.		I,	then,	argue	that	this	view	can	account	for	all	of	Variation.				
3.3.2	The	Constraint	Variant	View	
	
Recall	from	chapter	two	that	according	to	the	AIT	view,	all	imagining	is	a	
kind	of	supposing.		Central	to	this	view	are	two	basic	commitments:	first,	there	is	a	
basic	cognitive	attitude	that	I	call	the	as-if-true	attitude.		This	cognitive	attitude	is	
distinct	from	other	familiar	attitudes	such	as	belief	and	desire.		Second,	this	basic	
cognitive	attitude	can	be	constrained	in	various	ways.		When	this	as-if-true	attitude	
is	unconstrained,	it	just	is	the	core	of	supposition—taking	a	content	as-if-true.		
When	this	same	as-if-true	attitude	is	constrained	by	various	constraints,	I	argue	that	
it	is	imagining.		Imagination,	then,	is	the	as-if-true	attitude	under	constraints.	
	 The	AIT	view	of	imagining	can	explain	two	things	with	regards	to	imaginative	
resistance.		The	first	is	that	imaginative	resistance	is	primarily	due	to	the	operation	
of	the	constraints.		This	is	implied	in	much	of	the	literature,	especially	those	who	
count	imaginative	resistance	among	the	many	differences	between	supposing	and	
imagining.		My	view	gives	us	a	natural	account	of	why	there	is	a	difference	between	
supposing	and	imagining	with	regards	to	imaginative	resistance.		The	as-if-true	
attitude	without	constraints	does	not	trigger	imaginative	resistance.		Yet,	the	as-if-
true	attitude	under	the	operation	of	various	constraints	can	often	trigger	
imaginative	resistance.		The	second	thing	that	my	view	can	explain	is	Variation.		
Contextual	Variant	Views	such	as	the	Genre	Account	appeal	to	one	constraint,	genre.		
They	can	account	for	one	aspect	of	Variation—(i)	Interpersonal	Variation—very	
well.		They	can	account	for	some	parts	of	(ii)	Cause	Variation.	Yet,	as	we	have	seen,	
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appealing	primarily	to	the	one	constraint	of	genre	alone	cannot	account	for	all	of	
Variation.		By	casting	our	net	wider	to	include	any	of	the	constraints,	we	can	arrive	
at	an	explanation	for	all	of	Variation.		This	is	what	the	Constraint	Variant	View	
attempts	to	do.		I	show	this	next.					
3.3.3	Variation	Explained	
	
	 The	Constraint	Variant	View	holds	that	the	variation	of	imaginative	resistance	
is	due	to	the	constraints,	and	thus	in	order	to	explain	the	variation	one	must	appeal	
to	the	constraints.		One	nice	takeaway	of	the	Constraint	Variant	View	is	that	it	can	
embrace	and	appeal	to	the	strengths	of	the	Contextual	Variant	Views	such	as	the	
Genre	Account.		Thus	the	Constraint	Variant	View	explains	the	first	aspect	of	
Variation—(i)	Interpersonal	Variation	by	appealing	to	genre.		Whether	or	not	
people	experience	resistance	to	a	particular	puzzling	proposition	depends	on	the	
presence	or	absence	of	the	requisite	genre	schemas.			Yet,	unlike	the	Contextual	
Variant	Views,	the	Constraint	Variant	View	can	explain	the	rest	of	the	aspects	of	
Variation.			
	 Consider	(ii)	Cause	Variation.			As	we	saw	above,	the	Genre	Account	cannot	
account	for	all	of	this	aspect	of	Variation	primarily	because	the	causes	of	
imaginative	resistance	are	too	diverse.		Plausibly,	the	Genre	Account	can	explain	
causes	of	resistance	that	are	related	to	genre.		However,	it	is	also	plausible	that	some	
may	experience	resistance	even	if	they	have	the	requisite	genre	schemas.		People	
may	experience	resistance	because	they	have	an	aversion	to	the	content	of	the	
puzzling	proposition.		This	aversion	could	be	due	to	disgust	or	moral	qualms,	and	in	
either	case	such	people	would	not	desire	to	imagine	the	content	of	the	puzzling	
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proposition.		The	resistance	may	also	be	due	to	our	cognitive	architecture	similar	to	
Weinberg	and	Meskin	(2006).		But	notice	that	each	of	these	causes	are	due	to	
constraints,	some	non-architectural	(e.g.,	genre)	and	some	architectural	(e.g.,	
conative	and	affective	mechanisms,	and	so	on).		Because	of	this,	the	Constraint	
Variant	View,	through	appealing	to	any	and	all	of	the	constraints,	will	naturally	be	
able	to	account	for	all	of	(ii)	Cause	Variation.		
	 Now	consider	(iii)	Degree	Variation.		Recall	the	case	above	about	Sally	and	
Jane.		They	both	experience	resistance	to	the	last	sentence	of	Sun	of	the	Second	
Creation—“Reluctantly,	Ixchel	gave	her	baby	to	the	high	priest	to	be	sacrificed”.			But	
they	plausibly	do	not	experience	the	same	degree	of	resistance.		Sally	has	stronger	
moral	beliefs	about	female	infanticide	than	does	Jane.		This	would	contribute	to	a	
much	more	vivid	and	intense	resistance	for	Sally	than	it	would	for	Jane.		Again	
appealing	to	genre	does	not	help	here	because	we	stipulated	that	both	Sally	and	Jane	
have	the	requisite	genre	schema.		In	this	case,	the	degrees	of	resistance	are	the	
result	of	the	different	degrees	of	their	moral	belief	about	female	infanticide	as	well	
as	the	different	degrees	of	their	desires.		Both	Sally	and	Jane	do	not	want	to	imagine	
a	world	where	female	infanticide	is	good.		But	given	the	difference	in	their	degrees	
of	desire,	Sally’s	resistance	will	be	more	vivid.		The	Constraint	Variant	View	will	be	
able	to	explain	the	degrees	of	resistance	by	appealing	to	the	specific	desires	and	
beliefs	of	both	Sally	and	Jane.	
	 Finally	consider	Intrapersonal	Variation—one	person	can	experience	
different	degrees	of	resistance	across	encounters	with	the	same	fiction.		This	aspect	
of	Variation	is	rarely	discussed.		This	is	not	too	surprising.		As	we	have	seen,	older	
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views	treated	imaginative	resistance	as	an	on	or	off	phenomenon.		Later	views	
challenged	this	pointing	out	that	for	any	person	and	for	any	particular	puzzling	
proposition,	whether	or	not	she	experiences	resistance	is	the	wrong	question;	
instead,	we	should	ask	in	what	manner	of	imagining	does	she	experience	resistance.		
And	as	we	have	seen	the	“manner	of	imagining”	is	cashed	out	in	terms	of	contextual	
factors	such	as	genre.		We	have	also	seen	that	appealing	only	to	contextual	factors	is	
not	sufficient	to	account	for	all	four	aspects	of	Variation.		This	could	be	another	
reason	that	there	has	not	been	much	focus	on	what	I	am	calling	intrapersonal	
variation.		By	focusing	on	contextual	factors,	philosophers	did	not	see	just	how	deep	
the	variation	of	resistance	could	go.		The	Constraint	Variant	View	allows	us	to	see	it	
by	broadening	our	view	beyond	contextual	factors.		Thus	the	Constraint	Variant	
View	both	predicts	and	explains	Intrapersonal	Variation.				
	 In	order	to	see	this,	let’s	consider	Sally	again.		Sally	is	experiencing	resistance	
to	the	last	sentence	of	The	Sun	of	the	Second	Creation.		She	is	quite	interested	in	
continuing	to	engage	imaginatively	with	this	narrative.		However,	as	long	as	she	
keeps	experiencing	resistance,	she	will	not	be	able	to	continue	with	this	particular	
narrative	engagement.		Given	that,	according	my	view,	all	constrained	imaginative	
activities	include	the	core	of	supposition,	and	given	that	the	resistance	is	due	to	
constraints,	it	follows	that	Sally	has	a	few	options	with	regards	to	the	resistance.		
What	remains	for	Sally,	then,	is	the	option	of	removing	or	shutting	down	the	
constraints	that	are	causing	the	resistance.		Though	this	will	take	effort,	it	seems	
possible	that	she	can	eventually	get	to	a	place	where	she	is	simply	supposing	the	
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propositions	of	the	story.46		She	will	just	be	holding	the	as-if-true	attitude	without	
constraints	towards	the	propositions	of	the	story,	including	the	puzzling	
propositions.		This	will	count	as	a	minimal	narrative	engagement.		This	minimal	
narrative	engagement	will	be	temporary	until	she	can	begin	filling	in	the	requisite	
genre	schema,	or	find	some	ways	to	temper	her	aversion,	and	so	on.		Once	she	is	
successful	in	this,	she	can	begin	to	engage	in	a	more	robust	manner,	where	the	
disruption	to	being	carried	along	by	the	narrative	would	dissipate	until	it	was	gone.			
	 We	can	illustrate	this	with	talk	of	levels.			For	the	sake	of	illustrative	purposes	
only,	let’s	call	the	core	of	supposition	(the	as-if-true	attitude	without	constraints)	
the	base	level.		And	for	all	of	the	higher	levels,	we	will	just	assign	a	number.		These	
will	represent	the	as-if-true	attitude	under	constraints.		Let’s	arbitrarily	assign	the	
level	of	imagining	where	one	is	being	carried	along	by	a	narrative,	level	5.		Level	5	
represents	a	robust	level	of	imagining	having	many	constraints	activated.		Level	4	
then	would	represent	fewer	constraints	than	level	5;	level	3	even	less	than	level	4	
and	so	on	until	we	reach	the	base	level.		To	see	how	this	works,	first	consider	a	case	
of	constrained	imagining	that	is	not	resistance.		Suppose	that	you	are	prompted	to	
imagine	a	round-square	tower.		You	likely	could	comply,	but	only	at	the	base	level.		
Now	suppose	that	level	1	includes	the	imagery	mechanism.		If	this	is	the	case,	then	
you	would	not	be	able	to	comply	with	a	level	1	imagining.			
                                                
46	This	might	sound	strangely	familiar	to	the	objection	I	raised	in	chapter	one	against	one-nature	
views	(i.e.,	that	they	imply	that	supposition	takes	effort	due	to	the	fact	that	one	has	shut	down	or	turn	
off	various	mechanisms).		There	is	a	significant	difference,	however.		The	objection	against	one-
nature	views	is	that	any	act	of	supposition	takes	effort.		This	is	problematic.		The	fact	that	when	one	
is	engaged	in	an	imaginative	project,	it	takes	effort	or	time	to	turn	off	mechanisms	is	not	a	problem	
on	my	view.		This	is	a	phenomenon	that	many	of	us	have	experienced.		Think	about	the	times	when	
you	have	finished	a	novel	or	a	movie	and	you	still	find	yourself	with	anxiety,	or	sadness,	or	joy	that	
the	story	has	caused	within	you.	 
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	 Next,	consider	a	case	of	imaginative	resistance.		Suppose	you	are	engaging	a	
novel	and	you	are	being	moved	in	powerful	ways	by	the	story.		You	experience	
desires,	affections,	and	imagery	that	are	coloring	your	imaginative	engagement.		
Presumably,	your	are	engaged	at	a	higher	level	of	imagining,	say	level	4.		You	then	
come	across	a	puzzling	proposition	that	invites	you	to	imagine	a	content	as	true	that	
you	do	not	desire	to	imagine.		What	this	illustrates	is	that	in	order	to	continue	
imagining,	even	minimally,	may	require	you	to	drop	down	a	level	by	removing	or	
temporarily	putting	on	hold	certain	constraints.			
	 In	order	to	see	how	this	might	work,	consider	again	Sally.		She	is	
experiencing	resistance	while	attempting	to	engage	at	a	level	5	imagining.		She	can	
attempt	to	drop	down	a	level	and	determine	whether	the	resistance	remains.		If	at	
level	4	she	does	not	experience	resistance,	then	she	can	continue	with	the	narrative.		
If	she	does	experience	resistance,	then	she	drops	down	to	level	3	and	determines	
whether	or	not	she	is	still	experiencing	resistance.		Naturally,	she	can	continue	this	if	
need	be	all	the	way	to	the	base	level,	where	there	would	be	no	constraints	to	cause	
any	resistance.	
	 This	illustrates	how	one	person	can	experience	differing	degrees	of	
resistance	across	encounters	with	one	fiction.		It	also	shows	clearly	that	the	
variation	would	be	due	to	varying	constraints.		As	a	result,	my	view	of	imagining	
shows	us	how	we	can	expect	Intrapersonal	Variation,	and	it	shows	us	how	the	
Constraint	Variant	View	offers	a	way	of	explaining	it.				
	 This	completes	my	argument.		Earlier	views	of	imaginative	resistance	either	
did	not	have	the	resources	to	explain	Variation	(e.g.,	cantian	views),	or	they	did	not	
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exploit	those	resources	(e.g.,	wontian	views).		Contextual	Variant	Views	can	explain	
some	of	the	four	aspects	of	Variation.	Out	of	the	AIT	view	of	imagining	comes	the	
Constraint	Variant	View.		By	appealing	to	the	constraints,	the	Constraint	Variant	View	
can	account	of	all	of	Variation.		Seeing	what	the	AIT	view	does	for	the	phenomenon	
of	imaginative	resistance	offers	at	least	one	more	reason	to	think	that	it	is	true.		
Thus,	again	in	a	slogan,	all	imagining	is	a	kind	of	supposing.								
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